# 1ac – Cognitive Warfare

#### Inherency – NATO guidelines for combating disinformation remain placed on the backburner to national-level response and relies on E.U. rapid response infrastructure.

Chlon 2022 [Amb. Tomasz Chłoń Ambassador of Poland to Estonia (2005-2010) and to Slovakia (2013-2015) Director of NATO Information Office Moscow (2017-2020) “NATO and Countering Disinformation: The Need for a More Proactive Approach from the Member States” GlobeSec https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NATO-and-Countering-Disinformation-ver1-spreads.pdf]

Tackling disinformation remains an essential part of NATO’s communication strategies and day-to-day operations, which includes media monitoring, analysis of the information space and proactive communication in a coordinated and fact-based manner. Its goal is to inoculate or “pre-bunk” the mediasphere rather than debunk each false claim, i.a. through “Setting the Record Straight” narratives and activities which counter the Kremlin’s myths about NATO. In 2019, NATO adopted an updated and systematic package of appropriate objectives and measures to combat disinformation. The following year, NATO’s Response to Disinformation on COVID-19 became realised in an Action Plan issued to Allies by the Secretary General. This document sought to bring together multiple strands of work on countering hostile disinformation surrounding COVID-19. In 2021, NATO’s Toolbox for Countering Hostile Information Activities was created; it reflects the Alliance’s twin-track model to respond to hostile information activities: “understand” and “engage”, underpinned by “coordination”. The document aims to provide Allies with a toolbox to assess hostile information activities, including disinformation, and to assist in determining possible courses of action. Furthermore, NATO IS staff holds biweekly briefings on Russian and other disinformation activities at various relevant committees. Within the Civil Emergency Planning Committee, as part of a long-term effort, and covering resilience baselines – spanning across many domains including communications – Allies share information about how prepared they are to face various key civil security challenges, including disinformation. The organisation supports member and partner states by providing guidance as well as co-financing for social and scientific projects that strengthen their resilience to disinformation. **Rapid-reaction teams have been made available to member states as part of NATO’s strategy to fight hybrid threats. The organisation is also cooperating more closely with the European Union to ensure that NATO benefits from the EU’s Rapid Alert System set up to counter disinformation. At the same time, the West has yet to prepare a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated response to Russian disinformation.** **It is up to nations to fully utilise NATO’s potential. A response practice has been developed and seen partial success within some states and Euro-Atlantic institutions, but it has not yet been translated into a real common policy or strategy. At national levels, political declarations and agreed action plans are still not fully implemented in too many instances.** Western states approach disinformation in varied ways due to differences in history, regional security, wealth, education, media quality, political and legal culture and – most importantly – the current state of their relations with Russia. As a rule, some states prefer bilateral approaches that safeguard national prerogatives. This may change now following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the challenge of disinformation has begun to attract higher political attention. In the European Union, this has transpired through the adoption of the European Democracy Action Plan4 and the presentation of new regulations on digital services in December 2020. These regulations aim to address the core issue of the business model developed by disinformation organisers who instrumentalise social media platforms. The report by the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU, including Disinformation (INGE), has also promised that other means of influence will be addressed5 . In an effort to combat disinformation, the Digital Services Act (DSA)6 is a breakthrough legal instrument that will fundamentally change the rules of the game for the information environment in the European Union, member states and partner countries; it will also have an impact on national approaches worldwide.7 The DSA will impose numerous legal obligations on operators of online platforms that are more demanding than the previous voluntary commitments outlined in the Code of Practice for Fighting Disinformation. Companies will be obliged to cooperate with independent researchers and allow them to access their data. They will also participate in complaint and appeal procedures regarding content moderation and dispute resolution. The DSA will provide for the companies’ obligatory consultations, including with civil society organisations. It will also introduce the institution of trusted whistle blowers, who, among other things, will notify the companies about suspected crimes online. The act will correspondingly establish a European Digital Services Council and advisory body made up of national digital service coordinators responsible for implementing legislation at the national level. It will impose specific additional duties on exceptionally large online platforms with more than fortyfive million users per month. These obligations will include assessing systemic risks resulting from their services, identifying actions to reduce such risks, conducting independent audits, setting appropriate conditions for algorithmic recommendations of user content and ensuring additional transparency in advertising (including political ads). Among international organisations and institutions, the European Union plays a leading role in counteracting disinformation and introducing new effective measures against it. The future regulations on transparency in financing political parties and election campaigns gives hope for limiting corruption and external influence in the affairs of the member states.8 NATO and the EU share similar membership compositions and were created based on comparable value systems, so it is reasonable to assume that counteracting disinformation will be more prominently reflected in NATO’s new Strategic Concept. A need for this has been suggested by the authors of the NATO2030 expert group report prepared ahead of the Madrid Summit in June 20229 . As a result, countering disinformation could be given a more visible place on the agenda of NATO ministerial meetings and summits, and more proposals with clear commitments by member states to tackle disinformation may be unveiled. NATO also has the opportunity to strengthen the mandates of existing committees to better coordinate national efforts.

#### Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the areas of biotechnology and artificial intelligence by proposing the designation of the cognitive domain as an operational arena, establishment of a counter-political warfare directorate with an Article 2 mission to coordinate anti-disinformation efforts among NATO member states, and establishment of an alliance-wide disinformation Rapid Response Unit.

## Advantage 1: 2024

#### US is outdated in terms of warfare. We refuse to innovate from Cold War era strategies.

**Holshek, ‘22**,[Retired Colonel Christopher Holshek is vice president for military affairs of the Civil Affairs Association, where he organizes the annual CA Symposium and Roundtable and edits the Civil Affairs Issue Papers. He is also a senior civil-military adviser at Narrative Strategies, LLC, the International Preparedness Associates’ Global Strategy Group, and the NATO ResilientCivilians project.] "The Army Is Not Ready to Win Without Fighting," Modern War Institute, <https://mwi.usma.edu/the-army-is-not-ready-to-win-without-fighting/--> AL

For all its talk of great power competition, **the US military**—and the Army in particular—remains poorly structured to help the United States maintain a decisive advantage in contemporary strategic competition. This is largely because it **still subscribes to a now** outdated understanding of warfare**.** Losing to a materially inferior nonstate adversary like the Taliban is one thing, but the Army, as the joint force’s premier capability for strategic competition on land and in the human domain, is not able to help the United States “win without fighting,” as Sun Tzu put it, against the likes of Russia and China. To contend with the unique challenges of strategic competition, the Army needs to think beyond doctrinal updates, techno-centric silver bullets, and operational quick fixes—it must fundamentally change its strategic and organizational culture. **Rather than emphasizing geographic key terrain, the Army needs to recognize that traditional centers of gravity have shifted from the power of states and militaries to the** perceptions of populations**; i**t has to focus on what Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales described nearly two decades ago as “**capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground.” As the war in Ukraine is reaffirming, war, which is as much about people as politics, is above all a contest of wills**. Ultimately, how well the Army learns from its recent defeats, as well as from its partners in places like Ukraine, will determine how well it performs in the “infinite game” of strategic competition. The American Way of War is Outdated Today, the Army remains fixated on major combat operations and deterring conventional threats as its organizational identity. This imbalance reflects a limited understanding of competition, if not of modern war itself—an undervaluing of psychological factors compared to physical ones, disregarding Napoleon’s dictum that in war moral factors far outweigh the material. The central problem is that the United States remains heavily invested in a twentieth-century way of war involving overwhelming force, firepower, and technological superiority. This core playbook has remained unchanged since World War II. Despite its first major strategic failure in Vietnam, the United States again pursued a strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan that tried to repurpose forces designed for short, sharp, force-on-force battles for protracted, people-centric, irregular warfare and stabilization, with similarly disappointing results**. The US military**, in the words of irregular warfare expert David Kilcullen, has been “excellent at high-end technical combat but massively suck[s] at translating battlefield success into successful outcomes **outside the narrow, technological definition of warfare.” As a result, it “flounders in the human domain of conflict,” and its “failure to engage with the building blocks of humanity—culture, society, politics, economics, and religion—leaves our strategies and plans untethered to reality.”** For decades now, the way to beat the Americans has been an open secret—go asymmetric, irregular, and indirect. Attacking this US Achilles’ heel subverts both the material and moral advantages the United States would otherwise enjoy across the competition continuum. The United States may not like winning without fighting, but it has also been fighting without winning, repeatedly failing to achieve political and strategic outcomes while winning battles and firefights on the ground. The military’s demonstrated inability to “fight and win the nation’s wars” has produced what the Quincy Institute’s Andrew Bacevich calls a “yawning gap” between its reputation and its actual performance. Its failure to win on the ground has called into question its ability to maintain the confidence of allies as well as deter adversaries. Many have surmised that the debacle in Afghanistan emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine, as China and Russia open a new “Great Game” against the West. The Army’s cut-and-paste application of Cold War–era conventional-force deterrence theory in its concept of competition doesn’t help matters, either. “Traditional deterrence no longer works,” observes Sean McFate, author of The New Rules of War, because US adversaries “wage war but disguise it as peace.” In complex strategic competition, deterrence works more subtly, situationally, and regionally—and relies more on economic than military power. Besides, as the Royal United Services Institute’s Peter Roberts has pointed out, “what deters the Kremlin doesn’t necessarily deter Tehran.” This implies even more of a premium on geostrategic and cultural understanding, which must exist long before a crisis breaks out. Understanding the geostrategic, sociocultural, and historical context for the war in Ukraine, for example, with its implications for runaway escalation between nuclear-armed powers, is even more critical than it was in Iraq or Afghanistan.

#### Russia has shifted the paradigm of 21st century warfare by information operations that have targeted American elections in the past and threaten future elections.

**Backes** **&** **Swab**, **‘19**,[Olives Backes is a Misinformation-focused Project Manager @ Meta. Andrew swab worked at the U.S. Department of State on embassy security policy, in journalism for PBS NewsHour, and on Capitol Hill. He also worked as a research assistant at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he contributed work of the to the Korea Project led by Professor John Park, and published an analytical report with Harvard Law School on the classified U.S. defense and intelligence budget.] "Cognitive Warfare: The Russian Threat to Election Integrity in the Baltic States," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cognitive-warfare-russian-threat-election-integrity-baltic-states--> AL

Recent years have seen a cascade of revelations regarding Russian attempts to interfere with or disrupt elections in the West. While the Russian government’s influence campaign in the 2016 US presidential election is the most well-known, it was by no means an isolated incident. **Western governments are waking up the threat that Russian** cyber and **information operations pose to the integrity of their elections** and the stability of their domestic politics. However, the question of how to counter these efforts remains unanswered. The goal of this report is to offer an answer to two questions: How do we understand the Russian threat to election integrity? What can governments do to counter such efforts or mitigate their impact? Our specific focus is on Russian election interference efforts in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which have a long history dealing with and responding to Russian political interference. By studying the mechanisms through which Russia seeks to undermine domestic political processes in the Baltic states, we can better understand the threat that Russia poses. And by analyzing the policies that the Baltic governments have implemented over the last three decades, we can better assess the effectiveness of countermeasures and determine how Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and their Western allies should counter election interference in the future. The current Western discourse emphasizes two vectors of malign Russian interference in elections. The first is the cyber vector, through which Russia uses cyber capabilities to compromise sensitive election systems (and other government networks) with the goal of affecting the election outcome. The second is the information vector, through which Russia injects disinformation, propaganda, and leaked or stolen documents into the domestic political discourse in order to inflame divisions within a society, undermine its politics and institutions, and affect the election outcome. Russian strategy emphasizes the information vector over the cyber vector. Russia primarily interferes in the democratic processes of the Baltic states using information means, with cyber playing a secondary, enabling role. The Kremlin considers disinformation and information operations to be the most effective means of affecting political outcomes in other countries. Russia seizes on existing domestic political, social, or ethnic divisions and instrumentalizes them to change how voters think – and through that how they vote. We have termed this strategy “cognitive warfare” – altering through information means how a target population thinks, and through that, how they act. Russia has employed a cognitive warfare strategy in the Baltic states for years. Russian has pushed, through traditional and social media, narratives designed to divide ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers from the rest of the society, undermine domestic political stability, and break the Baltic commitment to the EU and NATO. Russia’s cognitive warfare efforts have not always met with success or improved the electoral results of pro-Russian political forces; however, the strategy has been consistent since the Baltic states regained their independence in the early 1990s. At present, **the threat that cognitive warfare operations pose to election integrity is greater than the threat posed by Russian cyber capabilities. We assess a low level of risk to the scenario in which Russia successfully, undetectably compromises election systems and alters an election outcome in the Baltic states.** That is not to say the governments of the Baltic states do not – or should not – emphasize cybersecurity countermeasures. On the contrary, all three Baltic governments have rightly developed robust cybersecurity protections for their election systems and implemented monitoring or post-election auditing procedures to protect against foreign compromise. In our view, the most significant cyber risk to election integrity derives from inadequate cybersecurity protections put into place by other politically-relevant actors, particularly political campaigns, political parties, and media. Russian hackers regularly target these organizations, stealing sensitive, private information that the Kremlin later integrates into interference and influence campaigns in the Baltic states. Rather than posing a direct threat to election systems, Russian cyber actors more often work to enable later information operations. What should governments do? We assess that the approaches taken by the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian governments to counteract and mitigate the impact of Russian interference efforts are sound and should continue. Responding to a cognitive warfare strategy is not merely a technical problem – it is a society-wide information challenge, requiring more than simply debunking fake news or removing fake accounts on Facebook or Twitter. We recommend that these governments build upon their efforts in several areas: Expand investments in election cybersecurity; Provide additional resources to working groups on election security and disinformation; Exercise and stress-test election-related contingency plans; Deepen sharing of intelligence, best practices, and lessons learned with allies; Invest in the monitoring of disinformation and explore regulatory approaches; Expand integration policies targeting Russian minority populations; and Craft and promote compelling, unifying national narratives. We believe that adopting this set of recommendations will enhance the effectiveness of the Baltic governments in responding to Russian interference in the short-term and promote greater societal resilience to cognitive warfare campaigns over the long-term. Other Western governments can learn from the experience of the Baltic states as well. If the experiences of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are a guide – and we believe that they are – it is Russia’s cognitive warfare strategy and information operations, not cyber threats, that pose the greater threat to election integrity on both sides of the Atlantic. The Kremlin’s goal is to undermine Western elections by interfering with the minds of voters, not our digital voting systems. Simply improving the security of those systems will not be sufficient to meet this threat. Russia weaponizes our domestic political, social, and cultural divisions, turning them against us and using them to undermine the integrity of our electoral processes. Western governments should also be clear-eyed in recognizing that mitigating the impact of Russian political interference campaigns is a long-term problem. This is the work of decades, not years. Russian interference is not a problem that can be easily solved; instead, Western governments will have to manage it for years to come. Just as cognitive warfare relies on our domestic vulnerabilities to function, so too will the Russian threat to election integrity not be fully mitigated as long as those vulnerabilities persist

#### Russia will ramp up efforts to derail U.S. elections as part of the Ukrainian crisis.

Wilde and Sherman, 3/17/22. Gavin Wilde is a nonresident fellow at Defense Priorities and a former director for Russia, Baltic, and Caucasus affairs at the National Security Council. Justin is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative. "Ukraine Offers Lessons for Russia’s 2024 Election Interference," [https://www.cfr.org/blog/ukraineofferslessonsrussias2024electioninterference](https://www.cfr.org/blog/ukraine-offers-lessons-russias-2024-election-interference) //JSAM

Vladimir Putin’s illegal, aggressive, largescale war on Ukraine is a horrific reminder of his deep-seated desire to attack and control the country. The Russian government has been fixated on reasserting control of Ukraine since the 2014 Maidan Revolution, when Ukrainians took to the streets to oust Kremlin-friendly dictator Viktor Yanukovych.

Yet this has also been an overlooked theme of Russian election interference in the United States, as the authors detail in a new issue brief for the Atlantic Council. For all the media attention on the domestic political dimensions, the Kremlin’s interference in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections (and the 2018 midterms) included a significant focus on shaping U.S. policy toward Ukraine. As Putin indicates that he is more willing than ever to use violence to control Kyiv, American policymakers must prepare now for this influence effort to reemerge in 2024.

In 2014, Ukrainian citizens organized and mobilized in protest against the Yanukovych regime, and they used internet technologies to aid in those efforts—including a EuroMaidan Facebook page and popular Twitter accounts @EuroMaydan and @EuroMaydan\_eng (the English-language version). Putin already viewed opposition movements as illegitimate, instead believing they must be covertly orchestrated by foreign powers, and this belief had been hardened by the “color revolutions” that swept former Soviet republics in the early 2000s. Hence, when Ukrainians mobilized in 2014, including with the use of Western social media platforms, the Kremlin saw foreign efforts to undermine its control of Ukraine.

**Moscow’s burgeoning online disinformation efforts—initially focused on delegitimizing Russian oppositionists**—turned their sights on the post-revolution government in Kyiv. The **Russian security** services created illegitimate “news” outlets to **smear newly elected Ukrainian president** Petro Poroshenko and his administration, **as well as the Barack Obama administration** supporting them—foremost, then Vice President Joseph Biden. For instance, a website called “South Front,” later revealed to be a front for the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), ran an opinion article alleging that “the CIA had its hands all over” the Maidan Revolution. Ukraine served as a proving ground for tactics Russian intelligence agencies would eventually deploy to influence elections in the United States.

During the 2016 and 2020 elections, Ukraine was a key theme of Russia’s interference activities. Numerous Kremlin operatives had ties to Ukraine or to past Russian interference in Ukraine, such as Andriy Derkach, a Ukrainian parliamentarian, Russian intelligence agency academy graduate, and son of Ukraine’s onetime intelligence chief. Derkach took direction from the Kremlin to offer manipulated “evidence” of corruption between then Vice President Biden and Ukrainian President Poroshenko. In that vein, some of the disinformation propagated by Russia’s proxy and patronage network fabricated ideas of U.S.-Ukraine corruption. Even though Derkach and his circle were sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department and exposed for these activities—and despite Ukrainian authorities debunking these claims—members of Congress and President Trump himself parroted these narratives.

American policymakers should prepare now for the likelihood that Moscow’s interference in the 2024 U.S. election will have a considerable focus on Ukraine. The specifics depend on the next several months, but the Kremlin will attempt to exploit the situation no matter the outcome; it will likely be a part of the U.S. election debate.

To prepare for 2024, Congress and the executive branch must implement the legislative and regulatory reforms recommended in the Senate review of 2016 election interference, endorsed on a bipartisan basis. As it wrote, “Unclear laws regarding foreign advocacy, flawed assumptions about what intelligence activity looks like…and the freedom of expression at the root of our democratic society became an opportunity for Russian influence to hide in plain sight.” **Congress should update legislation on foreign espionage, agents, and lobbying**—most of which is rooted in Cold Warera thinking—**to pre-posture for 2024**. In tandem, the **U.S. intelligence community should update its cyber and intelligence tradecraft to account for increased Kremlin use** of dark money, obscure financial webs, money laundering, and proxy groups.

#### 2024 election will be a disaster following 2020 election crisis – election deniers have gained a foothold in secretaries of state offices.

Michael Waldman, 2/1/2022. Michael Waldman is president of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law. Waldman was director of speechwriting for President Bill Clinton from 1995 to 1999, serving as assistant to the president. He was responsible for writing or editing nearly two thousand speeches, including four State of the Union and two inaugural addresses. He was special assistant to the president for policy coordination from 1993 to 1995. "How Bad Could the 2024 Election Be?" Brennan Center for Justice, <https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysisopinion/howbadcould2024electionbe> //JSAM

Some­times, like a Shakespeare anti­hero confiding in the audience, Donald Trump blurts out his true motives. This week he did it again. Lawmakers who want to tweak the Electoral Count Act, accord­ing to Trump, are essen­tially admit­ting that “Mike Pence did have the right to change the outcome. And they now want to take that right away. Unfortunately, he didn’t exer­cise that power. He could have overturned the election!”

All this came after Trump told a Texas rally that prosecutors investigating him are “racist” and urged supporters to stage massive, menacing protests in the cities where he faces legal action.

In a Q&A for Sunday’s Washington Post, Jennifer Rubin asked me for the worst-case scenario for the 2024 election. The truth is that as bad as 2020 was, it could be worse next time around. Trump’s coup try was clownish, incompetent, chaotic. (Remem­ber the Four Seasons Total Landscaping? Or hair dye mixed with flop sweat pour­ing down Rudy Giuliani’s face?) Since then, the **professionals have taken over**. State legislatures dominated by proponents of the Big Lie have laid the legal found­a­tion for a genu­ine constitutional crisis in 2024.

How could it happen?

**Election deniers are running for secretary of state or attorney** general in many states. The central argument for their candidacy is that **they would not have certified the 2020 election results**, as required by law, after voters chose Joe Biden. If elected, they **would** not hesitate to try to **block certification in 2024**. Some are seeking jobs as elections administrators, where they could use their authority to tilt turnout. They **could**, for example, selectively **reject provisional ballots from communities of color.**

Separately, lawmakers are scheming for the power to nullify elections. Some believe (bizarrely) that the Constitution itself gives them the power to reject elec­tion results. In seven states, legislators have proposed bills to form­ally give them­selves that authority. Fortunately none has passed, and, under any reasonable reading of the Constitution, those bills would be unconstitutional. But this disregard for constitutional norms is alarming and dangerous.

The **smallest tech­nical dispute could trigger a nullification attempt.** In 2020, some Wisconsin legislators argued that the results were invalid because elec­tions offi­cials offered mail-in ballots to residents of nursing homes without first visit­ing the facilities, as required by statute. (Of course, the pandemic made such visits impossible.) A similar technical legal violation could **serve as a pretext for a state official to reject future results.**

And new laws in Arkansas and Georgia recently gave state authorities the power to remove and tempor­ar­ily replace local elec­tion offi­cials. They could, for example, remove elec­tion offi­cials in Fulton County, Geor­gia, on a pretext, install their own candid­ate, and throw out ballots in the Atlanta area.

Would the Supreme Court step in to protect the sanc­tity of our elec­tions? The Court declared most recently in 2020 that once a state legis­lature has decided that voters choose the president, it cannot step in and undo their votes. That’s encour­aging. But in the last decade, the justices have refused to strike down even a single restrict­ive voting law. I would prefer not to test their commit­ment to voting rights in a crisis.

Fixing the Electoral Count Act — a good idea — would not stop these mach­in­a­tions in the states. Far more import­ant would be clear national stand­ards on things such as vote by mail and when ballots must be coun­ted. The Free­dom to Vote: John Lewis Act is the most import­ant step to stop election subversion of all kinds.

**For the first time, a national leader argues that our demo­cracy is fake.** Over a year after the elec­tion, **70 percent of Repub­lic­ans think Trump really won.** That’s new and scary. But some­thing else — some­thing more encouraging — is also happening. A democracy movement, galvanized by Trump’s lies, mobil­ized around the campaign for federal legis­la­tion. It’s the biggest push for voting rights in half a century — a coali­tion of breadth, diversity, and depth. Perhaps the story of **the next two years will be** **the rising righteous anger of this movement fight­ing for democracy.**

#### And widespread perception of a Trump victory causes U.S. civil war.

Alia Shoaib, 12-19-2021, "Retired US army generals warn of insurrection or civil war in 2024 if rogue military units pledge loyalty to a 'Trumpian' loser," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/retired-army-generals-insurrection-or-civil-war-2024-wapo-2021-12

Three **retired US army generals warned of an insurrection or even civil war if the results of the 2024 presidential election were not accepted by some in the military.**

Former Major Gen. Paul Eaton, former Major Gen. Antonio Taguba, and former Brig. Gen. Steven Anderson made the warnings in an op-ed in [The Washington Post](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/12/17/eaton-taguba-anderson-generals-military/) on Friday.

They wrote that **they were "increasingly concerned" about the 2024 election and the "potential for lethal chaos inside our military**." The generals highlighted the "disturbing number" of veterans and active-duty members of the military that took part in the January 6 attack on the Capitol by Trump supporters – more than 1 in 10 of those charged had a service record. They outlined **a possible situation in which, after the 2024 election, some service members might pledge loyalty to a "Trumpian loser" who refuses to concede defeat and tries to lead a shadow government. "Under such a scenario, it is not outlandish to say a military breakdown could lead to civil war,"** they wrote. Since the last election, the generals warned that even more turmoil and division had emerged in the armed forces. **They pointed to recent resistance within the military towards federal vaccine mandates,** such as a refusal to comply led by the commander of the [Oklahoma National Guard, Brig. Gen. Thomas Mancino.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2021/11/17/vaccine-mandate-oklahoma-national-guard/) Mancino claimed that while the Oklahoma Guard is not federally mobilized, their commander in chief is the Republican governor of the state and not the president. The generals wrote that they fear if 2024 is a contested election that splits loyalties, there is the "potential for a total breakdown of the chain of command along partisan lines." "The idea of rogue units organizing among themselves to support the 'rightful' commander in chief cannot be dismissed," they said. The generals urged that everything must be done to prevent another insurrection, including holding leaders who inspired the last one to be held to account. They said there was also work to be done by the military, such as reviewing how to deal with illegal orders and undertaking intelligence work to identify and remove potential mutineers.  The military should also work to identify how misinformation spreads in the ranks. The generals also suggested that the Defense Department "war-game" possible post-election scenarios to identify weak spots and put in place "safeguards."

## Advantage 2: Ukraine scenario - Sanctions

#### U.S. relations with Latin America stable now, but Russia has linked the region to its Ukraine strategy.

Don Gonyea, 2-20-2022 "Russia has been showing diplomatic interest in Latin American countries," NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2022/02/20/1082012392/russia-has-been-showing-diplomatic-interest-in-latin-american-countries

DON GONYEA, HOST:

Russia's attention hasn't just been on Ukraine lately. It's been making diplomatic overtures to countries like Nicaragua, Venezuela, Cuba, Brazil and Argentina. And last month, a top Russian diplomat said they wouldn't rule out sending military assets to Cuba or Venezuela, a comment the U.S. State Department dismissed as bluster. Joining us now to talk about Russia's involvement in America's neighborhood is Vladimir Rouvinski, a professor of politics and international relations at Universidad Icesi in Colombia. Professor, thanks for being here.

VLADIMIR ROUVINSKI: Thank you very much for this invitation.

GONYEA: OK, so Russian President Vladimir Putin has made highly visible diplomatic overtures to various leaders in Latin America. But I understand there's also been a huge disinformation campaign aimed at Spanish speakers. Can you explain that?

ROUVINSKI: Yes. First of all, RT in Spanish, which is Russia's government-sponsored TV channel, extended its presence everywhere in Latin America. I mean, literally, if you go to one or another Latin American countries and you turn on TV, you will see RT in Spanish broadcasting to you directly from Moscow. They have the presence everywhere in Latin America. They have presence in Caribbean, as well. But it's also a high presence on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, which is especially important now because Russians are telling a lot of things that are not true, and they expose Latin Americans to this information.

GONYEA: **Some of the countries that Russia is trying to engage more with have complicated relationships with the U.S. But others, like Brazil and Argentina, have historically had much closer ties to the U.S. So what does Russia stand to gain in places like that**?

ROUVINSKI: This is a very interesting development, and I think it has to do, on the one hand, with the fact that Latin Americans here are concerned about what is happening on the international arena. **The United States sort of diminished its presence in Latin America, and it seems that Latin America is no more important for the United States. So when some of Latin American leaders, like Brazilian President Bolsonaro or Argentinean President Fernandez, pay a visit to Vladimir Putin, they try to send a message to Washington saying, look.** We are still here. We are important. So please pay attention to us.

GONYEA: The Cold War is over, but it does seem like we've been here before. In the era of the Soviet Union. The Soviets were very involved in Central America, and then there was that thing known as the Cuban Missile Crisis when? John F. Kennedy was in office. Is this an echo of that? Or is this significantly different in many ways?

ROUVINSKI: It is different for several reasons. First of all, Russia today is not the Soviet Union. Today's Russia is much more weaker in terms of the economy. So they are not prepared to build the same type of relations like they used to have, for example, with Cuba because Cuba survived because the Soviet Union was actually supplying all the aid, all the financing and actually managed the Cuban economy. It was 100% satellite of the Soviet Union. Today, Russia is not prepared to do this. So if **Putin will try to expand its aid - tangible aids to the regimes like Venezuela, Nicaragua or Cuba, it means that Russia perhaps will be facing additional problems to its economy, and people will not be happy. So what Putin is doing instead is making these really strong statements about potential possibilities for Russia to expand its presence in Latin America**. But I don't see, really, any significant tangible actions in that sense. So this is very different from the Cold War time.

GONYEA: I wonder if you could help us understand how this Russian strategy in Latin America fits into its broader geopolitical ambitions more generally.

ROUVINSKI: **For Vladimir Putin and the Russian elites - because it's not only Vladimir Putin, but there are a lot of people in Russia do share the same vision. They believe that the world should be divided into spheres of influence**. And for Russia, they say it's kind of natural that Ukraine, Belarus and even Central Asian republics should belong to the Russian sphere of influence, which in practical terms mean that if someone like the United States want to establish some independent policy towards Ukraine or Belarus, they should first consult Vladimir Putin and ask him for permission. Very similarly, they view Latin America still as the United States' sphere of influence. And they say, well, if you do something in Ukraine, then we go to Latin America, and we will show you that we also can do something in your sphere of influence.

#### And Russian disinformation campaigns in Latin America are aimed toward building support for the Ukraine War.

David Klepper, 4-1-2022, "Russia aims Ukraine disinformation at Spanish speakers," AP NEWS, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-ap-top-news-facebook-europe-media-fb3758a9a11182558976a3a4f3b121dd

Washington (AP) — Though Russia is the country that invaded its neighbor Ukraine, the Kremlin’s version relentlessly warns social media users across Latin America that the U.S. is the bigger problem. “Never forget who is the real threat to the world,” reads a headline, translated here from Spanish. The article, originally posted in late February on Twitter by RT en Español, is intended for an audience half a world away from the fighting in Kyiv and Mariupol. **As that war rages, Russia is launching falsehoods into the feeds of Spanish-**speaking social media users in nations that already have long records of distrusting the U.S. The aim is to gain support in those countries for the Kremlin’s war and stoke opposition against America’s response. **Though many of the claims have been discredited, they’re spreading widely in Latin America and helping to make Kremlin-controlled outlets some of the top Spanish-language sources for information about the war.** Russian outlet RT en Español is now the third most shared site on Twitter for Spanish-language information about Russia’s invasion. “RT’s success should be concerning to anyone worried about the success of democracy,” said Samuel Woolley, a University of Texas professor who researches disinformation. “**RT is geared toward authoritarian control and, depending on the context, nationalism and xenophobia. What we risk is Russia gaining control of an increasingly large market share of eyeballs.” U.S.-based tech companies have tried to rein in Russian outlets’ ability to spread propaganda following the invasion, by banning apps linked to the outlets, demoting the content and labeling state-run media outlets**. The European Union has banned RT and Russian state-owned Sputnik, **Yet the content thrives on Spanish-language websites, message boards and social media pages. While Russia also creates propaganda in languages including English, Arabic, French and** German, it’s found particular success with Spanish-speaking users, according to recent research by Esteban Ponce de Leon, a Bogota, Colombia-based analyst with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, a Washington think tank that receives funding from the U.S. and other governments. Russia’s discredited claims about Ukraine and the U.S. include allegations that the invasion was necessary to confront neo-Nazis, or that the U.S. has secretly backed biological warfare research in Ukraine. In fact, the U.S. has long publicly provided funding for biological labs in Ukraine that research pathogens with the hope of curbing dangerous disease outbreaks. That type of disinformation can easily flow from Latin America into other countries — including the U.S. — that have large Spanish-speaking communities. Sometimes it’s passed between relatives who might be sharing the claims across continents with one another. It’s another potential entry point for Russia, and a reminder of the sophistication of the Russians’ efforts. ’There’s different avenues where RT is actively engaging communities across Latin America and the United States,” said Jacobo Licona, a researcher at the Democratic firm, Equis Labs. “That’s part of the reason RT has been so effective, they’ve been building this network or community ahead of time.” As one of the world’s most-spoken languages, Spanish is of obvious interest to any government or organization intent on shaping global public opinion. But Russia’s focus on the Spanish language goes further, reflecting the historic and strategic importance of Central and South America during the Cold War, said analyst Ponce de Leon of the Atlantic Council. For decades, the Soviet Union sought to exploit historic tensions between the U.S. and Latin America by supporting communist factions and larger allies including Cuba. Russia has sought to portray the U.S. as a colonizing empire, even as the Kremlin has worked to strengthen its own ties to the hemisphere.

#### **Russian efforts to gain Latin American support directly trades off with American soft power and opens the possibility for Russian military bases.**

Gurganus ’18 (Julia Gurganus, Julia Gurganus was a nonresident scholar with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focus is on trends in Russian foreign policy and Russia-U.S. relations., “Russia: Playing a Geopolitical Game in Latin America”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace”, 05/03/18, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228>)

Although Russia’s efforts to engage Latin America are largely overshadowed by the U.S. and Chinese presence, Moscow’s propaganda outlets are working to stoke anti-U.S. sentiment and support populist figures in upcoming elections. Moscow is also using its military and commercial ties to establish a meaningful presence, and thus enhance its image as a global power. As Russia-U.S. relations continue to deteriorate, Russia will likely turn to the Western Hemisphere as an important symbol of its global reach and to challenge the United States. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela are poised to serve as the cornerstones of this effort but do not on their own provide enough critical mass to allow Moscow to shape the region’s overall direction. Moscow’s reach in Latin America is limited by its modest resources. Russian military deployments there are costly and complicated, and Moscow lacks the financial resources to meet Latin America’s need for foreign investment or to serve as an important market for exports. Yet Moscow has been adept at promoting its presence at a low cost, and it can sustain this approach for a long time. When combined with China’s growing role in Latin America, this puts U.S. leadership and dominance at risk. Over time, Washington faces the prospect of losing ground with important economic and political allies. In the political realm, Russia is looking to draw on its ties with countries in the region to promote its international agenda. Over the past ten years, it has received political support from a handful of countries—Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—across a host of issues important to Russia, such as Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine. Bolivia’s Morales tweeted upon Putin’s reelection that it “guarantees geopolitical equilibrium and world peace before the onslaught of imperialism.” In the economic realm, Russia is ready to capitalize on the fallout from NAFTA renegotiations, and while it cannot economically replace the United States as a consumer or an investor, it is well positioned to respond to Latin American nations’ eagerness to diversify away from what they see as an unreliable, uncooperative United States. In terms of security, the United States faces potential military and intelligence challenges if Moscow is able to establish a greater physical presence in the region. Short of establishing its own bases, Moscow could pursue agreements with key countries that would provide it with the option of placing its assets and forces in the United States’ backyard. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have hosted Russian ships in their ports and have engaged in joint exercises.

#### Latin America is key to successful sanctions on Russia. Russian influence in the region allows them to evade and also opens up the option for forward missile deployment.

Carlos Malamud, Rogelio Nuñez, [Mira Milosevich-Juaristi](https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/biographies/mira-milosevich-juaristi/) 03 march 2022 "Latin America in the Ukraine crisis: a pawn in the game for Putin’s resurgent Russia," Real Instituto Elcano, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/latin-america-in-the-ukraine-crisis-a-pawn-in-the-game-for-putins-resurgent-russia/

**As the tensions over Ukraine continue to rise between Russia and the West** (defined by the Kremlin here as the US, NATO and the EU), **Moscow has hinted at plans to deploy military forces in Latin America, specifically in Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua**. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Ryabkov, recently remarked that ‘I don’t want to confirm anything… or rule anything out’. **The Kremlin’s thinly veiled threat to send troops (or perhaps even a more substantial deployment) highlights the importance of understanding the role played by Latin America in Moscow’s strategy.** **Such declarations can be interpreted as a way of setting boundaries for Washington, sending a clear signal on the need for mutual respect and to refrain from meddling in each other’s respective sphere of influence. If the US continues its expansion in the former Soviet republics, Russia will respond by increasing its presence in Washington’s own back yard.** Against the backdrop of rising tensions with the US and the EU, in January 2022 the Russian government announced it was strengthening strategic cooperation with Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua ‘in all areas’. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, communicated that Vladimir Putin had agreed to reinforce bilateral ties in recent conversations with the three countries’ leaders, citing Russia’s ‘close relations and strategic cooperation in all areas: economic, cultural, education and technical-military’. The rivalry between Russia and the US in their respective geographic neighbourhoods shares the same underlying dynamic, based on a strategy of ‘supporting resilience’. Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has cultivated relations with countries in the post-Soviet space, supporting their sovereignty and independence from Russia. For its part, Moscow has sought to preserve and increase its influence among the historic allies of the USSR (Cuba and Nicaragua) and –much to Washington’s chagrin– has become a fundamental source of support for the regimes of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua**. Even if the Biden Administration believes Russia lacks the military capacity to follow through on its threats in the region** (National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has accused the Kremlin of grandstanding), **there are nonetheless historic and modern precedents that mean they must be taken seriously. During the 2008 conflict in Georgia, for the first time, Moscow sent two nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, alongside four warships, including the nuclear battlecruiser Peter the Great.** This pattern was repeated in 2013 and again in 2018, when the Russian government declared its intention to establish an air base on the Venezuelan island of La Orchilla. In an increasingly globalised and interconnected world, it is impossible to ignore events on the other side of the globe, especially when one of the parties involved (in this case Russia), threatens to deploy troops in Cuba and Venezuela, alongside other ‘technical and military measures’. Going by past experience, such measures could range from the deployment of military specialists and technical experts (as has been the case in Venezuela) through support for new hybrid forms of warfare (including cyber-attacks) and even the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba, Venezuela or potentially Nicaragua, mirroring the situation in Kaliningrad and other border zones. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 shows this threat must be taken seriously, even if the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 sought to avoid a repeat of the crisis by transforming Latin America into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Moreover, this is not the only nuclear option available to Moscow: another, less costly alternative (in financial terms) would be to deploy its Zircon hypersonic missiles in submarines stationed off the US coast. **The spectre of a nuclear deployment in Latin American territory would bring an end to over half a century of regional consensus on the need to avoid the presence of nuclear arms.** If there is one lesson that can be learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is that when two major powers negotiate to avoid war, the associated allies –voiceless players like Castro’s Cuba– have no say in the final outcome. Castro was incensed when he discovered that the USSR had agreed behind his back to withdraw its missiles in exchange for the US doing likewise Turkey. However, **governments in the region should not need the materialisation of a nuclear threat to spur them into action. They must stand up and be counted on their immediate concerns, a case in point being rising energy costs, which –except in producer countries– increase the burden on families and are forcing governments to increase fiscal spending via subsidies**. The truth is that a coordinated regional response is simply not feasible at present, not only because it would be unprecedented, but also because of the level of fragmentation and divergence, the broad spectrum of positions on the crisis, and the preferences of the parties involved.

Familiar faces and emerging powers: China, Russia, Iran, India and Turkey on the Latin American chessboard

Latin America plays a bit part on the global chessboard. Even if it is not fully removed from the Ukraine crisis, it nonetheless occupies a peripheral position. This can primarily be attributed to the paralysis of the regional integration process, limiting Latin America’s presence on the global stage and preventing it from speaking up with a single voice in multilateral forums. Let us not forget that the majority of countries in the region do not have a robust and coherent foreign policy (Brazil, Chile and Mexico are a few rare exceptions). In general, foreign policies are focused on regional relations, especially with neighbouring countries, largely leaving Latin America’s international presence to be scripted by the world’s major powers. This was particularly evident during the Cold War, from the 1950s to the 1980s. Latin America was a key stage for the conflict between the US and the USSR (Guatemala in 1954, Cuba since 1959, South America in the 1960s and Central America in the 1980s) but in the bigger picture the region was just another battleground in the clash between capitalism and communism. Its role in this global struggle was driven by historical continuity and its relations with the various international centres of power. However, since the 1990s, particularly in the wake of the 2007-08 Financial Crisis and repeated signs of weakness in the US presence in the region, powers from outside it have sought to bolster their role and even challenge US hegemony. The process has been facilitated by the anti-imperialist and post-colonial policies of the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA, Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América) and its partners. The consolidation of a multipolar world, particularly in the aftermath of 2008, has had a number of consequences for Latin America. In economic terms, the region has diversified its markets, allowing China to consolidate its position as a major trading partner since the start of the 21st century. In geopolitical terms, some emerging international players have spotted the opportunity to gain influence, economic power, prestige and allies at the expense of traditional powers like the US, the EU and Spain. This gradual erosion of the presence, influence and reputation of old powers has allowed the rise of new ones (China), as well as the resurgence of familiar faces (Russia). Beginning in the first decade of the 21st century, and intensifying in the second, China and Russia have both expanded their presence in Latin America, alongside Iran and, to a lesser extent, Turkey. India is also present, with its own agenda, for now less pronounced but with greater capacity for expansion in the medium term. Almost all these countries are acting in support of a multipolar world, challenging US hegemony and trying to displace it economically, technologically, militarily and commercially. China’s strategy was consolidated under the presidency of Hu Jintao, when the country produced its first White Book on regional policy. Xi Jinping has furthered its Latin American projection, presiding over a quantitative and qualitative leap forward in Beijing’s presence in the region, transforming the Asian Giant into its second trade partner overall and the main partner of some countries. Despite its limited ties to Latin America, Turkey has also sought to expand not only its economic and commercial projection but its political one too. An increasingly authoritarian President Erdoğan is seeking allies to counterbalance his isolation on the global stage. El Salvador, which is also opposed to the US, has made advances to Ankara in search of support for its decision to make Bitcoin an official currency. Turkey is following the path of Iran, which has had a strong trade and political presence in the region since the 1990s, including murky links to terrorist attacks. Iran has become a key international ally for Venezuela under the presidencies of both Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. In January this year, the two countries’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Denis Moncada and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, agreed in a phone call to strengthen ties between their governments. Latin America has provided Iran, whose shadow has hung over the 1994 terrorist attack on the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA, Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina), with space to break free from its international isolation. A key factor has been its entente with regimes such as that of Chávez in Venezuela and Ortega in Nicaragua. Venezuela has signed over 270 agreements with Iran and the death of Chávez in 2013 prompted Ahmadinejad to label him a messiah. It is an unlikely alliance, forged in the first decade of the 21st century between the ultra-conservative regime of the ayatollahs and the ‘Bolivarian socialists’, grounded in oil and the rejection of US hegemony. Shared anti-imperialist sentiment has also led to close relations between the Iranian regime and Bolivia.

Putin’s objective: key aspects and methods of the international strategy of post-soviet Russia

In stark contrast to China, the Kremlin’s Latin American policy is linked to the personality-driven and authoritarian leadership of Vladimir Putin. Since his rise to power in 1999 and particularly over the past decade, one of Putin’s objectives has been to restore Russia’s status as a global power, lost with the collapse of the USSR. His path to restore this status has gone beyond his country’s immediate neighbourhood comprising the former Soviet republics to seek out new strategic niches. The countries of Latin America have offered fertile ground for this expansion. However, Russia’s strategy lacks the ideological conditioning of the USSR and is more pragmatic in its approach to diversifying the country’s foreign relations. Its roots can be traced back to the Primakov Doctrine (named after Yevgeny Primakov, who served first as Foreign Minister and then as Prime Minister between 1996 and 1999). Primakov was highly critical of Boris Yeltsin’s idea of ‘abandoning’ regions like Latin America, where Russia had exerted significant influence during the Cold War, in favour of closer ties with the West. His ideas constitute a common thread running through Putin’s ‘assertive’ strategy in Syria, his rapprochement with Beijing and his support for Maduro and Ortega. **Russia’s influence in Latin America is different from China’s. One of the key factors that explains this difference is historic precedent**. In some senses, Russia is the heir to the USSR, whose presence in the region grew during the Cold War, especially after the Cuban Revolution. Although its behaviour may have changed –more in form than in substance– there is nonetheless a certain continuity. The ideological factor of communism may no longer be present but other elements remain, such as the geopolitical rivalry with the US and a longstanding Soviet aspiration to be a world power, first by the tsars and now by Russia. **Moscow is using Latin America to counter US influence in other areas. If Washington seeks to expand its presence in zones of Russian influence, such as Ukraine, the Kremlin will increase its military presence in the Caribbean. The region is just another part of Putin’s global strategy. As a revisionist power, Russia is challenging the idea of a ‘unipolar’ world, led by the US and backed by the EU.** Together with NATO, the US and the EU are the main obstacles to rebuilding Russian influence in its hinterland (Georgia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) and restoring its status as a regional and global power. **This has led the Kremlin to seek out foreign partners to build other alliances, both geopolitical, to counter US hegemony, and economic and commercial, to offset the sanctions imposed by Washington and Brussels following the crises in Georgia** (2008) **and Ukraine** (2014 and 2022). Three main reasons explain why Latin America is important to Russia: (1) the potential of alliances with Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua to undermine US hegemony; (2) as a tool to allow Putin to present himself as a global actor (instead of just a local one), using Latin America as a platform to build a new, multipolar order (for example, Nicaragua was the first Latin American country to bestow diplomatic recognition on South Ossetia and Abkhazia following their separation from Georgia in 2008); and (3) as part of a strategy of deterrence towards further US advances into Russia’s hinterland. The Ukraine crisis has shown how US imposition in zones that are key to Russian interests, such as Ukraine, will be met with shows of strength or threats to do likewise in Latin America. Through its pragmatic, non-ideological stance, Russia is seeking to expand its presence in Latin America, strengthening its position in various areas, including trade, energy and arms sales. The Kremlin initially sought to take advantage of Bolivarian regional integration initiatives, such as ALBA, to forge alliances against the US. In 2014 Putin sent a message to the ALBA summit, expressing his desire to deepen ties and expand ‘our dialogue and practical interaction, both bilaterally and multilaterally’. However, like Bush’s attempts to push the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 2005, he soon discovered how regional division, lack of leadership and patchy integration prevent the achievement of regional goals. Similarly, the paralysis of ALBA following the loss of Chávez’ leadership and Venezuelan petrodollars laid bare its limitations.

#### Sanctions are key to negotiated end to Ukraine war.

Sean Monaghan 5-25-2022, "Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine," Foreign Policy Research Institute, https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/

Top of Form

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**The West has struggled to pursue a strategy of coercive diplomacy to persuade Russia to end its war in Ukraine because most of the conditions which favor success are not present. However, the prospects for coercive diplomacy can be revived if Washington and its allies can pursue smaller, more achievable goals through exploiting the economic and military costs it has already imposed on Russia**, while avoiding a wider confrontation with Moscow. Many of the challenges to coercive diplomacy cannot be addressed because they are inherent or deep-seated. For example, the type of provocation (a fait accompli invasion) that undermines coercive diplomacy has already occurred. Likewise, Russia’s advantages in motivation, sense of urgency, and escalation tolerance (which are inherent to the psychology and perception of Russia’s leader and regime) make coercive diplomacy more difficult. The West’s fear of escalation—another challenge—is mostly inherent, given Russia’s willingness to brandish nuclear threats as well as public polling against direct intervention. Equally, the West has little choice but to isolate Putin and treat him as an international pariah. But this isolation may be exploited in favor of coercive diplomacy through a negotiated compromise, especially since Putin may feel an increasing desperation to have something to show for his adventure. This prospect may have taken on new life with Russia now downgrading its military goals within Ukraine to focus on the south and east.[[39]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn39) **The most promising area for reviving the prospects of coercive diplomacy concerns the current objectives of the international anti-Russia coalitio**n. To date, these have been varied, ambitious, and unrealistic, given Russia’s obvious political and military commitment to the invasion and battlefield prospects that are still alive (despite significant losses).[[40]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn40) That situation is now changing. Ukraine’s highly effective resistance—supported and armed by the West—has forced Russia to reduce its own aims and ambitions. For Ukraine and the West, this development may be an opportunity to define clearer goals in response to Russia’s retreat—as Zelensky has now started to do.[[41]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn41) Recently, Western officials have followed the same script, with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz calling for an immediate ceasefire.[[42]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn42) The most crucial factor in setting diplomatic goals, according to George, is “that the strength of the opponent’s motivation not to comply is highly dependent on what is demanded of him.”[[43]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn43) In other words, the greater the demand, the less likely the opponent is to comply. Hence the choice of objective is crucial: “it affects the motivation of both sides and the balance of motivation between them.”[[44]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn44) Coercive diplomacy will be more difficult if the coercer conveys ambitious objectives that “infringe on vital or very important interests of the adversary.”[[45]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn45) For example, during the Cuban missile crisis, American demands were limited to the removal of missiles rather than the Castro regime or the Soviet presence in Cuba. The temptation for the West to expand their goals as they see Russia on the back foot will be strong as they appear more achievable. But this may be misleading. While many increasingly think Ukraine can win the war, it is also possible that Russia’s rot may well stop in south and east Ukraine as its forces consolidate and refocus on this smaller area.[[46]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn46) **Moreover, broader, longer-term goals—such as weakening Russia—may embolden Moscow’s resistance and jeopardize short-term efforts to end the war through coercive diplomacy**. Maximalist goals could also intensify the zero-sum nature of the confrontation between Russia and the West—another key challenge to successful coercive diplomacy. So to give coercive diplomacy the best chance, immediate goals should focus on smaller, more achievable steps, led by Ukraine. More broadly, a return to focusing on strategic stability as an end in itself—through conventional and nuclear arms control, robust dialogue on a new security architecture for Europe, and cooperation on areas of mutual interest such as international terrorism or nuclear proliferation—would alleviate to some extent the zero-sum nature of the relationship which currently dominates. **The United States and Russia have shown they can still conduct bilateral diplomacy, despite the war, such as arranging a prisoner exchange and a call between their defense ministers.****[[47]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn47) Aiming for a post-conflict relationship based on stability and pragmatism may also reveal mutually acceptable outcomes to the war**.[[48]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn48) However, the gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine, the lack of consensus over Western war aims, and the variety of approaches to dealing with Putin—contrast Biden labeling him a genocidal war criminal with others such as French President Emmanuel Macron encouraging restraint for fear of escalation[[49]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn49) —indicates how difficult this will be.[[50]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn50) Nonetheless, finding a way to limit the wider Russian-Western confrontation may increase the chances for coercive diplomacy to stop the war in the short term**. The prospects for ending the war on favorable terms for Ukraine and the West can also be improved by building on Ukraine’s success and Western solidarity to exploit Russia’s losses on the battlefield and the damage to its economy. Much of this simply relies on the West to keep pursuing this course of action: maintain unity while ratcheting up sanctions and international pressure on Russia, and support Ukraine militarily and politically.** This means maintaining the current trajectory that has already frustrated Russia’s war aims and undermined the viability of a drawn out campaign across Ukraine. This constant pressure through economic and military attrition may force Russia into a situation where its imperatives to negotiate or compromise rise to the fore and the exit ramp becomes more attractive.[[51]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/05/reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine/" \l "_ftn51) Again, Russia’s regional refocus within Ukraine shows this is already happening to some extent. This provides an opportunity for coercive diplomacy targeted at a negotiated agreement to end the war—or at least small steps towards that goal. The challenge will be achieving Ukraine’s stated war aims of returning to the Feb. 23 status quo ante in spite of the intensifying zero-sum Russian-Western confrontation.

#### Russia war in Ukraine an ongoing form of structural violence.

BBC News 31 May 2022 "Ukraine reports 15,000 suspected war crimes," https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61652467

Around 15,000 suspected war crimes have been reported in Ukraine since the war began, with 200 to 300 more reported daily, its chief prosecutor said. Some 600 suspects have been identified and 80 prosecutions have begun, Iryna Venediktova told reporters in The Hague. The list of suspects includes "top military, politicians and propaganda agents of Russia", she added. Russia has denied targeting civilians or involvement in war crimes.

What is a war crime?

**Of the 15,000 alleged war crimes, Ms Veneditkova said several thousand had been identified in the eastern Donbas region - the scene of fierce fighting between Russian and Ukrainian troops.** Alleged war crimes in the region include the possible forcible transfer of people - including cases of adults and children - to different parts of Russia, Ms Venediktova said. **Torture, the killing of civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure are also suspected war crimes**, she added. Though investigations relating to the eastern region have started, Ukrainian authorities do not have access to Russian-held areas, AFP news agency reports Ms Venediktova as saying. They were, however, interviewing evacuees and prisoners-of-war, she added. "Investigations are very difficult when fighting is going on at the same time," she is quoted as saying by German news agency DPA. Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia have also joined the investigation efforts, Ms Venediktova said. Poland and Lithuania were already helping. **The International Criminal Court described Ukraine as a "crime scene" and has despatched its largest team of investigators ever to Ukraine to assist in the investigations**. It said it was also hoping to open an office in Ukraine's capital Kyiv. The announcements came as two Russian soldiers were jailed for 11 and a half years in Ukraine on Tuesday for shelling civilian areas. The first Russian soldier to be put on trial in Ukraine, Sgt Vadim Shishimarin, was sentenced to life in prison for killing a civilian last week. Ukraine's ombudsman for human rights, Lyudmila Denisova, was also sacked by Ukraine's parliament. She was criticised for not organising humanitarian corridors and facilitating prisoner exchanges, as well as her handling of alleged rape cases against Russian soldiers, according to local media reports. Ms Denisova said she would appeal the decision. On the ground, Ukrainian and Russian forces battled for control of the eastern city of Severodonetsk in the Luhansk region.

The city is said to be divided between the two sides - but not equally. Regional governor Serhiy Haidai said "70%-80% of the city is controlled by the Russian army".

An explosion also reportedly hit a nitric acid container in the city, which is thought to have been caused by an airstrike, Mr Haidai said. He told the BBC toxic fumes were released into the air following the explosion, but only in a small area. Russia now occupies almost all of Luhansk, as it focuses on seizing it and neighbouring Donetsk. Away from the fighting, European Union leaders reached political agreement to ban 90% of oil imports from Russia, excluding pipeline oil, which Hungary had opposed. But EU members remain split over Russian gas exports. Russian oil giant Gazprom also announced it would be cutting gas supplies to Denmark's Orsted, as well as Shell Europe for its supplies to Germany, after both companies failed to make payments in roubles - something Russia has demanded.

## Advantage 2: Ukraine Scenario - Poland

#### NATO commitment to Ukraine through cyber and conventional forces strong now.

Pierre Morcos and Sean Monaghan 3-29-2022, "NATO and the European Union Show Unity and Resolve in Brussels," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-and-european-union-show-unity-and-resolve-brussels

**The leaders of NATO and the European Union met in Brussels last week,** along with G7 leaders, for an extraordinary trio of summits one month after Vladimir Putin began his invasion of Ukraine. While Russia continued its devastating assault across Ukraine, leaders from Europe, North America, and Japan reinforced their united front against Moscow’s war of aggression, repeating demands for Russia to end the conflict and withdraw its forces from Ukraine while increasing the economic and international pressure against the Kremlin. **They** also **stood firm with the people of Ukraine, committing to further economic, humanitarian, and military support.  On economic sanctions, leaders focused on fully implementing existing sanctions against Russia and Belarus, with the United Kingdom adding**[**new targeted sanctions**](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-65-new-russian-sanctions-to-cut-off-vital-industries-fuelling-putins-war-machine). The European Union, NATO, and G7 all announced [new measures](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/55082/2022-03-2425-euco-conclusions-en.pdf) to “close loopholes and target actual and possible circumvention.” NATO called specifically [on China](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm) “to abstain from supporting Russia’s war effort in any way, and to refrain from any action that helps Russia circumvent sanctions.” The EU-China summit at the end of this week provides another opportunity to make this point. Energy security was prominent, with European nations doubling down on their [pledge](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511) to reduce reliance on Russian fossil fuels, adding to [previous commitments](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-phase-out-russian-oil-imports) by the United Kingdom and the United States to phase out Russian oil imports this year. EU leaders accelerated their [energy divorce](https://www.csis.org/analysis/europe-russia-energy-divorce-begins) with Russia, assisted by the United States, which will send more natural gas to Europe. However, with some nations more reliant than others on Russian energy sources and domestic consumers increasingly affected, energy politics may be the biggest test of Europe’s unity and resolve in the coming weeks and months. On the humanitarian front, the European Union is directly [supporting](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_22_2020) Ukraine and its neighbors, which already host 3.5 million Ukrainian refugees. Washington [announced](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/us/ukrainian-refugees-biden.html) $1 billion in new humanitarian aid and will admit 100,000 Ukrainians fleeing the war. As the dire siege of the city of Mariupol continued, President Macron [announced](https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-france-spearhead-exceptional-operation-evacuate-mariupol/) that France, together with Turkey and Greece, was planning an “exceptional humanitarian operation” to evacuate civilians. With a major food crisis looming, France also launched—in its role as current chair of the Council of the European Union—an international [food security plan](https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20220325-france-proposes-food-security-crisis-plan-to-avoid-famine-stoked-by-ukraine-war-africa-egypt-wheat) with the African Union to avert famines in vulnerable countries dependent on Russian and Ukrainian crops.In providing military support to Ukraine, NATO and the European Union continue to walk the tightrope between helping Ukraine defend itself and avoiding escalation into a direct conflict with Russia. **NATO allies**[**committed**](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_193613.htm?selectedLocale=en)**to provide Ukraine with more defensive weapons, plus new “cybersecurity assistance” and “equipment to help Ukraine protect against biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear threats.”** The European Union [agreed](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/23/eu-support-to-ukraine-council-doubles-funding-under-the-european-peace-facility/) to double its support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility to €1 billion**. Beyond their immediate assistance to Ukraine, NATO and the European Union are revising their military plans to deal with a more intense and persistent period of confrontation with Russia. In the short term, NATO has**[**established**](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm)**four new multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia—adding to its four existing missions in Poland and the three Baltic states, which have also been bolstered**. There are now 40,000 forces from all allies under the direct command of NATO, concentrated in Eastern Europe. These are supported by air and naval forces positioned from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea, including an unprecedented five carrier strike groups. In the longer term, NATO leaders looked to [reset](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm?selectedLocale=en%22%20\h%20%20HYPERLINK%20%22https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_193671.htm) their collective defense and deterrence, stating, “We will now accelerate NATO’s transformation for a more dangerous strategic reality, including through the adoption of the next Strategic Concept in Madrid.” In the days before its summit, the European Union also adopted its first defense and security concept, named the “[Strategic Compass](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/),” designed to “make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider.”  **Last week’s summits demonstrated once again the unity and resolve shown by the nations of NATO and the European Union in the face of Russia’s challenge to Ukrainian sovereignty and European security. As a**[**new phase**](https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/a-new-phase-of-the-russo-ukrainian-war-begins/)**of the war begins, NATO and the European Union will need to keep this momentum while addressing the many long-term aftershocks of the conflict on the humanitarian, energy, food, and defense fronts.** With this in mind, the road to NATO’s summit in Madrid at the end of June will be critically important.

#### Ukrainian refugees and historical animosity between Poland and Ukraine are a unique target for Russian disinformation campaigns.

Vanessa Gera 4-10-2022, "Poland-Ukraine ties seen as target of Russian disinformation," ABC News, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/poland-ukraine-ties-target-russian-disinformation-83992663

WARSAW, Poland -- Days before Poland’s [Independence Day](https://abcnews.go.com/alerts/FourthOfJuly) in November, vandals painted the blue-and-yellow colors of the Ukrainian flag on monuments in Krakow. The vandalism, which took place as Russia massed troops near Ukraine’s border, looked as if Ukrainians were defacing memorials to Polish national heroes.

Yet some clues suggested otherwise.

The flag's colors were reversed, with the yellow on top of the blue and one offensive message was in an unnatural mix of Russian and Ukrainian. Though prosecutors are still investigating, Polish and Ukrainian authorities believe it was most likely a Russian-inspired attempt to trigger ethnic hostility between Ukrainians and Poles.

Polish and Ukrainian authorities have for years accused Russia of trying to provoke hostility between their neighboring nations as part of a broader effort to divide and destabilize the West — and the concerns have gained greater urgency since Russia invaded Ukraine. **Poland and Ukraine are neighbors and allies but they share a difficult history of oppression and bloodshed, and those historical traumas sometimes rise to the surface. Poland has also accepted large numbers of Ukrainian refugees, creating fears that could become another wedge issue that Russia could exploit.**

**“The Russian efforts to sow divisions between the Poles and Ukrainians, particularly by means of exploiting historical issues, are as old as time,” said Stanislaw Zaryn, the spokesman for Poland’s security services.** “**Russia has redoubled them since the war began,” he said. “And they are more dangerous now because the war is going on and it can affect more people than before."** Reacting to the November incident, the Ukrainian Embassy in Warsaw immediately denounced it as “shameful” and “a provocation aimed at harming the good neighborly relations between Ukraine and Poland.”

**More than 2.5 million Ukrainian refugees have arrived in Poland since the war began, and while some move on to other countries more than half have remained. Poles have reacted with an outpouring of help and goodwill and the government has extended to the Ukrainians the same rights to education and health care that Poles have.** Never Again, an anti-racism association in Poland, has documented several attempts to stoke aversion to the Ukrainian refugees and even to openly justify Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion. In some cases those behind the messages are far-right Polish activists or politicians with pro-Kremlin views, according to a report the organization published Thursday.“These groups do not enjoy widespread public support, but they do their best to make Poles and Ukrainians quarrel, spread hateful content, conspiracy theories and false information, primarily in the internet space,” it said.Larysa Lacko, **an expert on countering disinformation at NATO, said Russia is known to exploit refugees as a wedge issue because it touches on the economy, race and other sensitive issues, and that she has also observed Russian “disinformation talking about historical grievances.”**

#### But Poland is key to containing the Ukraine war.

The Economist 12 March 2022, "Why Poland has become NATO’s linchpin in the war in Ukraine," https://www.economist.com/europe/poland-will-play-an-outsized-role-in-western-efforts-to-assist-ukraine/21808064

Polish leaders have long pushed their partners in nato and the eu to forge closer ties with Ukraine, warning of the risk of Russian aggression, only to be dismissed as paranoid. Russia’s murderous and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has proven them entirely right. **Polish denunciations of Russia’s imperial ambitions, which Americans and western Europeans once pooh-poohed as post-communist stress disorder, have now become standard nato talking points. But it is not just Poland’s view of Russia that is being taken more seriously; it is Poland’s role in the world. In a matter of a few weeks, the country has become the linchpin of the Western effort to defend Ukraine and deter Russia, a task as important as it is dangerous. Hundreds of Stinger missiles, Javelin anti-tank weapons and other munitions have already poured into Ukraine through Poland and Romania, part of America’s $350m package to assist the besieged country**. **Poland itself has dispatched an ammunition convoy to Ukraine, and plans to send mortars, small drones and man-portable missile systems, known as manpads, from its own supplies. Weapons deliveries from other countries**, including a €450m ($490m) consignment financed by the eu, **are on the way, too**. “The biggest share of military equipment, both lethal and non-lethal, will go through Poland,” says Konrad Muzyka of Rochan Consulting, a military-analysis firm. “Like it or not,” says Stanislaw Koziej, a former brigadier-general in Poland’s army, “we are going to be the main link in the chain connecting Ukraine and the West.” **Poland is nearer the eye of the storm than any other nato member. It risks being drawn in further**. For days the country mooted giving its mig-29 fighter jets to Ukraine in exchange for f-16s from America. The Americans, who initially pushed the plan, balked when Poland asked to send the jets via an American airbase in Germany. On March 9th they backed out, saying transferring the jets risked escalation. Poland wants to do as much as possible, say officials in Warsaw, without being dragged into the war. **The crisis has also turned Poland, almost overnight, into the country with the second-largest refugee population in Europe. At least 2m people have escaped Ukraine since the start of the invasion, the most extensive and rapid movement of**[**refugees**](https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/03/05/a-new-refugee-crisis-has-come-to-europe)**in Europe’s post-war history. Over 1.3m have reached Poland. The country has coped remarkably well with the influx. But its resources are stretched.** Poland was already home to Europe’s largest Ukrainian diaspora, over a million strong, and so is an important recruiting ground for Ukraine’s resistance. In the first ten days of the war, Polish border guards recorded 217,000 crossings into Ukraine. A large share were Ukrainians heading back home to fight. “Our people are waiting,” says Aleksandr, who arrived at the border by bus from Estonia. “They’re going to tell us what to do, give us ammunition and guns, and then we’re off to work.” **Poland’s size, location and infrastructure make it the West’s most important gateway to Ukraine. The two countries share a 530km** (330-mile) **border,** punctuated by over a dozen crossings. The airport in Rzeszow, about an hour’s drive from the border, is the closest big airport to Ukraine on nato territory. Flight radar data show an uptick in military aircraft, almost certainly involved in weapons deliveries, flying in and out of Rzeszow since the start of the war. Were Kyiv to fall to the Russians, which is still far from guaranteed, Ukrainian troops and volunteers would probably regroup in the west of the country, in or around Lviv, only 80km from the Polish border. This would further raise Poland’s importance for Ukraine. The war has already strengthened Poland’s position in nato. The alliance is increasing its presence in Poland dramatically. America had deployed nearly 5,000 new troops to Poland in February, even before the Russian invasion, bringing the total to some 9,000. It also recently approved the sale to Poland of 250 Abrams tanks.Poland also hopes to reconcile with the rest of the eu. The bloc has repeatedly chided Poland’s nationalist government for stacking its top court with cronies, threatening judges who rule against it and harassing the media. The stand-off prompted the eu to freeze €36bn in pandemic recovery funds earmarked for Poland and to fine it for ignoring rulings by the European Court of Justice. Poland has moved to meet some eu demands, and its efforts in the face of Russia’s aggression may earn it a more sympathetic hearing.But there are incalculable risks involved, too. **Analysts say Russian retaliation of one kind or another against Poland is a near certainty. The longer the war lasts, the more desperate Russia will be to destroy the supply lines connecting Poland to Ukraine.** “I’m afraid that Russian rocket attacks against those supply lines are something we have to take into account in the coming days and weeks,” says Wojciech Kononczuk of the Centre for Eastern Studies, a think-tank in Warsaw. America clearly takes the possibility seriously: it is sending Patriot missile-defence batteries to Poland. Others mention the threat of Russian sabotage and cyberattacks inside Poland. A social-media monitoring group has already uncovered a Russian disinformation campaign intended to spread panic and drive up resentment towards refugees from Ukraine.Vladimir Putin’s threats against countries that interfere in Ukraine are not to be taken lightly. But for Poland and nato, the only risk bigger than that of Russian retaliation is the risk of Western inaction. “There’s no alternative, because we’re in the same boat,” says Mr Kononczuk. “The only difference is that Ukraine’s in the front, and we’re in the back.”

#### Without Polish support, war in Ukraine spills out into Western Europe

Michael Baranowski 3-16-2022, "Secure NATO’s Borders Before Putin’s War Spills Over," GMFUS, https://www.gmfus.org/news/secure-natos-borders-putins-war-spills-over

Viewed from Warsaw, Russia’s war in Ukraine is getting closer to our borders.

President Vladimir Putin, frustrated with the slow progress of his land operation and heavy losses, is indiscriminately destroying cities and killing civilians. **Russia bombed a military base barely ten miles from the Polish border over the weekend, sparking fears that the war may soon spill onto NATO territory. At the same time, Russia threatened to target convoys with Western weaponry coming across the border from Poland to Ukraine. These actions are meant as a warning to NATO**: “Keep out!” The alliance should do no such thing. Now is the time to prepare for the possibility that this war enters NATO territory, and today’s meeting of NATO’s ministers of defense is the perfect opportunity to do so. In recent weeks, the United States doubled its troop numbers in Poland from 5,000 to 10,000 and delivered two batteries of anti-missile Patriot systems. Other allies buttressed the Baltic states and Romania with additional soldiers. And NATO activated its response force and their contingency plans, granting the Supreme Allied Commander Europe greater flexibility to act in an emergency. **NATO has already reinforced its eastern members. But more must be done to ensure our security and deter Russia from expanding this conflict.** Placing two Patriot batteries in Poland is a good beginning, but they cannot cover the entire length of Poland’s border with Ukraine—or Romania’s, or Slovakia’s. The alliance’s force posture in the northeastern flank is a real problem. Belarusian territory has become de facto Russian military space. That means that the Baltic states are surrounded by Russia to the south and east, and only the narrow “Suwalki Gap” corridor between Poland and Lithuania connects them to the rest of NATO territory. Poland now has over 700 miles of border vulnerable to Russian military operations. And Russia’s military is ready. The most militarized corner of Europe is Kaliningrad, a Russian region bordering Poland, Lithuania, and Belarus, where 30,000 troops and 300 tanks sit ready to reach Poland, the Baltic states, and Germany. Since the Russian build-up for this war started, Russia placed an additional 30,000 troops in Belarus and brought a force of 190,000 to fight the war in Ukraine itself. Even this brief overview shows that NATO’s current reinforcements do not begin to address the existing imbalance in military power. **NATO needs to correct this imbalance, and its members’ defense ministers should consider the following at today’s meeting: how best to support Ukraine militarily in the war against an aggressive Russia; how to immediately shore up the air-and-missile defenses of frontline states; and how to begin to change NATO’s force posture on the eastern flank. Given that Putin already crossed many “uncrossable” lines, the alliance must now move from a force posture that relies on “deterrence by presence” to “deterrence by defense**.” There is a long way to go to get there.

#### Broader Western Europe war collapses the current world order.

Robin Wright 3-10-2022, "The Growing Fear of a Wider War Between Russia and the West," New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-growing-fear-of-a-wider-war-between-russia-and-the-west

Since Russia’s invasion, the besieged Ukrainian President, [Volodymyr Zelensky](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/03/14/volodymyr-zelensky-leads-the-defense-of-ukraine-with-his-voice), has repeatedly warned the West about the danger that Putin would target other European nations. “Everyone thinks that we are far away from America or Canada. No, we are in this zone of freedom,” [Zelensky said](https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-08-22/h_6bc0265765f5a9e14f0ab124e1cc906b" \t "_blank) in a television interview, on Monday. “And, when the limits of rights and freedoms are being violated and stepped on, then you have to protect us. Because we will come first. You will come second. Because, the more this beast will eat, he wants more, more, and more.” The U.S., however, pushed back this week on key military requests from [Ukraine](https://www.newyorker.com/tag/ukraine), for fear of Russia’s reaction. Putin’s reckless offensive has forced the U.S. to adopt awkward policy positions. On March 5th, Zelensky [made an impassioned appeal](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/05/zelenskyy-plea-congress-aid-00014419) to members of the House and Senate for more military aid, notably help in obtaining Soviet-era warplanes that Ukrainian pilots are trained to fly and that could balance Russia’s air superiority. On Wednesday, the Pentagon rejected an offer from Poland to turn over twenty-eight MIG-29 fighter jets to U.S. custody—flying them to a base in Germany—for transfer to Ukraine. U.S. intelligence officials assessed that an American role in a transfer “may be mistaken as escalatory and could result in significant Russian reaction that might increase the prospects of a military escalation with *nato*,” the Pentagon spokesman, John Kirby, [told reporters](https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2961705/us-doesnt-want-warfare-in-ukraine-to-escalate-says-dod-official/). U.S. involvement was deemed to be “high risk.” The majority of Ukraine’s warplanes are still intact, a senior Defense Department official added, while acknowledging that Russia’s surface-to-air missiles now have an “umbrella” that covers virtually all of Ukraine. The Administration cited the same fears about Zelensky’s request for help from *nato* in establishing a no-fly zone over part of Ukraine to protect civilians. “We also have to see to it that this war does not expand,” [Blinken said](https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-uk-foreign-secretary-elizabeth-truss-at-a-joint-press-availability" \t "_blank) on Wednesday, at a joint press conference with his British counterpart. “Our goal is to end the war, not to expand it, including potentially expand it to *nato* territory.” Otherwise, he warned, “it’s going to turn even deadlier, involve more people, and I think potentially even make things harder to resolve in Ukraine itself.” On Thursday, Avril Haines, the director of National Intelligence, acknowledged that the U.S. is now in a uniquely challenging position. “We are obviously providing enormous amounts of support to the Ukrainians, as we should and need to do,” she told the Senate Intelligence Committee. “But at the same time trying not to escalate the conflict into a full-on *nato* or U.S. war with Russia. And that’s a challenging space to manage.” Yet, at each of his four stops in *nato* countries near Russia, Blinken heard dire predictions about the broader Russian threat beyond Ukraine—and the need for the U.S. to do more. In Riga, on Monday, the Latvian Foreign Minister, Edgars Rinkēvičs, [lamented to Blinken](https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-antony-j-blinken-and-latvian-foreign-minister-edgars-rinkevics-at-a-joint-press-availability/), “We have no illusions about Putin’s Russia anymore.” In Vilnius, the Lithuanian President, Gitanas Nauseda, turned to Blinken and [said](https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-lithuanian-president-gitanas-nauseda-before-their-meeting/), “Deterrence is no longer enough. We need more defense here, because otherwise it will be too late here, Mr. Secretary. Putin will not stop in Ukraine; he will not stop.” And in Tallinn, on Tuesday, the Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, [said](https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-estonian-prime-minister-kaja-kallas-at-a-joint-press-availability/) that *nato* countries “need to adapt to the new reality” of a “very aggressive Russia” and permanently strengthen their defenses in the air, on land, and at sea. Pressed on what specifically countries on Russia’s borders needed, she replied, “Everything.” **Eastern European countries—notably those once allied with, or part of, the former Soviet Union’s empire—have long warned of the potential for Russian aggression**. “We, the Poles, are already tired of reminding everyone: ‘We told ya so,’ ” Marek Magierowski, Poland’s Ambassador to the U.S., told me in an interview this week. He cited the forewarning by the late Polish President Lech Kaczynski during the Russian invasion of Georgia, in 2008. “Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow—the Baltic states and later, perhaps, time will come for my country, Poland,” Kaczynski had said. Magierowski added, “We have never had any doubts whatsoever about Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions.” **Putin has been waiting for this “window of opportunity” for years, he said. “He convinced himself that the West is weak, divided, wallowing in a decadent mood**. He thought the free world wouldn’t care about Ukraine’s fate, as it didn’t care about Czechoslovakia’s in 1938,” when Europe tolerated Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland. **Putin**, he told me, **is similarly “emboldened” because the West was “tragically lenient” and “outrageously complacent” after Russia**[**murdered the defector Alexander Litvinenko**](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/29/kremlin-inc)**, in 2006;**[**invaded and annexed Crimea**](https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-creeping-annexation-of-crimea), in 2014; [helped destroy the Syrian city of Aleppo](https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-battle-for-aleppo-syrias-stalingrad-ends), in 2016; reportedly used chemical weapons to [poison the former spy Sergei Skripal](https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/sergei-skripal-russia-and-the-salisbury-conundrum) and his daughter, in 2018; and poisoned the opposition leader [Alexey Navalny](https://www.newyorker.com/tag/alexey-navalny), in 2020. Over the past three decades, Eastern Europeans have often encountered skepticism of their view of Putin as the U.S. and Western Europeans, notably the former German Chancellor [Angela Merkel](https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/angela-merkel-leaves-politics-on-her-own-terms), advocated dealing pragmatically with Russia.

During his European trip, Blinken repeatedly promised that *nato*, this time, would prevent further Russian expansion. “We will defend every inch of *nato* territory with the full force of our collective power,” he vowed, in Estonia. But U.S. **experts worry, too, about an unintended incident triggering a wider war, like the spark that ignited the First World War, a conflict that dragged on for four years and killed tens of millions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine “could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe,**” Thomas E. Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, [warned in a new report](https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-wider-european-conflict) issued on Tuesday. It might not matter what the U.S. does, he wrote. Crippling sanctions “could provoke Putin to lash out with greater violence,” Graham cautioned. But, **if***nato***appeared restrained, Moscow could be “tempted to press militarily even further into Europe” to enlarge its sphere of influence. The rippling impact of broader Russian aggression would stress “the geopolitical, economic, and institutional foundations” of the international order created after the Second World War,** Graham wrote. Given the Russian leader’s history, Angela Stent, a former National Intelligence officer and the author of “[Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest](https://www.amazon.com/Putins-World-Russia-Against-West/dp/1455533025),” is worried about a miscalculation. “**The concern we have to have immediately is that the war in Ukraine doesn’t inadvertently spread to Poland or Romania by some unforeseen clash, which would then have to involve***nato***in a war with Russia,”** she told me. Stent also worries about Putin’s intentions short of war. “You can use nonmilitary means to disrupt societies. And he’s already been doing that for the past couple of decades.” As the Russian leader grows increasingly cornered, she added, he will seek to exploit popular sentiment in countries like Serbia, where a pro-Russia march to support the war was held last week. The new U.S. intelligence assessment warns that Russia will employ “an array of tools” to undermine the interests of the U.S. and its *nato* allies. “We expect Moscow to insert itself into crises” whenever it sees an opportunity, it concludes. On Wednesday, the Biden Administration [issued a forceful denial](https://www.state.gov/the-kremlins-allegations-of-chemical-and-biological-weapons-laboratories-in-ukraine/) after Russia’s bizarre claim that the U.S. and Ukraine were developing chemical and biological weapons. The State Department spokesperson, Ned Price, said that Moscow has a long track record of accusing the U.S. of the very crimes that Russia is perpetrating. These tactics are “an obvious ploy” by Russia to try to justify “further premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified attacks,” he said. Russia, as the aggressor, still has the upper hand. But, for the U.S. and its allies, the one positive sign is that the performance of the Ukrainian military has exceeded expectations. Russian forces have fallen far short of Putin’s goal of a swift seizure of Kyiv and the ouster of Zelensky’s government. The first two weeks have, instead, been grinding for Moscow. U.S. intelligence estimates that between two thousand and four thousand troops fighting for Russia—not all of them Russian—have died in the first two weeks. The bravery of Ukrainians, so far, has prevented the worst-case scenario.

## Solvency

#### Nato says yes -

**Brussels Summit Communiqué 2021**

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021  
  
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\_185000.htm  
 Our nations continue to face threats and challenges from both state and non-state actors who use hybrid activities to target our political institutions, our public opinion, and the security of our citizens.  While the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid threats rests with the targeted nation, **NATO is ready, upon Council decision, to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign being conducted against it, including by deploying a Counter Hybrid Support Team.**  In cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of an armed attack.  NATO and Allies will continue to prepare for, deter, and defend againsthybrid threats.  **Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing hybrid activities and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign national prerogative.  We are enhancing our situational awareness and expanding the tools at our disposal to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns**,by developing comprehensive preventive and response options.  We will also continue to support our partners as they strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges.

#### A NATO coordinated effort to fight back against political warfare is necessary to preserve NATO control

**McInnis Starling 21** [Kathleen J. McInnis is an author and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. From 2006 to 2009, she served in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, working primarily on NATO’s Afghanistan operations. Prior to that, she was a research consultant at Chatham House in London, where she worked on NATO and transatlantic security matters. McInnis also served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), working NATO-Afghanistan matters and stability operations capability development. Prior to joining the Pentagon, McInnis spent several years at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzing US nuclear weapons strategy, strategic capabilities, NATO, European security, and transatlantic relations. Before joining CSIS, she was a researcher in the United Kingdom’s House of Commons, working on NATO, the European Union, and US-UK political-military relations Clementine G. Starling is the deputy director of Forward Defense and resident fellow of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. In her role, she oversees the initiative’s programming and research and leads on the defense policy and European security practice areas. Her own research focuses on great-power competition with China and Russia, deterrence and US force posture, and transatlantic security. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has produced and contributed to reports on Russia’s nuclear strategy, space security, military mobility, political warfare, Europe-China relations, and the US-UK relationship. Starling’s analysis has been featured in a range of publications, and she has provided commentary for NPR, the BBC, and ABC News, among others. Within the Transatlantic Security Initiative team, she played a leading role in managing NATO’s official public diplomacy efforts (“NATO Engages”) around the Alliance’s 2019 London Leaders’ Meeting and other summits. Starling was also the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP). Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Starling worked in the UK Parliament with the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, providing analysis on UK defense, Middle East security, and technology. Originally from the United Kingdom, she also worked for the Britain Stronger in Europe (BREMAIN) campaign. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a Bachelor of Science in international relations and historyhttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NATO-Comprehensive-Approach-Report-2021\_final.pdf]

Forging common approaches among NATO allies and partners on political warfare is no easy task. Political warfare is a complex beast; by design it is hard to notice, identify, call out, and grapple with. There is a reason that allies and partners, for now, have largely approached political warfare as distinct issues—including disinformation, election interference, political coercion, and economic pressure—with varying degrees of effort and success. It is challenging to put our heads around the entirety of the problem set. Nevertheless, the very nature of the problem is that it is cross-cutting, interlinked with other types of warfare and tools, and that it plays out and pulls levers in multiple actors’ jurisdictions. For that reason, and for NATO to really grapple with political warfare—to achieve deterrence, mitigation, management of the effects, and to mute the impact—it must tackle the whole, holistically and comprehensively. It is helpful that NATO has both an Article 2 Washington Treaty strategic mandate and operational experience and lessons learned to help allies and partners grapple with these challenges. Indeed, NATO has tackled multi-sector, multi-actor problems before; its prior Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan and Iraq provides a robust framework to forge a collective and effective response to political warfare. A Comprehensive Approach 2.0 would enable NATO to bring together multiple layers of actors, including government agencies (defense, foreign affairs, treasury, homeland security, law enforcement, etc.); the public, civil society, and private sector actors; NATO member states and partner nations; and different multinational institutions like the EU and the UN. Such groups can work to forge a multi-vector approach to threat assessments of, consensus building on, and coordinating responses to Russian, Chinese, and other authoritarian political warfare. Partners across multiple countries and sectors are critical to the success of a Comprehensive Approach 2.0 and enable NATO to extend its understanding, situational awareness, and learn best practices from others. The urgency of this problem should not be understated. While NATO allies and partners are coming to grips with aspects of Russian and Chinese political warfare tactics, they have fallen behind and remain on the back foot in effectively responding to this challenge. NATO is still not far enough along in recognizing threats in existing and emerging areas like predatory economic practices and subversive energy investments. Allies and partners’ approaches to hybrid warfare, while laudable for their developments in some areas of disinformation and cyber defense, have overall been insufficient to match the evolution of the threat landscape. NATO’s current approaches to hybrid warfare can be stiflingly broad, preventing effective tailoring of strategies to match the threat. There is still an overreliance on NATO’s military arm and a lack of focus and intent on how to employ its political toolkit and nonmilitary competencies. Ultimately, a strategic shift is needed within NATO for the Alliance to play a more advanced role in countering political warfare, enabled by its Article 2 mandate. A utilization of NATO’s nonmilitary actors, toolkit, and responses will enable a more nimble and effective Alliance posture to the political warfare side of the hybrid spectrum. As China, Russia, and other authoritarian actors seek to thwart international institutions from within and undermine them from the outside, this is an urgent problem. Mitigating political warfare over the next decade will be critical to upholding the value and integrity of the very institutional underpinnings that provide security for transatlantic peoples. It is the only way for NATO to avoid the sad fate of the orb spider and build resilience against the coopting and subversion of the liberal world order upon which our shared security relies. In other words, NATO must protect the transatlantic web. NATO has managed challenges like this before. With the right strategic focus and approach it can more effectively counter political warfare and forge a more secure future for like-minded allies and partners.

#### AI is key

Slapakova, Linda 29 March 2021 "Towards an AI-Based Counter-Disinformation Framework," No Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/03/towards-an-ai-based-counter-disinformation-framework.html

Though the majority of malign information on social media is spread by relatively simple bot technology, [existing evidence](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/01/08/130983/were-fighting-fake-news-ai-bots-by-using-more-ai-thats-a-mistake/) suggests that AI is being leveraged for more sophisticated online manipulation techniques. The extent of the use of AI in this context is difficult to measure, but many information security [experts](https://gizmodo.com/hackers-have-already-started-to-weaponize-artificial-in-1797688425)believe **that AI is already being leveraged by malign actors, for example to better determine attack parameters** (e.g., 'what to attack, who to attack, [and] when to attack'). This enables more targeted attacks and thus more effective information threats, including disinformation campaigns. **Recent advances in AI techniques such as**[**Natural Language Processing (NLP) (PDF)**](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.14165.pdf)**have also given rise to concerns that AI may be used to create more authentic synthetic text** (e.g., fake social media posts, articles, and documents). Moreover, [Deepfakes](https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/deepfakes-a-grounded-threat-assessment/)(i.e., the leveraging of AI to create highly authentic and realistic manipulated audio-visual material) represent a prominent example of image-based AI-enabled information threat. **AI also provides various opportunities for strengthening responses to increasingly sophisticated and democratised disinformation threats. Aside from**[**increased accuracy**](https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/using-machine-learning-to-detect-malign-information-efforts.html)**with which AI models can detect pieces of false or misleading information or recognise the**[**tactics**](https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/using-machine-learning-to-detect-malign-information-efforts.html)**used by social media bots in spreading disinformation** (e.g., the rhetorical tools they adopt), **AI models also represent more**[**cost-effective**](https://thenewstack.io/deep-learning-ai-tool-identifies-fake-news-with-automated-fact-checking/)**avenues for countering disinformation by reducing the time and resources needed for detection. AI-based solutions have been adopted, for example, to identify social media bots** through [automated (PDF)](https://www.shrmonitor.org/assets/uploads/2019/11/SHRM-Kertysova.pdf) bot-spotting or bot-labelling (i.e., detecting and labelling fake social media accounts). The pace and scale of disinformation on social media is also increasingly challenging the reliance on manual fact-checking, indicating that a level of automation may indeed be required to effectively address the social media-based disinformation challenge. AI can also play an enabling role in efforts to foster wider institutional and societal resilience to disinformation. This can include the [integration](https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/using-machine-learning-to-detect-malign-information-efforts.html)of AI-based detection into toolkits and applications that flag false or misleading content on social media to users while also educating them about various information manipulation techniques, thus advancing digital literacy.

# 2AC

## 2AC Case

### 2024 Election

#### Russia is more willing to take drastic action for 2024 elections

**Bertrand, Cohen, Lillis & Lyngaas**, **‘22**, "US assesses Putin may increase efforts to interfere with US elections," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/11/politics/us-russia-election-interference/index.html>, 4-11-2022-- AL

The intelligence community has made understanding Putin’s mindset a priority since early in the invasion, sources familiar with internal deliberations told CNN. Raw assessments have pointed to his increasingly unpredictable behavior, and US officials believe Putin is more willing to consider taking risks due to his anger over Russia’s failures in Ukraine – something his advisers, who officials say have not been telling him the full truth, did not prepare him for. The Associated Press reported on Saturday that Putin may use US support for Ukraine as a pretext to interfere in US elections. Lawmakers were briefed by intelligence officials last week on Putin’s calculus on potential influence operations, according to another US official familiar with the briefing. The briefing acknowledged that, should Putin shift his focus to inflicting harm outside of Ukraine, US midterm elections this year present one possible target for Russian operatives, according to the US official. Russian actors also attempted to influence the 2016 and 2020 elections. The briefing did not suggest there was specific intelligence saying that the Kremlin would target US elections, according to the official, but rather that elections are one of multiple areas that the Russian government could target for influence operations in response to the war in Ukraine. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley testifies before the House Armed Services Committee on Capitol Hill, April 5, 2022 in Washington, DC. US readies for long-term European security ramp-up after Russia's invasion “If Putin feels backed into a corner he may turn his cyber forces in any number of directions,” the US official said, adding that officials are on heightened alert given US midterm elections this year. While it would be difficult for Russia to tamper with voter tallies, another source noted that Russia would not need to change many, if any, votes “to throw the security of the entire voting enterprise into question.” Even if Russian hacking efforts did not affect the outcome at all, sowing chaos and distrust in the voting systems could be enough of a victory, another source said. When asked about the assessments, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment. “Our Election Threats Executive continues to lead the Intelligence Community’s efforts against foreign threats to US elections,” ODNI spokesman Nicole de Haay said in a statement to CNN. Elections are not the only target Russia could have in mind. The US government has begun warning about the possibility that Russia could try to attack US critical infrastructure, urging private sector owners and operators to be prepared. “All businesses, all critical infrastructure owners and operators need to assume that disruptive cyber activity is something that the Russians are thinking about, that are preparing for, that are exploring options, as the President said,” Jen Easterly, director of the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, told CNN late last month.

#### **Russia has been making the first move, causing a ton of destructions**

MILLER ‘22 (MAGGIE MILLER, a cybersecurity reporter for POLITICO, “Russian hackers targeting U.S., other Ukraine allies,” newsletter, issue, 06/22/22, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/22/russian-hackers-target-u-s-00041342)-KN

Russian intelligence agencies have been hacking into scores of organizations in the U.S. and other Ukraine-allied countries, according to a Microsoft report that shows Russia waging a global cyberwar alongside its attacks in Ukraine.

In the report released Wednesday, Microsoft said that Russian hackers have attempted to infiltrate networks at more than 100 organizations in the U.S. and dozens across 42 other countries since Russia invaded Ukraine in February. Targets have included the foreign ministries of NATO states, humanitarian organizations, think tanks, IT groups and energy suppliers. The hackers successfully infiltrated these networks in almost 30 percent of the attempts, and managed to steal data in about a quarter of those instances. “The destructive cyberattacks have been underreported because in a way, they are invisible to the naked eye, you only know they happen when they succeed,” Microsoft President Brad Smith said during remarks at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute. “But what we see from our perspective at the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center and the literally 24 trillion signals a day is that it has been a formidable, intensive, even ferocious set of attacks.” The U.S. has been the main target, but Russian hackers have also directed attacks at Polish groups helping deliver humanitarian aid to Ukraine, along with organizations in Baltic nations and Turkey.Ukraine has also been widely targeted. Microsoft found evidence that the Russian military conducted cyberattacks against 48 Ukrainian government agencies and other organizations, though Ukraine has been able to successfully repel most of these attacks. These have included cyberattacks coordinated with missile strikes on railroads and other transportation systems, and an attempt to breach the network of the nuclear power company in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine in early March — the day before it was occupied by Russian troops.

Ukraine has suffered a slew of cyberattacks in the runup to the Russian invasion and during the fighting. Just prior to the Russian invasion, Ukrainian banking and government websites were temporarily taken offline by hackers who overwhelmed the networks with traffic in so-called distributed denial of service attacks. Last month, the U.S., the United Kingdom and the European Union formally blamed Russia for a cyberattack in February that took out a major Ukrainian satellite provider, and Ukrainian officials said in April that the country had repelled a Russian cyberattack on its energy sector that would have knocked out power for millions of Ukrainians. And in May, Ukrainian authorities accused Russia of trying to cause a “humanitarian disaster” in the country through aiming cyberattacks against humanitarian operations. Russian influence operations have also come to the forefront during the ongoing conflict. Microsoft reported that Russian disinformation operations are concentrated on domestic audiences to help maintain support for the war, the Ukrainian population to undermine morale, and American and European countries to undermine unity. The disinformation is also aimed at what Microsoft described as “nonaligned countries,” including through attempting to blame Western nations for global food shortages resulting from the invasion of Ukraine.

#### Try or die for the affirmative – disinformation campaigns are only going to become more sophisticated in the 2024 election cycle.

Ashley Parker, 9-28-**2021**, "As Trump hints at 2024 comeback, democracy advocates fear a ‘worst-case scenario’ for the country," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/as-trump-hints-at-2024-comeback-democracy-advocates-fear-a-worst-case-scenario-for-the-country/2021/09/28/ee357558-1a47-11ec-914a-99d701398e5a\_story.html

In recent weeks, Trump has maneuvered to firmly establish himself as the predominant and most powerful figure in Republican politics. He has injected his voice into federal and state campaigns, endorsing several secretary of state candidates who embraced his false fraud claims and worked to overturn the results of the 2020 election. And while still banned from Twitter, he has issued a flurry of angry tweet-like statements through his political action committee.

He has also reemerged at rallies, appearing last Saturday in Perry, Ga., with another rally planned for Oct. 9, at the Iowa State Fairgrounds in Des Moines. Speaking in Perry, the former president promised to “make America great again” and called for “an earth-shattering win in November 2022,” before looking ahead to the next presidential election. “We’re not forgetting 2020,” Trump said. “The most corrupt election in the history of our country. Most corrupt election in the history of most countries, to be followed by an even more glorious victory in November of 2024.” **In some ways, the concerns among Democrats, constitutional scholars and democracy advocates about what the return of Trump could mean are simply one side of a coin, with Trump supporters representing the flip side**. A majority of Republicans still support Trump leading their party, according to polls. [A CNN poll](https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/15/politics/cnn-poll-most-americans-democracy-under-attack/index.html) released in September found that 68 percent of Republicans and those who lean Republican say democracy is under attack, with about 7 in 10 of them believing that President Biden didn’t win the 2020 election. One side’s nightmare scenario — **Trump running in 2024 and reclaiming the presidency — represents to the other side simply the democratic system working as it should. The threats to democracy that Trump critics envision are largely twofold. One real risk, they say, is that four years after the failed Jan. 6 insurrection, Trump and his supporters emerge in 2024 more sophisticated and successful in their efforts to steal an election**. “For me, **the scary part is, in 2020, this was not a particularly sophisticated misinformation or disinformation campaign,”** **said Matt Masterson, who ran election security at the Department of Homeland Security between 2018 to 2020.** Referring to some of the outlandish conspiracy theories of ballot fraud posited in the wake of the 2020 election by Trump’s allies, he added: “We’re talking about bamboo ballots and Italian satellites and dead dictators.” **In the future, Masterson said, these sorts of falsehoods are going to become more advanced and nuanced — exploiting genuine areas of confusion in the electoral system — and thus harder to combat.**

#### **Past Incidents prove Russian Infiltration and Hacks on the US – disinformation campaigns and even political interference**

James Lamond, 10-3-2018, (senior policy adviser at the Center for American Progress - focuses on Russian interference, European security, and foreign influence.)"The Origins of Russia’s Broad Political Assault on the United States," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/origins-russias-broad-political-assault-united-states/> --MV

On January 6, 2017, the U.S. intelligence community released a declassified assessment to the public confirming what most had already suspected: Russian President Vladimir Putin had ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election.1 Since the intelligence community released its assessment, the public has learned a great deal about this assault from the special counsel investigation, press reporting, and declassified intelligence. Based on analysis of available material, it has become increasingly clear when, how, and why Russia launched the campaign against American democracy. It is evident that there was a surge of activity intended to influence the American electorate and political institutions that originated in 2014 as a counterresponse to the U.S.-led international isolation of Russia following its intervention in Ukraine. To be clear, Russia’s use of political weaponry against the United States extends further back than just 2014. In fact, a 1981 U.S. State Department Special Report defined Soviet active measures as “operations intended to affect other nations’ policies, as distinct from espionage and counterintelligence,” but not including the legitimate tools of public diplomacy.2 The 1981 report highlights many of the same instruments that Russia uses today, including disinformation, controlling foreign media, deploying front groups, using blackmail, and engaging in political-influence operations.

#### 2024 election failure collapses NATO – U.S. relations

David **Knowles, 3-29-2022**,(senior editor)"Romney: NATO would rethink U.S. relationship if Trump wins 2024 election," No Publication, <https://nz.news.yahoo.com/romney-nato-rethink-u-relationship-223530506.html?guccounter=1> --MV

Sen. Mitt Romney, R-Utah, said Tuesday in a CNN interview that if former President Donald Trump won the 2024 election, the NATO alliance would be significantly damaged. Romney, the 2012 GOP presidential nominee, said NATO members would wonder whether they could continue to count on the United States. MITT ROMNEY: And they wonder whether we're going to return to the-- if you will-- the policies that we've had for the last 70 years, or whether we're instead going to take the turn that Donald Trump represented. If he were to come back as the US President, I think it would represent a pretty dramatic departure for the world, and they would rethink whether they can count on the United States to-- [MUSIC PLAYING] Well, I think what's happened in NATO is that they have said, can we rely on the US? And is this America First idea, which is the president saying to everybody, hey, go off and do your own thing. I think that approach is one that frightens other members of NATO, and they wonder are we committed to NATO, and to our mutual defense, or are we all going to go off on our own? And so they wonder. - Are they ever going to get over that, do you think? - Well, they wonder whether we're going to return to the-- if you will-- the policies that we've had for the last 70 years, or whether we're instead going to take the turn that Donald Trump represented. If he were to come back as the US President I think it would represent a pretty dramatic departure for the world, and they would rethink whether they can count on the United States to lead NATO, and to lead other nations as they push back against China and against Russia. - So you think that the 2024 election will decide this question? About permanent damage to Nato? - I think if President Trump were to return as president, that the nations of the world would say that they have to really rethink. [MUSIC PLAYING]

## 2AC Hypersonics Turn

### Defense

#### Russia wont deploy hypersonic missiles

Andrew **Reddie, 1-13-2020.** Andrew Reddie is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of California, Berkeley. He currently serves as deputy director for the Nuclear Policy Working Group and as a researcher for the Department of Nuclear Engineering, Goldman School of Public Policy, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, and Berkeley Asia-Pacific Study Center at UC Berkeley as well as a researcher with the Project for Nuclear Gaming. “Hypersonic missiles: Why the new “arms race” is going nowhere fast," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <https://thebulletin.org/2020/01/hypersonic-missiles-new-arms-race-going-nowhere-fast/> //jsam

Speaking on December 24, 2019, Russian President Vladimir **Putin marked the deployment of Russia’s first nuclear-capable hypersonic missile system**, noting, “Today, we have a unique situation in our new and recent history. [Other countries] are trying to catch up with us. **Not a single country possesses hypersonic weapons**, let alone continental-range hypersonic weapons.”

The question that is now facing policy makers in Washington, Beijing, London, and elsewhere is whether and how this deployment reshapes strategic stability.

The answer, perhaps counterintuitive amid the hand-wringing over Moscow’s announcement, is not much. In reality, the systemic **consequences of hypersonic missiles will be minimal to nil,** and the narrative that Washington is “behind” in a hypersonic arms race fails to take into account the different strategic challenges facing China, Russia, and the United States—not least that the United States need not overcome an adversary’s missile defense systems.

Maneuverable missiles. Hypersonic missiles travel faster than Mach 5 (approximately 3,800 miles per hour) and have the ability to maneuver during flight. Existing research and design efforts associated with hypersonic weapons have focused on two types of missile technologies. The first, a boost-glide vehicle, is designed to sit on top of an existing ICBM and to be launched on a normal ballistic trajectory before being released and maneuvering to a target without any additional propulsion. Russia’s recently-deployed Avangard system serves as an example of this type of hypersonic weapon. The second type, perhaps more complex to develop and deploy, is a hypersonic cruise missile. This type of weapon involves a supersonic combustion ramjet or turboramjet engine that would provide in-flight propulsion, and this feature would allow it to travel at significantly lower altitude than its boost-glide counterpart. In both cases, though these missiles are named for their speed, it is their potential maneuverability that represents the central concern surrounding the effects of their deployment.

Hypersonics and missile defense. Just as missile defense systems represent an antidote to traditional nuclear missiles that travel on a ballistic trajectory, hypersonic weapons represent an innovation to overcome these defenses. As a result**, it is difficult to discuss the strategic effects of hypersonic weapons without taking into account the current state missile defense capabilities.**

Among those who frame hypersonic weapons as a strategic game-changer, there are three aspects of missile defense that are too often ignored. First, missile defense technologies remain in their infancy, with the United States the only country possessing significant numbers of deployed missile defense systems. Second, US capabilities are explicitly deployed to deter North Korea and Iran—not peer or near-peer competitors like Russia or China. As the 2019 Missile Defense Review notes, “Today’s US missile defenses provide significant protection against potential North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile strikes against the US homeland, and will improve as necessary to stay ahead of missile threats from rogue states.” Finally, amid a mixed test record with debates surrounding the appropriateness of test conditions, it remains **unclear whether existing US missile defense technologies are as successful as policy makers might like.**

In light of the above and in the near term, Moscow’s deployment of hypersonic nuclear weapons changes little. Given that **US missile defense systems are not designed to address the threat posed by peer competitors** with large numbers of nuclear weapons, the vulnerability of the United States to a nuclear attack from Russia is the same in January 2020 as it was in November 2019, prior to Russia fielding this class of weapon. The fact that both Washington and Moscow rely on their respective mutual vulnerability—not missile defense technologies—to deter nuclear warfare remains unchanged. Among those who theorize that missile defense itself is destabilizing, hypersonic missiles may actually strengthen strategic stability by reinforcing rather than degrading the mutual vulnerability upon which nuclear deterrence rests.

#### Russian hypersonic missiles are defective in current war but they still have extravagant number

John **Grady, 5-19-2022**, John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News. “Russian Hypersonic Missiles Underperforming in Ukraine Conflict, NORTHCOM Says," USNI News, <https://news.usni.org/2022/05/19/russian-hypersonic-missiles-underperforming-in-ukraine-conflict-northcom-says>

The **Kremlin’s most advanced missile systems are not operating effectively in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine**, U.S. Northern Command chief Air Force Gen. Glen VanHerck said Wednesday before the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee.

The Russians have “had challenges with some of their hypersonic missiles as far as accuracy,” he told the panel.

“I will tell you, originally, we thought they weren’t working at a rate that was as good as ours. But what I would say is, they’re on par with our capabilities, not all of them, specifically their cruise missiles,” VanHerck said.

**Despite Russia’s overall inaccuracy in firing all of its missiles**, John Plumb, the assistant secretary of defense for space policy, said “the sobering reality” is that the **estimated 1,500 missiles Russia has fired since the Feb. 24 invasion** targeted Ukrainian civilians.

The witnesses agreed it was the largest employment of missile systems since World War II.

As the fighting in Ukraine has evolved, Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Karbler said Kyiv needs offensive and defensive missile systems for a layered defense and to stymie maneuvers on the ground. Among the systems he mentioned were Patriot, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and specialized mortars.

#### Hypersonics are not uniquely threatening – not developed enough.

Andrew W. Reddie 1-13-2020, "Hypersonic missiles: Why the new “arms race” is going nowhere fast," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2020/01/hypersonic-missiles-new-arms-race-going-nowhere-fast/

Hypersonics and missile defense. Just as missile defense systems represent an antidote to traditional nuclear missiles that travel on a ballistic trajectory, hypersonic weapons represent an innovation to overcome these defenses. As a result, it is difficult to discuss the strategic effects of hypersonic weapons without taking into account the current state missile defense capabilities. **Among those who frame hypersonic weapons as a strategic game-changer, there are three aspects of missile defense that are too often ignored. First, missile defense technologies remain in their infancy**, with the United States the only country possessing significant numbers of deployed missile defense systems. Second, US capabilities are explicitly deployed to deter North Korea and Iran—not peer or near-peer competitors like Russia or China. As the 2019 Missile Defense Review notes, “Today’s US missile defenses provide significant protection against potential North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile strikes against the US homeland, and will improve as necessary to stay ahead of missile threats from rogue states.” Finally, amid a mixed test record with debates surrounding the appropriateness of test conditions, it remains unclear whether existing US missile defense technologies are as successful as policy makers might like. **In light of the above and in the near term, Moscow’s deployment of hypersonic nuclear weapons changes little. Given that US missile defense systems are not designed to address the threat posed by peer competitors with large numbers of nuclear weapons, the vulnerability of the United States to a nuclear attack from Russia is the same in January 2020 as it was in November 2019, prior to Russia fielding this class of weapon. The fact that both Washington and Moscow rely on their respective mutual vulnerability—not missile defense technologies—to deter nuclear warfare remains unchanged**. Among those who theorize that missile defense itself is destabilizing, hypersonic missiles may actually strengthen strategic stability by reinforcing rather than degrading the mutual vulnerability upon which nuclear deterrence rests.

#### Hypersonics are just hedges against U.S. and NATO missile defense improvemets.

Andrew W. Reddie 1-13-2020, "Hypersonic missiles: Why the new “arms race” is going nowhere fast," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2020/01/hypersonic-missiles-new-arms-race-going-nowhere-fast/

Characterizing the hypersonic “arms race.” **Alongside concerns surrounding strategic stability, US policy makers have also expressed concern that the United States is “behind” in a hypersonic arms race—with deployment of US hypersonic capabilities currently**[**slated**](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/27/us/politics/russia-hypersonic-weapon.html)**for 2022.** To the extent to which there is a “race” surrounding hypersonic weapon systems at all, Russia and China do enjoy an [advantage](http://thehill.com/policy/defense/380364-china-russia-eclipse-us-in-hypersonic-missiles-prompting-fears) in the development of hypersonic technology—measured by the number of successful hypersonic weapon tests. Prior to Putin’s announcement, China’s DF-ZF boost-glide vehicle had [achieved](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170421_Cancian_PONI2016_Web.pdf?nwHMP3v85oG_fo1GB6E.w9aqWw7.SsvK#page=142) the most success in testing, while India and France are [reported](https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/03/hypersonic-missiles-a-new-proliferation-challenge.html) to be close behind. Against the backdrop of a historical record in which Moscow has long had more [diverse nuclear options](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891?needAccess=true) compared to the United States, what should military analysts make of the US failure to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons first?The answer: very little. As noted above, **the United States is the primary developer of missile defense technologies, with Moscow and Beijing registering their objections to various US deployments in Europe and East Asia over the past two decades. Amid concerns that US missile defense systems might eventually be used against them—and particularly in the absence of their own missile defense capabilities—investment in hypersonic weapons makes sense for both Moscow and Beijing. In the language of strategists, research and development of hypersonic weapons represent a “hedge” against future advancements in US missile defense technologies. This driver is**[**not present**](https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/hypersonic-hysteria-examining-hypersonic-hammer/)**for the United States. As such, nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons would provide**[**few if any**](https://thebulletin.org/2019/12/hypersonic-missiles-three-questions-every-reader-should-ask/)**appreciable benefits to the existing US nuclear capabilities encapsulated in the nuclear triad.** This reality is also reflected in the fact that the current research and development programs in the United States focus on [conventional](https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/11/7/doe-official-say-us-is-not-pursuing-nuclear-hypersonic-weapons) rather than nuclear payloads for hypersonic weapon systems. Others have also [noted](https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/04/china-s-ballyhooed-new-hypersonic-missile-isn-t-exactly-game-changer-pub-79998) that this conventional focus increases the accuracy requirements of US hypersonic weapons—which may explain some of the delay in their deployment. Commentary suggesting that increased US investment in hypersonic weapons is needed to “match” or “lead” are also incongruous with the various offset strategies used by the United States to engage in military competition over the past six decades. For example, faced with superior Russian conventional forces in Europe in the 1950s, Eisenhower [armed](https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/role-offset-strategies-restoring-conventional-deterrence) a much smaller US ground force with battlefield nuclear weapons—using a technological solution to asymmetrically compensate for a strategic disadvantage. More recently, the third offset strategy [sought](https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/991434/deputy-secretary-third-offset-strategy-bolsters-americas-military-deterrence/) to “include autonomous learning systems for handling big data and determining patterns, human-machine collaboration for more timely relevant decision making, and assisted human operations”—and using these technological capabilities as a force multiplier. In both cases, military planners did not seek to match an adversary capability for capability. Instead, they sought a policy solution that addressed the underlying strategic threat. These offset strategies offer benefits both in terms of flexibility and reducing the resource cost of strategic competition, and it is unclear why this logic would be abandoned in the context of hypersonic missile threats.

## Latin America

#### Russia/Venezuela partnership destabilizes latin America

**DiaLogo** **‘17**, "Russia-Venezuela Military Partnership A Threat to Latin America," Diálogo Américas, https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/russia-venezuela-military-partnership-a-threat-to-latin-america/#.YrQEn3bMLrd--AL

The Venezuelan regime’s support for the Vladimir Putin government amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a destabilizing factor for Latin America. “Russia has the full support of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro said, upon receiving Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov at the Miraflores Palace on February 16, 2022. “We have ratified the path of powerful military cooperation between Russia and Venezuela,” he added. Russia and China are the Venezuelan regime’s main weapon suppliers. According to Rear Admiral (ret.) Carlos Molina Tamayo, former head of Armament for the National Bolivarian Armed Force, who lives in exile in Spain, following his participation in the coup against Hugo Chávez in 2002, Moscow has delivered weapons systems worth more than $15 billion to Venezuela since the 2000s. In addition, “the Venezuelan NGO Control Ciudadano detailed in 2021 Venezuela’s purchase from Russia of an unspecified quantity of Orlan 10, an unmanned aerial vehicle for reconnaissance operations,” Voice of America said on January 18. But this connection goes much further. Julio Borges, former foreign envoy for Interim President Juan Guaidó, warned that Maduro and Putin’s goal is to destabilize the region, with the partnership of Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega and Cuba’s Miguel Díaz Canel. “They have opened the region’s doors for Putin to import a conflict that is not ours, putting hemispheric security at risk. Our region cannot be part of Russia’s international chess game,” Borges said via Twitter on February 24, as Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Days before the invasion of Ukraine, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Riabkov said he could not confirm nor rule out the possibility of sending Russian military assets to Venezuela, Voice of America reported. Weapons for guerrillas At present, however, the greater concern is that irregular armed groups could get their hands on light weapon systems Russia delivered to the Venezuelan regime. According to Molina Tamayo, these weapons range from AK-103 rifles to the Igla-S surface-to-air missile systems. “Chávez’s purchase of AK rifles was in the interest of getting closer to Russia,” he said. The most serious issue has to do with the Igla-S system. In 2017, Reuters reported that, according to a military document its teams were able to review, the Maduro regime would have some 5,000 Russian-made surface-to-air missiles. Since then, government officials of the region and foreign affairs experts have expressed concerns that these weapons could be slipping out of the regime’s hands and into those of irregular armed groups, such as the National liberation Army, and dissident groups of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. In February 2019, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration warned about increasing risk to U.S. civil aviation of flying “into, out of, within or over the territory and airspace of Venezuela,” due to the concern that the regime could lose control some its man portable air defense systems, which could in turn be used by non-state armed actors. Amid the conflict over the invasion of Ukraine, Molina Tamayo says that Putin’s plan is to cement Venezuela, as well as Cuba and Nicaragua’s, “‘pro-Russian,’ [stance] in order to annoy the United States.”

#### Russia is increasing influence in Latin America to counteract US influence.

**Small ’22** "As U.S. popularity declines, Putin gains foothold in Latin America," Newsweek, <https://www.newsweek.com/us-popularity-declines-putin-gains-foothold-latin-america-1682702>, 2-25-2022 --AL

Russians still believe that Latin America is a backyard of the United States and that it should be considered their exclusive area of influence," Rouvinski said. "So they want to reach out to this area precisely to carry out reciprocal actions." He explains that many Russian elites see the world in terms of spheres of influence, and believe the United States is encroaching on theirs with unpopular actions in countries like Belarus and Ukraine. "Vladimir Putin and the Russian elites believe that parts of Eastern Europe and some Central Asian countries naturally belong to the Russian sphere," Rouvinski said. "They believe that nothing should happen there without the explicit or implicit permission of Russian authorities," he added. American involvement in these places has led the Kremlin to plan their own retaliation. But instead of exploring direct military interventions or investing billions into local infrastructure projects, Russian officials have relied on trade, diplomacy and media savvy to expand their influence in Latin America. Russian trade in the region has increased by 44% since 2006 to nearly $12 billion in 2020. Over the past year, high-ranking Russian and Latin American officials have met much more frequently to discuss collaboration and negotiate bilateral trade agreements. Just last week, Brazilian President Jair Bolsanaro visited Moscow to discuss a strategic partnership between the nations. "We jointly strive to develop political, economic and humanitarian ties," Putin told a news conference at the conclusion of the meeting. "We closely cooperate on the international stage."

#### Russia gaining ground in Latin America but U.S. can push back.

By Vladimir Rouvinski, 2-13-2017, "Kennan Cable No.20: Understanding Russian Priorities in Latin America," Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no20-understanding-russian-priorities-latin-america

For Russia, the key value of Latin America and the Caribbean is its geographical proximity to the United States. In the eyes of the Kremlin, it is Washington’s “near abroad.”  Moscow believes that its own “near abroad,” the territory of the former Soviet Union, to be a region where Russia’s interests must be taken into consideration by all other states. The Russian government further believes that the United States consistently ignores Russian interests, and for this reason Russia must amplify its presence in Latin America in response. As early as 1997, the then-Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, while visiting Latin America, reportedly said that if Russia maintains a presence in the region, it might help Russia deal with the West in Russia’s neighboring territories.[[vi]](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no20-understanding-russian-priorities-latin-america#_edn6) This vision was only reinforced in the following years: in 2013, Moscow declared its relations with Latin America were of “strategic” importance.[[vii]](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no20-understanding-russian-priorities-latin-america#_edn7)

During the crisis in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014, Russia displayed hesitation in part because of the presence of the U.S. Navy in the Black Sea and by Washington’s support for Tbilisi and Kyiv. From this perspective, the flashy but brief sword-rattling in South and Central America can be explained as a kind of logic of reciprocity: Moscow first sent its war planes and navy ships to the Western Hemisphere soon after the Russian-Georgian 2008 war, while signs of increased military cooperation with Nicaragua coincided with the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. But the notion of reciprocity in the “U.S. near abroad” extends far beyond the military sphere. Latin America occupies a particular place in the political spectacle underway on Russian television. The extraordinary popularity of Vladimir Putin in Russia stems mainly from a common perception in Russia that he has restored Russia’s role as a world power, with the United States reemerging as Russia’s most important rival. **Russian activities in Latin America provide the Russian mainstream media with opportunities to portray Russia as a rising world power capable of establishing its presence even in the United States’ “backyard.”** The regular visits by Russia’s president and other top officials receive prominent coverage on major Russian TV channels and popular print media. This coverage particularly increased after 2008, when the joint declarations of Russian and Latin American political figures from the ALBA countries, Argentina, and Brazil began to include references to the imperative role Russia will play in constructing a new “just” world political order against the wishes of Washington and America’s allies. With the continuing Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s direct involvement in Syria, Russian government-controlled media now often reports on how Latin American leaders support the Russian position. Other activities that get covered include, but are not limited to, joint celebrations of events such as the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War (a high-level delegation from Moscow took part in the festivities in Cuba), joint opening of memorials to local iconic leaders (such as the Chavez Memorial Museum in Venezuela), or Vladimir Putin and Kristina Fernandez launching Russia Today’s Spanish-language broadcasting as a national public channel in Argentina. When they visit Russia, Latin American heads of state are taken to the Great Patriotic War memorials or are shown paying respect to Russian national traditions (for example, Hugo Chavez was awarded the title of Honorary Cossack). **As a result of the efforts by the Russian media, today the Russian general public is much better aware of Latin America and its importance for Russia than in the recent past: According to Russian surveys asking to name nations friendly to Russia, not a single Latin American nation was listed in 2006; by 2008 several started to appear**; and, by 2016, Cuba, Venezuela, and Brazil made it to the top 10 list of countries friendliest to Russia.[[viii]](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no20-understanding-russian-priorities-latin-america#_edn8)

#### Latin American relations vulnerable due to Trump era trade policy.

The Financial Times Editorial Board 6-8-2022, "The US’s lack of ambition risks losing Latin America," No Publication, https://www.ft.com/content/5e579b12-e0c1-41c0-8600-ae394ef48c8f

The United States this week hosts a summit of leaders from across the Americas for the first time in 28 years. What should be a golden opportunity for Washington to show leadership risks instead highlighting the decline of US influence close to home. The president of Mexico, the most important US ally and its biggest regional trading partner, will not attend the summit. Andrés Manuel López Obrador ruled out going after Washington refused to invite the leaders of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela because they were not democracies. Honduras and Bolivia also shunned the summit over the selective guest list. The presidents of El Salvador and Guatemala, both smarting from US criticism, appeared unlikely to go. Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro only agreed to show up after extracting the promise of a first bilateral meeting with Joe Biden. Caribbean nations successfully lobbied to stop the US from inviting Venezuela’s opposition chief Juan Guaidó. The squabbling is unfortunate because **Latin America matters. A major fuel and food producer, the region could help fill the gap in global supply left by the war in Ukraine and the boycott of Russia**. Latin America has the world’s biggest reserves of lithium and is rich in other metals. It has excellent locations for generating wind and solar power. Less happily, it is also the source of most of the world’s cocaine. When Bill Clinton convened the inaugural Summit of the Americas in 1994, he did not need to cajole presidents into coming. On offer was a bold initiative: the promise of a free trade area stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. Those negotiations ended in failure but the idea remains a high water mark for US ambition in the region. Judged against that yardstick, this week’s promised offerings look meagre. Washington is touting a “partnership for economic prosperity”, a migration declaration and the promise of $300mn in assistance. These are poor substitutes for ambitious trade deals and major infrastructure investment, which could transform Latin America’s growth prospects and stimulate US companies to relocate manufacturing closer to home. The no-shows from Mexico and Central America and the non-invitation of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela are particularly awkward for the migration declaration. It will not bear the signatures of the presidents of countries behind the biggest increase in illegal US border crossings in two decades**. The Biden administration’s aversion to new trade treaties has robbed it of what should be a trump card. Ecuador and Uruguay’s pro-US governments are among those frustrated at the difficulty of engaging Washington to negotiate on commerce and investment. There have been other disappointments. Little has been done to change the Trump-era punishment policies which have failed to bring democracy to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua.**

#### Latin America key to solve sanctions

Alvarado ‘22 (Gabriel Alvarado, nonresident senior fellow, Atlantic Council, “Upcoming Summit Could Begin to Heal US-Latin America Ties,” Magazine, issue, 06/23/22, https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/97873-us-passes-bills-to-foreground-national-cybersecurity)-KN

The Biden administration should use the Summit to describe the region’s importance to key White House priorities, from Build Back Better to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, including strategic competition with Beijing and the recently unveiled Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. U.S. officials have indicated that they intend to discuss issues related to the Framework at the Summit. But they should also explicitly invite Latin American countries to participate in it, following the precedent of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which includes Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Canada. U.S. officials should come prepared to explain how Latin American can help counter Chinese and Russian efforts to upend international norms and promote authoritarian practices. As part of this, they should describe and explicitly criticize China’s support for Russia’s Ukraine invasion to counter propaganda and false messaging from Beijing and Moscow.

The Biden administration, which recently designated Colombia a major non-NATO ally along with Brazil and Argentina, should invite more Latin American partners to cooperate with the alliance. Here again, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Beijing’s support would be a timely topic of discussion. One specific area of cooperation might be migration—NATO is currently dealing with the forced displacement of Ukrainians, while Latin America faces similar challenges, such as the massive displacement of Venezuelans, largely to Colombia. Another useful topic to discuss would be alternative sources of critical goods. Brazil,for example, has been reluctant to punish Moscow with sanctions because its food supply depends on Russian fertilizer.

Still another would be safeguarding data networks. The Clean Network provides a helpful framework, which a few Latin American countries—Brazil, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic—have already signed on to.By highlighting the hemisphere’s importance to global challenges, the White House would signal that it is prioritizing ties with its neighbors—and not solely to advance U.S. interests. Acknowledging the extra-hemispheric dynamics that compound regional challenges is important, but rather than harp on the risks of engagement with China, Washington should propose better alternatives, framing them in terms of advancing the region’s security and economic interests.

### Sanctions

#### Sanctions effective – they create internal pressure for Putin to change behavior.

Elizabeth Goitein and Benjamin Waldman 4-11-2022, "How the Russia Sanctions Work and What Congress Needs to Know," Brennan Center for Justice, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/how-russia-sanctions-work-and-what-congress-needs-know

The Biden admin­is­tra­tion [prom­ised](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/02/28/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-on-new-economic-restrictive-measures-on-russia/) in late Febru­ary that Russi­a’s economy will “go[] back­wards as long as Pres­id­ent Putin decides to go forward with his inva­sion.” The threat of wide­spread finan­cial distress was borne out imme­di­ately after insti­tu­tional block­ades and asset freezes took effect. The ruble lost [almost half](https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/russians-line-banks-prices-rise-sanctions-83153869) of its value, spur­ring the cent­ral bank to [double its key interest rate](https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=12730), imple­ment draconian restric­tions on capital conver­sion, and [shut­ter](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-04/russia-keeps-stock-trading-closed-in-nation-s-longest-shutdown) the stock market [for nearly a month](https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/russian-stocks-slide-trading-resumes-companies-83718331). It was as if more than $300 billion in cent­ral-bank reserves had [evap­or­ated overnight](https://thehill.com/policy/finance/596144-unprecedented-western-sanctions-strangling-russian-economy), limit­ing Putin’s abil­ity to weather the effects of sanc­tions. Soon, one senior Amer­ican offi­cial [sugges­ted](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/02/28/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-on-new-economic-restrictive-measures-on-russia/), we will “see infla­tion spike and economic activ­ity contract.” Expert assess­ments are sober­ing: Russi­a’s GDP will [shrink](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-11/two-weeks-into-war-russian-economy-rarely-fared-worse-than-now) 9% in 2022, its debt has been [down­graded](https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/sp-drags-russias-rating-deeper-into-junk-territory-2022-03-03/) to “junk,” and a default may be [immin­ent](https://www.marketwatch.com/story/russia-will-likely-default-with-april-4-payment-due-of-2-2-billion-experts-say-01648317115). Total finan­cial collapse, however, is less certain. Under­stand­ing that the United States and its allies retain a weighty interest in Russian energy produc­tion, OFAC [exemp­ted](https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl8.pdf) [trans­ac­tions](https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl8a_1.pdf) “related to energy” from the [lion’s share](https://slate.com/business/2022/02/biden-left-a-giant-loophole-in-his-sanctions-against-russias.html) of its sanc­tions pack­age. Bipar­tisan push­back led the admin­is­tra­tion to ban imports of Russian oil and natural gas, but whether this meas­ure will choke “[the main artery of Russi­a’s economy](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/08/remarks-by-president-biden-announcing-u-s-ban-on-imports-of-russian-oil-liquefied-natural-gas-and-coal/)” remains unclear. As OFAC [conceded](https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1010), Russi­a’s energy sector remains relat­ively unen­cumbered, partic­u­larly since European nations have been [mostly](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/mar/25/biden-and-eu-agree-landmark-gas-deal-to-break-kremlin-hold) [unable](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/eu-tighten-sanctions-russian-oil-companies-stops-short-import-ban-source-2022-03-14/) to follow Biden’s lead. That means — [at least in theory](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-russian-central-bank-is-running-out-of-options) — Putin can still rely on [some west­ern finan­cing](https://twitter.com/HannoLustig/status/1501229193073655811) to [prolong](https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-93-russias-720m-per-day?s=r) his war posture. Moreover, Russia has found recept­ive trad­ing part­ners beyond the West. India, for instance, has begun snap­ping up [discoun­ted oil](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60783874), thereby extend­ing Russi­a’s economic viab­il­ity.

In the mean­time, ordin­ary Russi­ans will exper­i­ence the sharp sting of sanc­tions. Fear that the ruble will collapse has already precip­it­ated a race to with­draw depos­its, draw­ing [long lines](https://twitter.com/cwmiii3/status/1498259073892069382) across the coun­try; restric­tions on consumer banks have left trav­el­ers [stran­ded](https://www.npr.org/2022/03/02/1083694848/sanctions-russia-ukraine-economy-war) abroad, their credit cards worth­less; [PayPal](https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-consumers-cut-off-from-many-foreign-purchases-11646154897) no longer processes trans­ac­tions in Russia, cutting freel­an­cers off from their incomes; and export controls have contrib­uted to soar­ing prices of [consumer goods](https://www.npr.org/2022/03/02/1083694848/sanctions-russia-ukraine-economy-war), commen­cing a vicious cycle of price-gouging. Secret­ary of State Antony Blinken expli­citly [acknow­ledged](https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-15/) this dynamic: “We regret that tens of millions of Russi­ans will suffer because of the danger­ous decisions made by a tiny circle of corrupt lead­ers.”

To its credit, OFAC has issued general licenses for human­it­arian aid. It has author­ized the oper­a­tion of [certain nonprofits](https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl5.pdf), includ­ing the Inter­na­tional Commit­tee of the Red Cross, and approved the [limited](https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl6.pdf) [flow](https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl6a.pdf) of agri­cul­tural commod­it­ies and medi­cine. Never­the­less, as experts have observed [time](https://www.justsecurity.org/78785/the-biden-administrations-disappointing-sanctions-report-what-should-come-next/) and [again](https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing/), sanc­tions nomin­ally targeted at govern­ing elites often exact the most severe toll on the people most atten­u­ated from govern­mental decision-making. These sanc­tions on Russia — issued in response to brazen viol­a­tions of inter­na­tional law — will likely be no excep­tion. Indeed, that might be the point. Rather than an unin­ten­ded byproduct of sanc­tions aimed at govern­ment actors, mass hard­ship might repres­ent an inten­ded “[vector of influ­ence](https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-west-economic-war-plan-against-putin-sanction-ukraine-russia-banks-oil-gas-ruble-central-11647032502)” to Putin. Declin­ing stand­ards of living in Russia could gener­ate a groundswell of popu­lar [pres­sure](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/us/politics/russia-sanctions-ukraine.html), force Putin’s atten­tion inward, and [sap](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-02-28/new-russian-sanctions-playbook) the energy and resources required for war. This is “sanc­tions from the bottom up,” and it appears to be a larger part of the United States’ play­book with each passing day. Biden’s advisors had previ­ously disclaimed “even the appear­ance of target­ing” ordin­ary Russi­ans. Testi­fy­ing about the meas­ures imposed on Russia follow­ing its inva­sion of Crimea, Daleep Singh, now a core member of Biden’s economic team, [stressed](https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Singh%20Testimony%209-12-18.pdf) the import­ance of “limit[ing] unwanted spillovers” and “avoid[ing] caus­ing wide­spread panic and impov­er­ish­ment among the general public.” But speak­ing from the White House podium last month, Singh took a conspicu­ously [differ­ent tack](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2022/02/24/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-deputy-national-security-advisor-for-international-economics-and-deputy-nec-director-daleep-singh-february-24-2022/): “any leader, whether you’re an auto­crat or a small-‘d’ demo­crat, has to pay atten­tion to the living stand­ards of your coun­try. And already, we’re seeing the effects of these meas­ures.” It is clear that spillover effects will not be limited to the Russian people. The uncer­tainty induced by war and the shock of sanc­tions have already [driven](https://time.com/6155581/russia-sanctions-global-economic-impact/) a global surge in oil and gas prices, [raised](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/01/business/economy/russia-ukraine-sanctions-economy.html) the cost of some grains and metals, and [dimin­ished](https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/global-economic-impact-of-sanctions-on-russia.html) supply-chain capa­city for crit­ical commod­it­ies. Amer­ican famil­ies will likely continue to notice higher prices at the gas pump and the grocery store, despite Biden’s efforts to [blunt](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-emergency-sale-30-million-barrels-crude-oil-strategic-petroleum-reserve) market disrup­tions. In the longer term, sanc­tions might fuel infla­tion and [curtail](https://time.com/6155581/russia-sanctions-global-economic-impact/) economic growth across the United States and Europe. The contours of sanc­tions’ second-order effects are, as always, [unpre­dict­able](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/29/us/politics/russia-sanctions-economy.html), but global rever­ber­a­tions are all but certain.

#### Even if sanctions aren’t effective in general, they can be effective on Russia.

Brian O’Toole and Daniel Fried 6-24-2022, "Sanctioning Russia is a long game. Here’s how to win.," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sanctioning-russia-is-a-long-game-heres-how-to-win/

As the G7 considers these crucial near-term policy actions, it will also need to consider how to keep the pressure on Russia now that the initial flurry of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given way to what will likely be a longer war—and an even longer effort to isolate and weaken Putin and his regime. An effective policy is one that ramps up pressure on Moscow while deepening its political isolation, highlighting Russian atrocities in Ukraine. Here are several additional measures policymakers should consider along those lines:

1. **Restrict additional Russian exports.**After oil and gas, major [Russian exports include](https://www.worldstopexports.com/russias-top-10-exports/) gems, gold, and other precious metals; iron and steel products; aluminum; and wood. The EU has already imposed restrictions on many of these; the United States should follow suit. Both the United States and the EU, as well as the United Kingdom, could also use sanctions (some of which are already imposed) to target Russian shipping and insurance sectors and thwart Russian efforts to redirect exports otherwise intended for the United States or Europe. Market impact, however, may augur against action targeting big Russian companies, such as Rusal, that have dominant global positions—since sanctions would likely cause further inflation or supply-chain disruptions.
2. **Extend export controls and bans on products and technologies to Russia.**One of the more impactful economic steps taken in the initial package of post-invasion measures was the Biden administration’s use of the Foreign Direct Product Rule to ban exports of semiconductors to Russia that are based on US parts, technology, or licensing. That amounted to an effective ban and has had a negative impact on Russian production of automobiles, tanks, and other sophisticated manufactured products. It will take some effort to properly enforce this ban over time, since the Russians will seek to circumvent it. The United States, EU, United Kingdom, and G7 partners should additionally seek to identify other niche export bans to continue pressuring Russian manufacturing. To institutionalize export controls, the United States should also reestablish the Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, which proved effective in planning and executing export controls on the Soviet Union.
3. **Step up enforcement against sanctions evasion.**The massive sanctions imposed on Russia since February 24 will inspire massive efforts at evasion. The Russian government, Russian companies, and sanctioned individuals already [appear to be considering](https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/commodities/russian-exports-commodities-traders-dubai-switzerland-sanctions-ukraine-moscow-war-2022-6) using non-EU countries, such as Turkey and Middle East nations, to establish sanctions-evasion operations or otherwise provide “material support” for sanctioned persons (a step that would leave a “material supporter” vulnerable to their own sanctions). Such actions could include helping sanctioned Russian banks raise capital, supporting sanctioned individuals (even those in Putin’s inner circle), or helping Russia evade the EU’s oil restrictions. China, however, may be taking earlier US cautions seriously and, according to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, has [not yet engaged in sanctions evasion](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/white-house-says-china-has-not-crossed-lines-russia-beijing-offers-closer-ties) on Russia’s behalf. But this will bear continued scrutiny and warnings to governments considering assisting Russia in sanctions evasion, steps that Biden administration sources tell us they are already starting to take.
4. **Impose additional corporate and individual sanctions.**The EU, United States, and United Kingdom have continued to impose full blocking or other sanctions against Russian banks and companies, including Russian oligarchs. These should continue with an emphasis on quality, not quantity, when it comes to individual sanctions; it is best to target those close to Putin and his circle rather than impose individual sanctions by the thousands. This means continuing to expose Putin’s wallets and agents, such as Yevgeny Prigozhin, believed to be the financier for key Kremlin operations such as the Internet Research Agency troll farm and the Wagner mercenary group. While Russian businesses and businessmen may not hold much sway over Putin’s decision making, freezing yachts and million-dollar properties is an important symbol in the pressure campaign against Russia—and an easier success story to explain than more complicated, even if strategic, economic measures.
5. **Institute transparency standards for doing business with Russia.** The United States, United Kingdom, and EU, possibly in concert with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, could develop transparency standards with respect to doing business with Russia, including disclosure standards for investments, trade, and ownership. This could include disclosure of Western business relations with Russian firms, equity holdings in Russian companies, and Russian equity holdings in Western companies; and an inventory of Russian investment, both direct and indirect, in Western countries. The Trump administration did the much-needed work to provide additional transparency and power to regulate foreign investment in the United States; a similar effort to address US investment abroad would be welcome. Transparency could prevent situations in which Russia gained control over key European or US economic assets or industries. (The Stanford University-led Russian sanctions working group, an informal set of experts from the United States and Europe led by former US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, has been working on such ideas.)

Taken together, the economic steps suggested above amount to a shift from the frantic, though understandable, post-invasion ratcheting up of pressure to a mature punishment regime that seeks to isolate the Russian economy for as long as Russia remains an aggressor nation. While Putin remains Russia’s leader, Moscow’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and other G7 governments will likely remain hostile. This state of affairs will resemble the Cold War isolation of the Soviet Union, pre-détente. Also as in the Cold War, Russia [will not be isolated](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/24/business/russia-oil-china-india-ukraine-war.html) from China or from many countries in the Global South. While this continues to dishearten many supporters of Ukraine, they should also remember: Such relations did not help the Soviet Union in the end.

#### Sanctions are key to keep Russia at bay

**Treisman ‘22**, [Rachel Treisman is a writer and editor for the Morning Edition live blog, which she helped launch in early 2021. Treisman previously covered business at the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and evaluated the credibility of digital news sites for the startup NewsGuard Technologies, which aims to fight misinformation and promote media literacy] "How sanctions factor into negotiations between Russia and Ukraine ," NPR.org, [https://www.npr.org/2022/03/30/1089630996/russia-sanctions 3-30-2022](https://www.npr.org/2022/03/30/1089630996/russia-sanctions%203-30-2022) --AL

Zarate says sanctions could play two important roles in the ongoing peace talks. For one, they help shape how Russia feels the costs of its actions, something he says should play into the calculus of negotiators at the bargaining table. In other words, he says, they should understand that things are only going to get worse for Russia as its economy continues to feel the effects of sanctions. The conversation could also come to include the lifting of certain sanctions, such as restrictions on trade or investment. "Every sanction that is used as a stick can also be used as a carrot," Zarate says, adding that he has seen this in the case of Iran and other countries that are seeking to get out from under the pressure of economic sanctions. Zarate says a "classic dilemma" with the application of sanction is that if you're putting maximum pressure on an economy, you're ultimately harming ordinary people and their ability to operate commercially. "Whether or not the regime leadership feels it directly, or whether or not they even care about the effects on their population is a different question," he said, pointing to examples like Iraq's Saddam Hussein and the Castros in Cuba. Zarate says the sanctions targeting Russian oligarchs have been a way to try to get at Putin's assets. He sees them as an attempt to (at least psychologically ) impact Putin's level of comfort and warn him that the international community won't let him rest — even if the Russian people are bearing that cost.

#### **Sanctions necessary to respond to Russia; they solve for the Ukraine food crisis**

Ukrinform ’22 (Ukrinform, “G7 should strengthen sanctions against Russia after missile strikes on Kyiv - Yermak,” Ukrinform, 6/26/22, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3515583-g7-should-strengthen-sanctions-against-russia-after-missile-strikes-on-kyiv-yermak.html)

The head of the President's Office, Andriy Yermak, has said that sanctions against Russia should be tougher, with the need to include a gas embargo in the new EU sanctions package. He wrote this on Telegram, Ukrinform reports. "The G7 summit **must respond to Russia'**s strikes on Kyiv. **Sanctions should be more aggressive**. An embargo on gold exports is good, but a gas embargo is needed in the new EU sanctions package," Yermak said. In his opinion, military **convoys** to **unblock Ukrainian ports** should be the **answer** to the **food crisis** orchestrated by Russia. "**Recognition of Russia as a sponsor of terrorism is very necessary**," he said. He also reiterated that Ukraine needs more heavy weapons. "More heavy weapons for Ukraine is the way to victory over an enemy who understands only force," Yermak said. Early on Sunday, June 26, several explosions rocked Ukraine's capital Kyiv, with one missile hitting a nine-storey residential building in the Shevchenkivskyi district, partially destroying the 7th, 8th and 9th floors. A three-day summit of the Group of Seven countries began in the Bavarian Alps on Sunday, with world leaders expected to discuss critical global challenges largely caused by Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine. In addition to the heads of state and government of Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy and Japan, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel are taking part in the summit.

#### **Sanctions were heavily influential on Russia’s economy and it will continue to decline**

Bellaware ’22 (Kim Bellaware, Kim Bellware covers national and breaking news for The Washington Post. She previously worked for the Chicago-based civic journalism lab City Bureau, The Huffington Post and as a freelancer for the New York Times, Rolling Stone, Vice News and other outlets, “Sanctions may help shrink Russian economy by up to 15 percent, Blinken says,” The Washington Post, June 26, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/26/russia-ukraine-war-putin-news-live-updates/)

**Russia’s econ**omy is **predicted to slow between 8 and 15 percent** next year **amid new sanctions** by the United States and other Group of Seven members, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Sunday. In the four months since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has **faced mounting econ**omic **pressure from sanctions** by Ukraine’s Western allies. Several North American and European countries have banned Russian oil and energy imports; Russian banks have been blocked from accessing the SWIFT international payment system, effectively cutting off Russia from global banking; and international companies have pulled out of the country. On Sunday, G-7 members announced that they would ban imports of Russian gold, denying President Vladimir Putin the revenue he needs to fund the war against Ukraine. Penalties for the Kremlin could amount to tens of billions of dollars, President Biden tweeted Sunday morning. Blinken, speaking Sunday on CNN’s “State of the Union,” said the sanctions are having a “dramatic” effect. “Well, first, let’s take gold, the thing that we’re just announcing. That is the second-most-lucrative export that Russia has after energy. It’s about $19 billion a year. And most of that is within the G-7 countries,” he said. Blinken added that **Russia cannot capitalize on higher oil prices because of export control**s, **deny**ing it a way to **modernize its defense sector, technology and energy exploration**. Those sectors, he said, **will continue to decline**. “Already, we’re seeing predictions that the Russian economy will shrink by 8 to 15 percent next year,” Blinken said. “**The ruble is** being **propped up artificially, at great expense**.”

#### More Russia sanctions incoming

Reuters 22 “France's Macron Not Ruling Out More Russia Sanctions”https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-05-31/frances-macron-says-not-excluding-anything-about-additional-eu-sanctions-against-russia-going-forward May 31, 2022

PARIS (Reuters) -French President Emmanuel Macron said on Tuesday that, following a sixth European Union **package of sanctions against Russia**, nothing could be ruled out in terms of additional sanctions in the coming weeks. Speaking to reporters following an EU summit in Brussels, he also said he hoped that in the next days and weeks agreement could be reached with Russia to allow more exports of food from Ukraine. He said recent talks on the matter between the Russian and Turkish presidents had produced "positive conclusions". "I hope that the next few days or weeks will make it possible to resolve this situation," Macron added. During his last conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Macron said he had made an offer to offered to Putin to draft a U.N. Security Council resolution providing a framework for the release of grain from Ukraine's blocked seaports.

#### Sanctions are Affecting Russia more than expected

**Guardian, 6-11-2022,** "Sanctions are hitting hard enough to hurt Russia, if not stop it," <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/jun/11/sanctions-are-hitting-hard-enough-to-hurt-russia-if-not-stop-it> --MV

Sanctions have affected many aspects of life in Russia, but one particular shortage has sent the wealthy elite into a spin: beauty clinics are running out of Botox. The business daily newspaper Kommersant reported this month that Botox imports saw a threefold drop to 74,500 units in the period between January and March compared with the same time last year, after one western manufacturer stopped exporting to Russia. While the beauty industry is a small cog in the machine, the decision by western allies to sever financial and trade ties with Russia has plunged the country’s economy into a deep recession, with the OECD forecasting a 10% contraction this year and a fall of more than 4% in 2023. Sanctions have not halted the military assault, but some are now asking whether a promise to lift them could bring Russia to the negotiating table: a return to global markets, in exchange for peace in Ukraine. The British foreign secretary, Liz Truss, held out such a prospect in March, when she suggested Britain could lift sanctions if Russia commits to a full ceasefire and withdrawal, with a promise of “no further aggression”. Some of the allies have closer links to Russia than others. Last week, Germany’s former premier Angela Merkel defended her decision to increase trade links with Russia, and Germany’s reliance on Russian hydrocarbons, after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. “It is a great tragedy that it didn’t work, but I don’t blame myself for trying,” she said. But Tim Ash, a Russia expert at the Chatham House thinktank, says Germany underestimated Putin for a long time. He says sanctions, which should have been tougher in response to Crimea, are working and should remain in place. “The sanctions have exceeded most people’s expectations and they have exceeded Putin’s as well,” he says. “The self-sanctioning by the likes of McDonald’s has also hit the Russian economy, with around 1,000 major businesses pulling out of the country when they didn’t need to. They weren’t on any sanctions list.” Output in industries from aviation to automotive has crashed. In May, the number of cars sold across Russia tumbled by 83% from the previous month, to 24,000. Rewind to May 2021 and monthly sales were nearer 150,000. Likewise, Russian plane makers are in a fix now that US, Japanese, EU and UK sanctions have blockaded the industry.

#### Aff Key to Supporting Sacntions

Analysis **By, 6-6-2022**, "Analysis," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/sanctions-fatigue-is-next-obstacle-inconfronting-putin/2022/06/06/563f798a-e556-11ec-a422-11bbb91db30b_story.html> --MV

The momentum behind Western sanctions against Vladimir Putin is flagging. Even as the European Union toasts its toughest restrictions yet against the Russian war machine — including a partial ban on oil imports — concessions are mounting, from exempting pipeline crude to removing Putin’s favorite cleric from the sanctions list. Hungary’s Viktor Orban, an admirer of Putin, is clearly playing a big role in splintering the united front. But the risk of fatigue and waning morale goes well beyond Budapest. The cost of hitting Putin where it hurts — energy — is preying on many leaders’ minds at a time of high inflation and economic slowdown, as is the grim sight of Russia’s advance regaining momentum after 100 days of fighting. Along with differences of opinion percolating inside and outside the EU over what an endgame might look like, this doesn’t bode well for the near term. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, who now must reassemble her governing coalition after its collapse last week, is keen to keep tightening the screws on Moscow. But she acknowledges everything will get more “difficult” from here — with little chance of a gas embargo in the next raft of restrictions. It’s time for a different approach — or a “pause,” as Kallas’ Belgian counterpart, Alexander De Croo, puts it. There’s no easy fix for sanctions fatigue. The “financial weapon” is an imperfect tool that is prone to patchy enforcement and unintended consequences. The unprecedented scale of sanctions against Putin’s inner circle, as well as Russia’s financial system, airlines and trade, will contribute to an estimated 10% decline in Russian gross domestic product this year. But it has not deterred or dislodged Putin. Worse, there have also been some counterproductive effects. The rising price of energy has lined Putin’s pockets while impoverishing importers. Russia’s oil-and-gas revenue will be about $285 billion this year, according to Bloomberg Economics estimates. Throw in other commodities, and that more than offsets $300 billion in Russian foreign reserves frozen as part of the sanctions. And while seizing the yachts and villas of wealthy oligarchs feels good, it’s jarring to see Western firms leaving Russia sell assets to those billionaires who are effectively too big to be sanctioned. Even if the long-term answer here will be to go harder and faster against Russia, it will be vital to shore up economic defenses at home first. Barclays Plc estimates a full embargo on Russian natural gas may reduce euro-area GDP by 4% compared to a baseline scenario; without extra economic support for households, the rhetoric of Orban — who tastelessly compares energy sanctions to an economic “nuclear bomb” — will spread. Already, a YouGov survey from April found European public opinion somewhat conflicted: More than 30% of respondents in seven countries including Spain and Italy advocated investing in trade and diplomacy with Russia, rather than defense and security. Without light at the end of the economic tunnel, the public mood might turn. If this war drags on and becomes a test of morale, the West and the EU have the advantage in terms of resources and human capital, as Miguel Otero Iglesias of the Elcano Royal Institute has noted. But that comes with a need to protect the most vulnerable in society; fiscal support should be “inevitable,” he rightly adds. Pandemic-style support measures should inspire Europe’s next policy steps, whether via the joint borrowing structure of the EU’s recovery fund or “SURE” loans offered to member states to protect employment. Unity really will be strength at a time of rising interest rates and fragile public finances — especially as Putin starts to throttle gas supplies to countries that don’t play by his rules. It is easy to assume, as some have, that the dividing line in this conflict is between those who want to accommodate Putin and those who are on Ukraine’s side. This is neither accurate nor helpful. The journey of Italy is especially instructive: Before Putin’s invasion, Mario Draghi was mulling deeper gas ties with Russia. He has since supported an oil ban and backed sending heavy weapons to Ukraine despite domestic political resistance.

#### The US and UK have no intention to stop sanctions

**Reuters, 6-21-2022,** "UK says it will impose further sanctions on Russia," https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-impose-more-sanctions-russia-foreign-secretary-says-2022-06-21/

LONDON, June 21 (Reuters) - The British government is determined to impose further sanctions on Russia and will continue to do so until Moscow fully withdraws from Ukraine, foreign minister Liz Truss said on Tuesday. "We are determined to provide more weapons, impose more sanctions and back Ukraine in pushing Russia out of their territory," Truss told parliament. Truss said she would be travelling to Turkey on Wednesday to discuss options to help get grain out of Odesa, saying that there was only a matter of weeks to find a solution. Britain, the United States and the European Union have coordinated in imposing massive sanctions on Moscow for what they call an invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has termed it a military operation. "We will continue to impose sanctions, we will continue to stop importing goods from Russia until we see Russia fully withdraw from Ukraine," Truss said. Britain has targeted Russian business

### Poland

#### Holding the line against Russia is imperative. Russian perception of success is a risk in and of itself.

Pavel, Engelke, Cimmino ‘22 (Berry Pavel, senior vice president and director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, Peter Engelke, a deputy director and senior fellow within the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security as well as a nonresident senior fellow with the Global Energy Center, Jeffrey Cimmino, associate director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Four ways the war in Ukraine might end,” blog, issue, 03/01/22, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-ways-the-war-in-ukraine-might-end/>) – KN

The most dangerous scenario for the future of Europe and the global order is one in which the Ukraine conflict sets the stage for a direct military conflict between NATO and Russia. There are multiple pathways toward such an outcome, including:

NATO could decide to escalate its involvement in Ukraine by, for example, attempting to implement a no-fly zone or another form of direct intervention. For now, the United States and other NATO allies have rejected implementing a no-fly zone—but that calculus could change if Russia continues to escalate its bombardment of civilians. Russia would be forced to decide whether to back down or directly engage alliance military forces. If it chooses the latter, the risk of an escalating armed conflict between NATO and Russia would increase substantially.

Russia could inadvertently strike a NATO member’s territory—for example, through imprecise targeting or erroneous identification of friend and foe—prompting countermeasures from the alliance. (Russia already has attacked targets close to the Polish border.) As the Russian military’s stock of precision-guided munitions starts to dwindle, the risk of such an accident leading to an inadvertent escalation with NATO rises. This scenario would see the beginnings of direct conflict, perhaps air-to-air or air-to-ground, in border regions of Ukraine. In turn, this could set off a tit-for-tat cycle of strike and counterstrike leading to open hostilities.

A fearful prospect concerns the possibility that Putin has broader designs well beyond Ukraine. If Russian forces make rapid progress in Ukraine and achieve effective control over the country, Putin may turn his attention to states that he covets as part of a desire to reconstitute a sphere of influence that broadly aligns with the territory of the former Soviet Union. The obvious candidates to test his designs, and the resolve of NATO itself, would be the Baltic states (all of which are members of the Alliance). Putin might harbor a belief that NATO will back down if pushed; NATO insists it will fight any Russian military incursion on a member state.

#### Signaling is an independent deterrent to Russia

**Grady 22** John Grady U.S., NATO in for a ‘Long Haul’ Conflict with Russia, Says Polish PM John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of communications for the Association of the United States Army. His reporting on national defense and national security has appeared on Breaking Defense, GovExec.com, NextGov.com, DefenseOne.com, Government Executive and USNI News.https://news.usni.org/2022/05/17/u-s-nato-in-for-a-long-haul-conflict-with-russia-says-polish-pm May 17, 2022 4:39 PM

Morawiecki praised the United States for its “stepped-up presence” on NATO’s eastern flank to signal to Russia that the alliance is serious about defense. Mark Brzezinski, American ambassador to Poland, said that in Warsaw, there are now 12,600 American soldiers on Polish bases. Either arriving with them or coming soon are M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters. “We are being tested, and Poland is under threat,” he said when explaining the reasoning behind the U.S. troop levels there. Former ambassador to Poland, Daniel Fried, said, “we don’t know who will win” in Ukraine, but the Ukrainians “have a reasonable chance of success.” He said **the West has to keep the pressure on Moscow**. “We can’t screw this up.” Brzezinski added that the movement of so many U.S. forces and so much equipment eastward from the U.S. and other bases in Europe “allow[s] NATO to stand firm.” He said the American build-up and similar moves by the United Kingdom further underscore Washington’s and London’s commitment to the alliance. “Sanctions will not stop Russia today,” Katarzyna Pisarska, chair of the Warsaw Security Forum, added. “But we need more of them” to weaken Putin, his coterie and the nation’s economy over time. Europeans also need to become more energy independent from Moscow to cripple Putin’s ability to wage war by cutting off revenues from his largest source of foreign revenue, said Georgette Mossbacher, who also served as an ambassador to Poland. By building liquified natural gas terminals and exploring nuclear energy, Mossbacher said Warsaw took these steps when Moscow seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Foreign energy sales provided revenue for 36 percent of Russia’s released 2022 budget, according to a Reuters report from earlier this year. Pisarska said the Russian leader has been steering his country into “self-isolation” since 2008 to consolidate power. A large part of self-isolation is playing out in domestic propaganda to build support for the regime’s war, which it calls a “special military operation,” and in other propaganda denigrating Ukraine, Poland and other eastern and central European nations as ruled by Nazis. The unrelenting stream of stories and postings on these points also makes the Russian audience more accepting of crimes and atrocities committed by its soldiers, she added. For years, the Russian public has been fed a steady diet that “mass genocide has been carried out in Donbas” by the Ukrainians. Days before the invasion, Putin recognized two provinces in Donbas, where there are large numbers of Russian speakers, as independent of Kyiv. Separatists in the two provinces, backed by the Kremlin, have been engaged in a civil war with the Ukraine government for eight years. The secretary general of the United Nations said Russia’s claim violated Ukraine’s sovereignty and integrity as a nation. When the disinformation and propaganda turn outward, Pisarska said it plays on nationalist feelings that oppose allowing more Ukrainian refugees to enter Poland and other NATO and European Union countries. “You see that in the comment lines” on social media, and this digital campaign “never stops,” despite constant monitoring by social media firms, said Marta Poslad, director of central and eastern European public policy for Google. “The technology is constantly changing,” and that makes removing hated-filled disinformation even more difficult, she added. Despite the Russian propaganda aimed at Poland’s nationalists, Brzezinski called Warsaw “a humanitarian superpower.” He cited citizens driving to the border to greet and help refugees and others opening their doors to house them as examples of how ordinary Poles have responded to the invasion. Rafal Trzaskowski, Warsaw’s mayor, estimated that the Polish capital was now housing 300,000 Ukrainian refugees.NATO and **the** **West must be “in the fight for the long haul**” **economically, diplomatically and militarily in supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression,** Poland’s prime minister said Tuesday. Although drawing the line at direct military confrontation, Mateusz Morawiecki, in prepared remarks delivered by a Polish chancellery official at the Atlantic Council, said, “it’s up to us to win the battle” of protecting Ukrainian sovereignty and blunting possible Kremlin moves against alliance members. “**Ukraine is fighting this war not only for its security but ours**.” He said the Feb. 24 invasion “**turns out to be a wake-up call” to all of Europe about President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions in eastern and central Europe**. In response to the invasion, the prime minister added, “we, the Europeans, have to step up our defense spending.” Poland already meets the NATO threshold of spending 2 percent of its gross domestic product on security. In light of the war in Ukraine, Warsaw intends to raise that percentage in coming years.

#### Article V doesn’t check Russia mistargeting

El-bawab ‘22 (Nadine El-bawab, I am a Northeastern University graduate with dual Bachelor of Arts in Journalism and Political Science with a concentration in International Relations and Diplomacy. I am fluent in both English and Arabic, I lived in Egypt for 9 years and currently live in Boston, MA, “Article Title,” ABC News, March 1, 2022, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/natos-article-pull-us-allies-russia-ukraine-conflict/story?id=83108600>)

President Joe Biden repeatedly has said the United States will not be sending troops to fight Russia in Ukraine, but vowed that the U.S. would defend its NATO allies. "As I made crystal clear, the United States will defend every inch of NATO territory with the full force of American power," he reiterated in an address Thursday. The main goal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's founding in 1949 was to foster mutual assistance in response to the Soviet Union's expansion in Europe. A key component of the treaty, Article 5, covers "collective defense," which means that an attack on one ally is considered an attack on all allies. Amid the current crisis, **Article 5 could mandate a more direct response** from the U.S. and other treaty members if Russian aggression escalates beyond Ukraine. NATO announced last week it launched its response force, a deployment of about 40,000 troops to provide land, air and naval assistance across the alliance. This is the first time the force has been deployed for a "deterrence and defence role," a NATO spokesperson said. Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, told ABC News it is possible Article 5 could be invoked while the U.S. and its allies are providing military aid to Ukraine. “Let's say that Russia succeeds in toppling the government. And it then tries to occupy and pacify Ukraine. Assuming that the **U.S.** **and** its **allies attempt to get arms to a Ukrainian resistance** movement, there's a not in**significant risk that Russia might try to interdict that flow**. And that whether by design or by accident, an **artillery** shell or a missile or a bomb **could land in Poland or another NATO country**,” Kupchan said. “And then we're looking at **the prospect of an attack on NATO territory and the potential trigger of the Article Five collective defense guarantee**, which then **raises** the prospect of **potential military conflict between NATO and Russia**,” Kupchan said. All participating countries agree to the form of solidarity outlined in the article, making it a key component of the alliance. While Ukraine is not a member of NATO, it borders Poland, Hungry, Slovakia and Romania, which are members. Ukraine has been moving toward the West and away from Russia, attempting to join both NATO and the European Union. Kupchan said its geographical location could be strategic during this conflict. “In the current moment, Ukraine's border with four NATO countries affords it two important advantages,” Kupchan said. “One is refugees are able to seek asylum in NATO countries, and we're seeing hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians head west. And the other is that now that Ukraine's airspace is … dominated by Russia, the long border between Ukraine and NATO affords an opportunity to continue to funnel weapons and other sources of support to Ukraine." The first time Article 5 was invoked was after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The alliance had already identified terrorism as a risk affecting its security in 1999. In response to the attack, NATO engaged in the fight against terrorism, launching its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area to patrol the skies over the U.S. In 2008, NATO appeared to open the door for Ukraine's membership saying it would become a member of the alliance, despite a lack of consensus between members, Kupchan said. NATO did not specify a pathway or timeframe for Ukraine to join the alliance. “In 2008, the Bush administration wanted to proceed with what's called a Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia. And European partners were reluctant, in part because neither Ukraine nor Georgia was ready to join NATO and because of concern that NATO's enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine would be seen as provocative in Russia,” Kupchan said. “Given the lack of consensus within NATO, the alliance agreed to issue a generic statement that Georgia and Ukraine would become NATO members, but didn’t specify a timeframe or a pathway,” Kupchan said. Russian President Vladimir Putin linked the current crisis to Russia's NATO demands, including a guarantee that NATO will stop expanding to the East, in a video address days before Russia invaded Ukraine. **Putin accused** the **U.S. and NATO of ignoring his demands and blamed the West for the Ukraine crisis**. "[Putin] has **said explicitly** that he **wants to see NATO's military presence** [**reduced**] **in the eastern flank** and that would include the three Baltic countries, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, " Kupchan said. "He wants to see NATO pull its capability back." "One of the tragic dimensions of this conflict is that the **Russians knew full well, that Ukrainian membership in NATO was not under consideration**. It was not on the table. And NATO governments were quite explicit about that. Nonetheless, Putin decided to invade the country," Kupchan said. Its unlikely Putin would launch an attack on a NATO ally because he would be looking at a "full-scale war," he said. "My guess is that he understands that this is a non-starter," Kupchan said. In addition to NATO's deployment of its response force, it also said it was deploying a quick response brigade of 3,500 troops that could deploy on short notice while the larger unit gathers its troops from various member nations. "**Our measures are and remain preventive, proportionate and non-escalatory**," a statement from NATO said last week. Kupchan said it is still **unclear how far** west **Russia will go** into Ukraine. "It's conceivable that there could be a rump in Ukraine that Russia does not try to grab hold of and Western Ukraine has generally been much more integrated into Europe, than into Russia," Kupchan said.

### Solvency

#### Cooperating with Nato can effectively address solve cognitive warfare with Russia and China

Mclinnis and Starling ‘21(Kathleen J. McInnis, a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security's Transatlantic Security Initiative, Clementine G. Starling, the deputy director of Forward Defense and resident fellow of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council “The Case for a Comprehensive Approach 2.0: How NATO Can Combat Chinese and Russian Political Warfare,” report, issue, 06/01/21, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NATO-Comprehensive-Approach-Report-2021_final.pdf>) – KN

While tensions flare up at times, NATO’s success has been its flexibility and adaptability to meet both emerging security challenges as well as the political demands of its members and partners. Now is a critical time, once again, for NATO to answer the call, in this instance by embracing and acting upon its important role in countering nonmilitary coercion strategies. Traditional and nontraditional security, economics, trade, diplomacy, and emerging technologies can no longer be considered discretely, nor can the interrelationships be ignored to satisfy preferences for bureaucratic stovepiping. As a matter of urgency, NATO must help its member states and partners grapple with how to think about authoritarian coercion strategies and develop holistic responses to them. Failure to do so risks the possibility of the international system, upon which NATO allies rely, being hollowed out from within—commercially, technologically, socially, or otherwise—and allies being unable to either defend themselves or contribute to the common defense. Responding to political warfare is arguably the most important geopolitical challenge of our time. NATO can, and must, help address it.

The concept of conducting synchronized activities short of overt warfare to achieve strategic ends has subsequently been expressed by policy makers through terms such as “gray zone competition” and “comprehensive coercion.” Hybrid warfare is conceptually distinct but related to political warfare and authoritarian coercion as it describes the application of these hostile activities and strategies across the conflict spectrum during times of war and peace. Political warfare refers to these coercive activities outside the context of overt hostilities. In the strategic calculations of both Moscow and Beijing, political warfare appears to be a critical—if not decisive—line of effort in hybrid warfare campaigns. NATO’s work to date on hybrid warfare—coordinating with the European Union (EU) and other partners and providing support to NATO allies on critical areas upon request—represents crucially important steps in the right direction. Further, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) counters disinformation and propaganda every day. Still, by framing NATO’s response as one of hybrid warfare, its conceptual strength may also be a fundamental limitation.

Crucially, because of the interplay between external and domestic threats to regime survival, the activities of Beijing and Moscow are best conceived as part of concerted, comprehensive, whole-of-society strategies to weaken adversaries and undermine many of the key institutions of the liberal international order. As Mahnken, Babbage, and Yoshihara argue: “These authoritarian states practice a form of political warfare that is notable in three respects. First, due to their long history of using political warfare to consolidate and maintain Communist Party control during the 20th century, Moscow and Beijing continue to lean heavily on influence campaigns and view them as a core element of their competitive toolkit. Second, because these regimes remain deeply insecure and fearful of both internal challengers and external threats, they often eschew restraint and conduct a particularly aggressive form of political warfare. Lastly, thanks to their centralized governments, Russia and China enjoy a significant unity of effort and can engage in highly coordinated whole-of-nation campaigns to manipulate public opinion and political debate. Considering the inherent vulnerabilities of open democratic societies and decentralized governments against which these efforts are utilized, these attributes make comprehensive coercion an especially appealing strategy for authoritarian nations.

#### NATO needs to seriously consider and study A.I in order to tackle the new technology. NATO-wide integration is key.

KASAPOĞLU and KIRDEMIR 28 November 2019 CAN KASAPOĞLU, BARIŞ KIRDEMIR As the AI revolution and accompanying technologies are transforming geopolitical competition, NATO should address internal and external disparities in AI capabilities. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/artificial-intelligence-and-future-of-conflict-pub-80421

NATO would benefit from initiatives to prepare for, govern, and regulate AI-related policy priorities. From developing capabilities to building consensus on the challenges mentioned above, **NATO needs new mechanisms to tackle emerging threats** and continuously adapt to the dynamism of AI-led developments Comprehensive collective initiatives are known to be effective in the cybersecurity field. The alliance should establish an AI task force to review policies and strategic issues. On the policy level, NATO should initiate a **continuous and meaningful conversation among decisionmakers, industry, civil society, and the scientific research community.** The alliance has a long way to go in developing algorithmic warfare capabilities and adopting an AI-enabled C4ISR structure.14 Because most innovations in AI and robotics come from outside the military-industrial complex, some studies have encouraged the alliance to cooperate closely with big tech or develop ties with promising start-ups.15The interdisciplinary conversation needs to go beyond tech companies. AI and other modern disruptive technologies relate to a multitude of scientific fields, from computer science to behavioral biology, neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, robotics, nanotechnology, and many others. **NATO nations have relied on these scientific communities** to lead AI innovations. However, the level of **integration** of these sectors is still significantly **below** what is required, in part because of a populist backlash against experts among parts of the political class. The transatlantic community needs to build a culture to overcome such **communication issues** and ensure a continuous conversation. NATO must test its social-cognitive and digital-security vulnerabilities systematically. Ideally, red teaming—in which a group adopts an adversarial point of view to challenge an organization to improve its effectiveness or detect a major weakness—and experimentation efforts should cover both allied exercises and more isolated, peacetime activities to test defenses in national security apparatuses. Inputs from the interdisciplinary and multisectoral conversation, as well as continuous exercises, may provide significant information for new concepts. A new international and interdisciplinary research center, as an analytical hub and in the form of a center of excellence, would enable effective solutions for all the challenges mentioned above. The proposed institution would blend the high-level techno-scientific outputs of existing NATO bodies, such as the Science and Technology Organization, the Innovation Hub, and centers of excellence with state-of-the-art scientific contributions from member states and in-house experts.

#### Without NATO-level response, disinformation responses are patchwork and ineffective.

**McInnis Starling 21** [Kathleen J. McInnis is an author and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. From 2006 to 2009, she served in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, working primarily on NATO’s Afghanistan operations. Prior to that, she was a research consultant at Chatham House in London, where she worked on NATO and transatlantic security matters. McInnis also served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), working NATO-Afghanistan matters and stability operations capability development. Prior to joining the Pentagon, McInnis spent several years at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzing US nuclear weapons strategy, strategic capabilities, NATO, European security, and transatlantic relations. Before joining CSIS, she was a researcher in the United Kingdom’s House of Commons, working on NATO, the European Union, and US-UK political-military relations Clementine G. Starling is the deputy director of Forward Defense and resident fellow of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. In her role, she oversees the initiative’s programming and research and leads on the defense policy and European security practice areas. Her own research focuses on great-power competition with China and Russia, deterrence and US force posture, and transatlantic security. During her time at the Atlantic Council, Starling has produced and contributed to reports on Russia’s nuclear strategy, space security, military mobility, political warfare, Europe-China relations, and the US-UK relationship. Starling’s analysis has been featured in a range of publications, and she has provided commentary for NPR, the BBC, and ABC News, among others. Within the Transatlantic Security Initiative team, she played a leading role in managing NATO’s official public diplomacy efforts (“NATO Engages”) around the Alliance’s 2019 London Leaders’ Meeting and other summits. Starling was also the 2020 Security and Defense fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP). Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Starling worked in the UK Parliament with the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, providing analysis on UK defense, Middle East security, and technology. Originally from the United Kingdom, she also worked for the Britain Stronger in Europe (BREMAIN) campaign. She graduated with honors from the London School of Economics with a Bachelor of Science in international relations and historyhttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/NATO-Comprehensive-Approach-Report-2021\_final.pdf]

**One of the dominant challenges of contemporary statecraft is the “cylinders of excellence” problem: the stovepiping of key policies, activities**, and even worldviews by bureaucracies that, practically speaking, limits the ability of nations to design and implement holistic strategies to address current and emerging threats.12 To date, **NATO allies and partners have generally muddled through on countering political warfare with discrete efforts to identify and counter disinformation, improve cyber defenses, and sanction Russia and other actors in response to below-threshold attacks**. **Yet, these counterefforts have been mixed in terms of effectiveness, scope of response, and the actors involved**. China and Russia’s authoritarian political warfare campaigns are neither siloed, piecemeal, nor singular in nature. **Accordingly, these challenges demand a much more robust and comprehensive approach from NATO allies and—crucially—they require a reimagined response that better incorporates external partners** (including partner states, multilateral organizations, civil society, and private sector actors). Ultimately, political warfare is a matter that NATO allies and partners must attend to with more urgency and intentionality lest they be at risk of becoming the orb spider: having mindlessly, inadvertently contributed to the design of a world that is no longer compatible with transatlantic security and the democratic values and freedoms that are central to our way of life. This paper argues that **NATO has both a designated strategic role to play due to its mandate in the 1949 Washington Treaty, and an operational-level toolkit to utilize,** when it comes to developing and implementing an urgently needed Comprehensive Approach to countering authoritarian political warfare.13 Political warfare can be difficult to pinpoint, as both malign and non-malign activities can be blended together as part of an ultimately coercive influence campaign. Political warfare is, therefore, most readily discerned at the strategic level, where a clearer picture of overall behaviors and trends can be aggregated and analyzed—a task that NATO headquarters is well positioned to take on. NATO convenes not only heads of state and government, military leaders, and ministers of defense, but also ministers of foreign affairs and others civilian leaders 13 This paper uses the terms political warfare, authoritarian political warfare, coercion, and authoritarian coercion interchangeably. The key difference this paper highlights is the distinction between hybrid and political warfare/coercion. Parsing these terms from the overall conceptual umbrella of “hybrid warfare” enables an analysis of what, specifically, NATO might do to counter the political warfare components of hybrid warfare. on a regular basis. With multiple divisions and directorates, NATO headquarters has the ability to engage with outside actors, including nongovernment actors and civil society**. NATO has the platform to further dialogue and coordinate action among multiple stakeholders in a way that is necessary to spur cross-national and multinational counter-political warfare efforts in the transatlantic community. For NATO to get a handle on countering political warfare, it can also benefit from its various partnership frameworks to learn from and employ the capabilities of partner nations and nongovernment actors**. Partners like Finland and Sweden have often led the way on countering political warfare nationally, while partners like Georgia and Ukraine have much experience to share. Civil society and commercial actors also have a part to play in any proposed counterstrategies and in developing potential solutions. A whole-of-system approach is required to combat whole-ofsystem attacks. NATO is well positioned to help build that holistic approach and it should do so with greater urgency.

#### AI capacity building key

Slapakova, Linda 29 March 2021 "Towards an AI-Based Counter-Disinformation Framework," No Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/03/towards-an-ai-based-counter-disinformation-framework.html

The myriad opportunities for leveraging AI to counter disinformation may require stakeholders to consider actions for addressing the above-described challenges and barriers through regulatory, technology-oriented, and capacity-building measures. There are three key priorities towards which these measures could be oriented: **Government stakeholders could engage with platforms and technology developers to prioritise technology development towards strengthening the ability of AI models to recognise contextual nuance in social media discourse and adapt more rapidly to recognise novel pieces of disinformation.** As RAND Europe's previous research highlighted, [linguistic stance technologies](https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/using-machine-learning-to-detect-malign-information-efforts.html) can provide significant opportunities in this context through enhancing AI-based detection models by analysing potential false or misleading information in the context of the wider rhetorical battlefields of social media discourse. **The development of new technical, AI-based approaches for countering disinformation could be sufficiently 'future proof' in considering the potential impacts of an AI-based counter-disinformation framework on digital human rights such as freedom of expression online. It could also regard the adoption of AI as an enabler of a more comprehensive response to disinformation, rather than an isolated, overly technology-centric solution**. **Future efforts could therefore also focus on fostering societal resilience to information threats through**[**digital literacy**](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA112-12.html)**.** This could include strengthening the understanding of social media users of the potential impacts of technologies such as AI on social media content and strengthening their ability to recognise malign information while engaging in informed discourse with others. The integration of AI in counter-disinformation frameworks could go hand in hand with comprehensive organisational capacity-building. The adoption of more [shallow but interpretable](https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/using-machine-learning-to-detect-malign-information-efforts.html) models can, for example, foster institutional capacity for using AI-based disinformation detection models. Beyond detection, institutions particularly in the public sector might explore specialised AI training for technical personnel to be able to leverage innovative AI-based solutions for countering disinformation.

## 2AC China Trade-Off

#### NATO is pivoting toward checking China AI now.

**Gallo ‘22**, [William Gallo is the VOA Seoul bureau chief and regional correspondent.] "Why NATO’s China Focus May Endure," VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/why-nato-s-china-focus-may-endure/6631280.html> 6-24-2022 --AL

Europe’s growing skepticism of China can also be observed in NATO’s recent history. In 2019, China was included for the first time in a NATO statement – but only in a single sentence saying Beijing “presents both opportunities and challenges.” By 2021, NATO’s tone had shifted. A joint communique issued in Brussels said China presents “systemic challenges to the rules-based international order.” The statement also slammed China’s “coercive” policies, “opaque” military modernization, use of “disinformation,” and military exercises with Russia in the Euro-Atlantic area. A major reason for NATO’s more combative tone is the Ukraine war, which coincided with Beijing and Moscow declaring a “no limits” partnership. Just weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Beijing, where they announced a broad plan to counter Western influence around the world. Since Russia’s invasion, China has attempted to portray itself as a neutral party. But many European observers are not convinced, noting China has consistently defended Russia from global criticism and instead blamed Washington for engaging in a "Cold War mindset" that provoked Moscow. Pierre Morcos, a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the Ukraine conflict has “confirmed the growing strategic rapprochement between China and Russia.” “The war in Ukraine has also demonstrated that the Euro-Atlantic area and the Indo-Pacific region are deeply inter-connected. A crisis in a region can have deep impacts on the other one,” he said. That explains why like-minded Asian countries are eager to play an active role in supporting Ukraine and pushing back against Russia, Morcos said. “I think that we will see growing coordination and consultations between NATO and these countries in the future notably to discuss the aftershocks of the war in Ukraine but also exchange about China’s capacities and activities,” he added. Speaking at a forum earlier this week, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg insisted the alliance does not regard China as an adversary. However, he suggested the coming summit would result in a statement acknowledging “China poses some challenges to our values, to our interests, [and] to our security.” China has responded angrily to NATO’s eastward focus. At a Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry briefing Thursday, spokesperson Wang Wenbin accused NATO of engaging in a “highly dangerous” effort to create hostile blocs in Asia. “NATO has already disrupted stability in Europe,” he said. “It should not try to do the same to the Asia-Pacific and the whole world.”

#### Link turn - China developing cognitive warfare now with the intention to control the highest decision-makers’ will.

**Takagi, ‘21**, [Koichiro Takagi is a visiting fellow with Hudson Institute’s Japan Chair. His research areas include future warfare, cognitive warfare, and the relationship between emerging technologies and operational concepts. Mr. Takagi is a former deputy chief, Defense Operation Section] "New Tech, New Concepts: China’s Plans for AI and Cognitive Warfare," No Publication, <https://www.hudson.org/research/17882-new-tech-new-concepts-china-s-plans-for-ai-and-cognitive-warfare--> AL

The United States and its allies may have built the Maginot Line of the information age. But just as the German armored units broke through the Ardennes Forest in ways the French did not expect, so the Chinese People’s Liberation Army may break through the United States’ information-age arsenal, no matter how cutting-edge, if the technology remains tied to the operational concepts of a previous era. China is developing a new concept of warfare, which they call intelligentized warfare (智能化战争). First mentioned by the government in 2019, it is an innovative military concept with a focus on human cognition, which Beijing intends to use to bring Taiwan under its control without waging conventional warfare. However, only a few of the many studies on intelligentized warfare have focused on this aspect of human cognition. Chinese thinkers have clearly stated that the core operational concept of intelligentized warfare is to directly control the enemy’s will. The idea is to use AI to directly control the will of the highest decision-makers, including the president, members of Congress, and combatant commanders, as well as citizens. “Intelligence dominance” or “control of the brain” will become new areas of the struggle for control in intelligentized warfare, putting AI to a very different use than most American and allied discussions have envisioned. This article analyzes the essence of China’s intelligentized warfare, its possibilities, and limitations, and suggests measures that the United States and its allies should take.

#### Link turn – U.S. and allied AI capabilities key to forecasting China offensive.

**Takagi, ‘21**, [Koichiro Takagi is a visiting fellow with Hudson Institute’s Japan Chair. His research areas include future warfare, cognitive warfare, and the relationship between emerging technologies and operational concepts. Mr. Takagi is a former deputy chief, Defense Operation Section] "New Tech, New Concepts: China’s Plans for AI and Cognitive Warfare," No Publication, <https://www.hudson.org/research/17882-new-tech-new-concepts-china-s-plans-for-ai-and-cognitive-warfare--> AL

The United States and its allies should analyze intelligentized warfare more to avoid surprise attacks in future wars. They should also designate the cognitive arena as a new operational arena, along with land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace, to raise awareness and invest resources. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider how to win the “battle of narratives” to counter the manipulation of public opinion in wartime. Future warfare comes from innovative theory and cannot be derived from existing weapons. In the 1920s, when Germany developed the concept of blitzkrieg warfare, the country did not have any tanks, as the Treaty of Versailles banned them. Even in 1939, when Germany led the blitzkrieg, less than 10 percent of the German troops were armored forces. Most of China’s colossal military still has outdated equipment, and only a tiny percentage of its troops have modern intelligence equipment. The vision of future warfare lies not in existing equipment, but in military thought. The United States and its allies have to evaluate hypotheses about the future, rigorously and effectively. Regardless of whether China’s intelligentized warfare succeeds or not, it is important to pay attention to the cognitive domain in warfare and consider the means to win in it. The idea of directly influencing human cognition is not new, but with the development of AI, it may be more feasible. Intelligentized warfare uses AI to intimidate the enemy’s decision-makers and manipulate public opinion. Dealing with the direct manipulation of public opinion requires a complex operation. There are many studies about the manipulation of public opinion by China and Russia in peacetime, but there have been few analyses on wartime efforts. In warfare, both sides will use their own narratives. For example, in the case of the Taiwan-China conflict, the Chinese narrative will be something like, “These are China’s domestic problems that other countries should not be involved in.” In contrast, the narrative of the United States and its allies will likely be about the defense of democratic society. Many sub-narratives will support these narratives. There will be a battle of the narratives to determine which narratives will penetrate and gain support in the international community. China’s intelligentized warfare is a far cry from the information age wars that have been waged in the past and is not simply the use of AI or unmanned weapons systems in warfare. Its feasibility is unknown and may have been overestimated, out of political necessity. But with its goals of influencing human cognition directly and controlling the enemy’s will, it is a revolutionary idea

#### Not unique and only risk of link turn - China is using cognitive warfare now on Taiwan

**Huang ‘21**, "China Using ‘Cognitive Warfare’ Against Taiwan, Observers Say," VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_china-using-cognitive-warfare-against-taiwan-observers-say/6200837.html>, 1-17-2021 --AL

A Taipei think tank and observers in Taiwan say China is trying to influence residents with “cognitive warfare,” hoping to reverse opposition to Beijing’s desired takeover of Taiwan so it can be accomplished without having to go to war. Taiwanese attitudes have been drifting away from the mainland, especially among the younger generation, whose members see themselves “born independent” with no ties to China. China’s effort, these analysts say, includes tactics ranging from military intimidation and propaganda to misinformation spread by its army of online trolls in a bid to manipulate public opinion. They say the complexity and frequency of the effort puts Taiwan on a constant defensive. “Its ultimate goal is to control what’s between the ears. That is, your brain or how you think, which [Beijing] hopes leads to a change of behavior,” Tzeng Yi-suo, director of the cybersecurity division at the government-funded Institute of National Defense and Security Research in Taipei, told VOA. Cognitive warfare is a fairly new term, but the concept has been around for decades. China has never stopped trying to deter the island’s separatists, according to Tzeng, who wrote about the Chinese efforts last month in the institute’s annual report on China’s political and military development. Liberal democracies such as Taiwan, that ensure the free flow of information, are vulnerable to cognitive attacks by China, while China’s tightly controlled media and internet environment makes it difficult for democracies to counterattack, according to Tzeng. China’s campaign has intensified since the outbreak of COVID-19, using official means such as flying military jets over Taiwan, and unofficial channels such as news outlets, social media and hackers to spread misinformation. The effort is aimed at dissuading Taiwan from pursuing actions contrary to Beijing’s interests, the report said. China has used these tactics to attack Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, undermine support for democracy and fuel Taiwan’s social tensions and political divide, it said. The South China Situation Probing Initiative, for example, a project run by Najing University in China, has disseminated information about Chinese military activities in the region through its Twitter account, but some of the posts have been found to be false, apparently aimed at intimidating Taiwan's public and weakening Tsai’s Democratic Progressive Party government’s resolve, according to the report. Tzeng said China’s efforts didn't work in Taiwan’s presidential election last January, when Tsai won a landslide victory. The island’s growing anti-China sentiments – seem further strengthened by disapproval of China’s brutal suppression of pro-democracy Hong Kong protests. China “set out to [actively] promote the island’s reunification with the mainland, its identity as ethnic Chinese or favorable views toward the CCP [Chinese Communist Party]. But now all it can hope for is to curb Taiwan’s [growing] pro-independence sentiments” – a trend Beijing has found it difficult to contain, he said. Tzeng added that he believes China is biding its time and experimenting with new tactics, which it hopes will succeed in influencing the island’s future elections. For example, the report said that China’s Communist Party is believed to have played a role in hacking Tsai’s office in May to discredit her. Reporters covering her office at the time claimed to have received minutes of internal meetings from an anonymous email account, which accused the president of corruption. Tsai's administration responded by saying that the documents had been doctored and contained fabricated content. Taiwan should, Tzeng said, stay alert and establish a comprehensive fact-checking system to prevent fake news and misinformation from subverting public opinion. Taiwan should also “work with regional and global liberal democracies to establish a common defense mechanism” as China’s influencing attacks have a global outreach and aren’t limited to Taiwan. They constitute the most serious challenge facing democratic societies today, Tung Li-wen, former head of the ruling DPP’s China affairs department, wrote in a 2019 essay. Chinese citizen journalist and blogger Zhou Shuguang, who now lives in Taiwan, said many Chinese have taken to the internet to spread China’s narrative. Two groups of such online promoters of China’s narrative are known as “Little Pink” and “50 Cent Party,” The groups, he said, have formed China’s sizable army of online trolls to spread fake news, for example, rumors about Tsai’s academic background. Despite repeated clarifications, many kept circling rumors that the president’s 1984 doctorate degree from the London School of Economics was fake. A 2016 study, led by Harvard University data scientist Gary King, found that 50 Cent Party produced 488 million “fake” social media posts a year to distract other internet users from news and online discussions painting the Communist Party in a negative light.

#### US already focused on China – Hot topic at 2022 NATO Summit

Stuart **Lau,, 6-26-2022**, "The G7 conundrum: How hard should you push China in a crisis?," POLITICO, <https://www.politico.eu/article/g7-conundrum-push-china-crisis/> --MV

For China, the main concerns about western countries' pronouncements in the days ahead focus on what's brewing at next week's NATO summit, rather than any tough talk at the G7. For the first time ever, NATO will consider China to be a challenge in its upcoming 10-year blueprint, the Strategic Concept, to be adopted next week. According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the 30 leaders in the military bloc will "address China and the consequences for our security" at the Madrid summit. "I expect that allies will state that China poses some challenges to our values, to our interests or to our security. And this, of course, has an impact also on how NATO should react in a more competitive world," Stoltenberg told POLITICO this week. In a last-minute appeal to head off that kind of designation, Wang Lutong, head of European affairs at China's Foreign Ministry, wrote that China "is not an adversary to NATO and should not be regarded as one. China poses no challenge, and its rise is for delivering better lives to the Chinese people, and has brought economic opportunities to the world, including NATO members." China's close alliance with Russia during the Ukraine war is, however, already posing big questions about how rich Western nations should deal with the broader G20 format, in which high-income nations engage with a broader group representing the wider global economy, including China, Russia, Mexico and Indonesia. Russia's presence has raised the prospect that some Western nations could boycott to avoid being in the same room as Putin. But a senior EU official said that the a widening divide between the G7 nations and developing economies made the G20 all the more important. “The G20 takes on all the more relevance as a bridge to constituents who may not have an identical world view,” the senior official said. "The worst thing we could do is break that format. ... Diplomacy is not about having just cozy chats with your like-minded friends.”

#### US already focused on measures against Chinese AI

Amy **Hudson, 7-13-2021,(** news editor of Air Force Magazine) "DOD's Artificial Intelligence Efforts Gain Momentum as US, Allies, and Partners Look to Counter China," Air Force Magazine, <https://www.airforcemag.com/dods-artificial-intelligence-efforts-gain-momentum-as-us-allies-and-partners-look-to-counter-china/> --MV

The Defense Department’s push to operationalize artificial intelligence, which leaders say will change the way the military conducts war but not the laws of war, is gaining momentum. More than 600 AI efforts are in progress across the department, “significantly more than just a year ago,” Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III told a live audience at The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s Global Emerging Technology Summit in Washington, D.C., on July 13. AI is “one of the top technology priorities” in the department’s $112 billion research, development, test, and evaluation budget request for 2021—the largest RDT&E request ever, he added. “In today’s department, innovation cannot be an afterthought. It is the ballgame,” Austin said. “As President Biden has noted, we’re going to see more technological change in the next 10 years than we saw in the last 50. And we know that some of our competitors think that they see an opening, but we’re determined … to develop and dominate the products and technologies of the future.” All the conference speakers, which included senior members of Congress and the U.S. national security team as well as leaders from India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, NATO, and the European Union, agreed that China is the pacing threat. China already has stated it intends to be globally dominant in AI by 2030. Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, opened the full-day conference with a stark warning: “China has reared a generation of innovative technologists, and let’s not underestimate the enormous skills and talents of the Chinese people,” he said. “In many areas, we’re now seeing Chinese competitors launch both products and new technologies in advance of all Western competitors.” Warner said China is expanding its global influence by offering other authoritarian regimes a chance to monitor dissidents. “China, I believe, is hoping to control the next generation of technological innovation and digital infrastructure and hopes to impose its values on those developments,” Warner said. “All of this again, I think, puts into question principles of transparency, accountability, sovereignty, [and] free, fair, and reciprocal relations.” That’s why the Defense Department is focused on responsible artificial intelligence, which Austin said is the culmination of “cutting-edge technology” and “timeless values.” He emphasized that the U.S. will not choose between the two. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan agreed, saying the U.S. and its allies and partners need to “muster the will, the energy, and the resources to alter the course of the digital revolution.” He outlined three waves to this revolution. The first was based on the premise that technology would favor democracy and human rights, while the second was the authoritarian counter to that revolution. “So, the question before us today is whether we have the will and determination to usher in that third wave of this digital revolution—whether we can reboot and ensure that critical and emerging technologies work for, not against, our democracies and our security,” Sullivan said. “I believe that third wave is within our reach, if across party lines, across the public and private sectors, and across borders to allies and partners, we invest in our enduring advantages, we promote our shared values, we protect our technological ecosystem, and we mobilize and organize the rules of the road for the 21st century with our partners and allies.” Austin said the Defense Department is “working with other like-minded friends to advance global norms grounded in our shared values,” noting DOD leaders meet several times a year with representatives from 15 allied and partner nations on the topic. He said he expects that number to “mushroom, going forward.” Austin said artificial intelligence is a “transformative technology” that will require new processes, policies, and procedures. Last year, DOD adopted ethical principles for AI development and use and in June it announced the creation of the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve, which “helps us get promising tech across the so-called ‘Valley of Death’ and into new prototypes, capabilities, and concepts,” Austin said. The Department also recently launched a new AI and data acceleration initiative aimed at harnessing data at scale and speed. “We’re going to compete to win, but we’re going to do it the right way. We’re not going to cut corners on safety, security, or ethics … We don’t believe for a minute that we have to sacrifice one for the other,” Austin said.

#### US Presence in China not as large as though

Van **Jackson, 10-26-2021**,( senior lecturer in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington,)"America’s Asia Strategy Has Reached a Dead End," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/09/us-southeast-asia-china-biden-economic-strategy-geopolitics/> --MV

In December 2021, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, detailed the shape of U.S. thinking about China and Asia during a conference on Indo-Pacific security. He hit all the familiar notes: the importance of alliances, weapons sales to counter China, the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the optimistic view that Sino-U.S. relations could be at once competitive and stable. In any other era, such talk might have been comfort food for regional experts and policymakers. But absent from Campbell’s remarks at the conference, which was organized by Australia’s Lowy Institute, was any meaningful statement about political economy—the single aspect of statecraft most crucial to the Indo-Pacific region’s stability. It is in this arena of policy that China has done more to displace the United States than in any other, and it remains the glaring hole in Washington’s attempts to craft an Indo-Pacific policy. When pressed on this by his host, Campbell acknowledged that defense initiatives were not enough. But he could mention no concept, policy, or action to suggest economics was anything more than a throwaway gesture in a speech. Grand references to a forthcoming “economic framework” that would be “cutting-edge” lacked all specifics and stated no purpose other than wanting the United States to “design” the region’s standards. To the extent Campbell’s remarks reflect Washington’s view of Asia, they are at once modestly reassuring and highly troubling. Reassuring because Campbell’s bland rhetorical restraint is a refreshing departure from the volatility and pugnaciousness of the Trump administration. Troubling, however, because the ideas powering U.S. President Joe Biden’s Asia policy are as bland as the rhetoric itself. U.S. policy toward the world’s most important region is no more than a mashup of the residual inertia from Trump’s military-first Asia policy with a revival of then-U.S. President Barack Obama’s well-intentioned but ill-fated “pivot to Asia,” which also had a heavily militarized agenda. Consequently, the United States is misallocating its attention and influence relative to what would actually benefit the region most. Economic policy, not defense policy, is the only way to address the interrelated problems of development, pandemic recovery, and adaptation to climate change—issues that plague policymakers throughout Asia and threaten to derail the region’s peace and prosperity. This is precisely the trouble with U.S. engagement in Asia to date: The United States has no economic strategy for the region—at least not since Obama’s ill-fated attempt to negotiate a new U.S.-Asia trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And it is unrealistic to expect any economic strategy beyond the free-trade pabulum so sharply at odds with U.S. domestic political constraints. First, Washington must obviously prioritize economic statecraft and stop thinking with its missiles. It is clear from the way U.S. leaders talk about their country’s role in Asia that trade, aid, finance, and development are not as privileged in their minds as the Pentagon; economic equality outside U.S. borders does not even appear to register as a problem needing attention. If that does not change, the United States will continue to place itself on the wrong side of trends—including defense spending, naval expansion, nuclear modernization, and missile proliferation—that are turning the region into a powder keg, which serves no one except the defense industry. Second, Washington needs an economic policy for Asia—one that tries to do actual good for the region instead of furthering only abstract U.S. interests. And there is much the United States can do to do right by Asia. For instance, U.S. officials could use the United States’ privileged position in the global economy to negotiate various forms of debt relief on behalf of low- and middle-income countries in the region that have been hit particularly hard by the pandemic, such as the Philippines and Malaysia. (The United States did this for Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion.) Washington could also grant these countries preferential trade access, which would be a boon to Asia’s export-dependent economies.

## 2AC Diplomacy CP

#### Diplomatic solution doesn’t work

Snider ‘22 (Ted Snider, a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com, “Is the US hindering much-needed diplomatic efforts?,” report, issue, 04/09/22, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/04/09/is-the-us-hindering-much-needed-diplomatic-efforts/)-KN

Years prior to the war, when diplomatic avenues were open to prevent war, the United States already seemed to be setting up roadblocks.

In 2014, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych was faced with the choice of economic alliance with the European Union or with Russia. In a country that was nearly evenly split, the choice of either partner was divisive and dangerous. But there was a way out of the dilemma: compromise was possible. Ukraine doesn’t have to choose, Putin offered. Both Russia and the EU could work economically with Ukraine.

There didn’t need to be a dangerous dilemma. But Washington and the EU rejected Putin’s peace offering. The late Stephen Cohen, Professor Emeritus of Politics and director of Russian Studies at Princeton, reminded in a 2014 interview that “it was the European Union, backed by Washington, that said in November to the democratically elected president of a profoundly divided country, Ukraine, ‘You must choose between Europe and Russia.’” There was a diplomatic solution to the catalyst of today’s crisis. The U.S. rejected it. That rejection led to the coup that led to the civil war between Western Ukraine and the Donbas region in the east and set the stage for the current crisis.In 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky was elected on a platform that featured making peace with Russia and signing the Minsk Agreement. The Minsk Agreement offered autonomy to the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of the Donbas that had voted for independence from Ukraine after the coup. It offered the most promising diplomatic solution.

Facing domestic pressure, though, Zelensky would need U.S. support. He did not get it and, in the words of Richard Sakwa, Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent, he was “thwarted by the nationalists.” Zelensky stepped off the road of diplomacy and refused to talk to the leaders of the Donbas and implement the Minsk Agreements. Having failed to support Zelensky on a diplomatic solution with Russia, Washington then failed to pressure him to return to the implementation of the Minsk Agreement. Sakwa told this writer that, “as for Minsk, neither the U.S. nor the EU put serious pressure on Kyiv to fulfill its part of the agreement.” Though the U.S. officially endorsed Minsk, Anatol Lieven, senior research fellow on Russia and Europe at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told this writer, “they did nothing to push Ukraine into actually implementing it.”The Ukrainians gave Zelensky a mandate for a diplomatic solution. Washington did not support or encourage it.

Having inhibited diplomatic solutions prior to the war, the United States has been absent from negotiations since the invasion last month. The empty U.S. seat at the table is striking. Sakwa said that, “in the Cold War the U.S. would have taken the lead on diplomacy in a situation of the sort that we have today. Instead, now the U.S. is clearly not interested in peace negotiations — it is waiting for a Russian defeat, however many Ukrainian lives are lost in the process.”

In the direct talks between Russia and Ukraine, and even in the Turkish mediated talks, the United States seems invisible. Ambassador Chas Freeman, who served 30 years as a U.S. diplomat, told me that “it is the opposite of statecraft and diplomacy that the U.S. is not involved in any negotiations.”

#### Non Unique – The DoS already has engagement

Sanger ‘22 (David E. Sanger, Davide E. Sanger is a White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer. In a 38-year reporting career for The New York Times, he has been on three teams that have won Pulitzer Prizes, most recently in 2017 for international reporting. His newest book, “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age,’’ and an HBO documentary by the same title, examine the emergence of cyberconflict and its role in changing the nature of global power, “U.S. Sends Top Security Official to Help NATO Brace for Russian Cyberattacks,” New York Times, Feb 1, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/01/us/politics/russia-ukraine-cybersecurity-nato.html)

**The White House dispatched** its **top cybersecurity official to NATO** on Tuesday in what it described as a mission to prepare allies to deter, and perhaps disrupt, Russian cyberattacks on Ukraine, and to brace for the possibility that sanctions on Moscow could lead to a wave of retaliatory cyberattacks on Europe and the United States. The visit by the official, **Anne Neuberger**, the deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, underscored recent intelligence assessments that an invasion of Ukraine would almost certainly be preceded by renewed cyberattacks on Ukraine’s electric grid, its communications systems and its government ministries. All of those systems have been Russian targets in the past six years. Ukraine has often been President Vladimir V. Putin’s testing ground for Russia’s arsenal of cyberweapons. “We have been warning for weeks and months, both publicly and privately, that cyberattacks could be part of a broad-based Russian effort to destabilize and further invade Ukraine,” the White House said in a statement announcing Ms. Neuberger’s arrival at NATO headquarters in Brussels. After speaking with the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s main policy body, she will go on to Poland, where she will meet with Baltic officials responsible for cyberdefense. Ms. Neuberger will tell NATO members that over the last few years they have **witnessed** a lot of **cyberskirmishes**, but no cyberwar. She will say, according to a White House statement, “that the kinds of disruptive or destructive cyberactions possible during a conflict **are different in scope, kind and sophistication from** the types of incidents we have seen during **peacetime**.” In January, hackers brought down dozens of government websites in Ukraine, and Microsoft warned that it had detected a dangerous form of malware in government and private computer networks in the country. The U.S. government has been quietly sending teams into Ukraine in recent weeks to help shore up the country’s defenses, and it is preparing to do the same with NATO countries on the alliance’s eastern flank. But those experts are reporting back to Washington that there is **relatively little they can do** to fundamentally harden Ukraine’s networks in a few weeks. Ukraine poses some unique cyberdefense challenges. The electric grid is still connected to Russia’s own electric supply network, a huge vulnerability that Ukrainian officials vowed to fix after attacks that turned out the lights in 2015 and 2016. Those incidents were later blamed on Russian hackers, though it was never clear if they were working at the government’s behest. Ukraine is scheduled to conduct some long-planned experiments in coming weeks that involve disconnecting from Russian electric supply networks and linking to other European power grids. But the effort is preliminary, and American officials doubt it will be of much help in any near-term confrontation with Russia. There are also concerns about how easy it would be to shutter the Ukrainian internet and communications throughout the country. A blog post this week from the Atlantic Council noted that by slicing a single undersea cable in the Kerch Strait that was installed in 2014 by Russia’s state-owned telecommunications company, Russia could disrupt much of Ukraine’s internet traffic — but at the cost of also cutting off Crimea and other Russian-speaking territory. “It could create panic in the rest of Ukraine and limit the international community’s visibility into further Russian actions,” wrote Justin Sherman, a fellow at the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council. Such an action would echo a move taken by Russia when it annexed Crimea nearly eight years ago and would be “well in line with the Kremlin’s willingness to accept some costs to invade and forcibly exert control over Ukraine.” Many of these scenarios have been mapped out by United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, and they have been part of war game exercises overseen by the White House. Ms. Neuberger’s trip is largely **focused on how to coordinate a NATO response should Russia again attack** parts of the power grid in **Ukraine or take out communications** in an effort to destabilize the government of President Volodymyr Zelensky.

## 2AC Politics

### Non Unique

#### Cybersecurity passage in the squo thumps and is bipartisan popular

Lauver ‘22 (Madeline Lauver, Security magazine in 2021 as its Assistant Editor, “US passes bills to foreground national cybersecurity,” Magazine, issue, 06/23/22, https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/97873-us-passes-bills-to-foreground-national-cybersecurity)-KN

President Biden signed into law the Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program Act of 2021, which establishes a federal rotational cyber workforce program for the federal cyber workforce; and the State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act of 2021, which requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to increase collaboration with state, local, tribal and territorial governments on cybersecurity issues. The Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program Act of 2021 creates a rotating program for cybersecurity and information technology (IT) positions across federal agencies.

"By signing two new bipartisan bills into law, the Biden Administration emphasizes that cybersecurity is a main-stage issue and deserves air time in our crowded political landscape," said Justin Fier, VP of Tactical Risk and Response at Darktrace."These bills mark substantial progress, but no legislation is without faults. While the Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program Act will grant federal cyber professionals valuable transferable skills and diversify their career paths, it also adds to an industry already suffering peak burnout. Hopefully, the focus on interagency collaboration will benefit understaffed cyber departments amidst a globally limited workforce."

The State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act of 2021 will lead to increased collaboration between DHS and state, local, tribal and territorial governments. DHS will conduct tabletop exercises with government organizations, provide cybersecurity training and promote cyber awareness.

"An extension of 'Shields Up,' the State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act will affect U.S. cyber defense more immediately," predicts Fier. "This legislation renews guidance for state and local governments to rely on DHS resources to defend against incoming cyber threats. While some state governments may push back, hoping to keep their resident data decentralized, we will continue to see federal cyber programs trickle down to the state and local levels."

## 2AC Feminist IR

### No solvency

#### Recent literature published about Fem IR is fundamentally flawed by ignoring significant events. This means that the alternative cannot solve the affirmative.

Crilley ‘18 (Rhys Crilley, any qualifications, “International relations in the age of post-truth politics,” March 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Rhys-Crilley-2/publication/323645901\_International\_relations\_in\_the\_age\_of\_%27post-truth%27\_politics/links/5c7d09df299bf1268d36ba2f/International-relations-in-the-age-of-post-truth-politics.pdf)

Undoubtedly, many of these things have played a role in creating the conditions of possibility for the ‘post-truth’ present. Yet while interesting, these authors’ analyses are rendered **problematic by their definition of ‘post-truth’ as something novel and contemporary**. This is not to say that the authors present ahistorical accounts of recent events. Rather, it is to suggest that the **understanding of ‘posttruth’** politics itself—collectively **deemed to be the victory of emotion over reason in contemporary politics and society—is flawed**. This is because there has been **no sudden shift** towards people making decisions and voting with their hearts rather than their heads. **Emotions have always been importan**t in politics, economics and society. Feminists, critical theorists and others outside the mainstream of academic inquiry have argued so for decades.1 What is new is the recognition, both within the study of these respective fields and within wider public discourse, that emotions matter. And it is not that emotions matter at the expense of rationality. Seeing them in opposition to one another is to construct a false dichotomy that ignores the ways in which emotions are pervasive and interlinked with rationality.2 Subsequently, what marks the ‘post-truth’ age is not an actual shift in politics from an age of reason to an age of emotion, but an analytical one whereby the likes of d’Ancona, Ball and Davis—and the popular psychology, economic thinking and political studies that they draw on—have begun to realize that emotions matter. The point is underlined by their engagement with psychology. The dynamics of confirmation bias, the prioritization of an in-group at the expense of an out-group and the notion that humans are more convinced by narratives than by statistics, are important. They are, however, not new. In the social sciences, and indeed in International Relations (IR), many critical theorists, feminists, post-colonial theorists and post-structuralists have highlighted the importance of these phenomena throughout history. While integrating the insights of multiple disciplines into accounts of the political present is important, it also has to be recognized that those insights can help explain the past. Claims about psychology suddenly helping us understand an epochal shift from a world of truth to one of ‘post-truth’ are therefore to be approached with caution. They do not tell us about the specifics of the modern-day moment, but instead they illuminate general tendencies of human psychology. This is not to say that human psychology is universal across time and space, but it is to **point out that what is lacking in the authors’ accounts of psychology as a cause of ‘post-**truth’ politics is a sense of what exactly, if anything**, has recently changed** in **how people think about politics**. If, as Davis asserts, ‘we are willing accomplices to bullshit peddlers’ (p. 158), one is left wondering how, exactly, this is a novel development that has led to a shift towards ‘post-truth’ politics. Ultimately, these concerns create further limitations within these works. The first is an avoidance of contextual specifics when talking about a condition of ‘post-truth’ politics instead of engaging with the complexities of events such as Brexit and the election of Trump. The second is the proclamation that we, collectively, are to blame for buying into ‘post-truth’ politics, rather than fully interrogating how **political actors are at fault for strategically lying and playing on people’s prejudices**. As a consequence, the authors pay scant attention to the role of racism, sexism and xenophobia in ‘post-truth’ politics. Although the suggestions that the new age of ‘post-truth’ politics has been ushered in because of our psychology is unconvincing, the sections of these books that do engage with the historical and contextual specifics leading up to the events they are concerned with are much better. This is where Ostrovsky’s work is strongest. The invention of Russia is a detailed history of the evolution of Russian media after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, and how television has come to be a key tool for the Kremlin. As such, it provides insights into Putin’s approach to television and media coverage, and more specifically into how he has used the media as a scapegoat in the wake of national disasters, such as the sinking of the Kursk submarine. Then, Putin proclaimed to relatives of the dead submariners: ‘Television? They are lying! They are lying! They are lying!’ (p. 299). Ostrovsky also documents how television and the media have come to be interwoven with Russian military activities, labelling the Russian–Georgian conflict of 2008 as ‘Russia’s first fully televised war’ (p. 321). Although the addition of a new preface does attempt to bring the original 2015 book up to date with the current climate of ‘the new Cold War’, the book only touches on certain issues that are worthy of more attention. Ostrovsky suggests that Putin emerged as Russia’s president as a result of the public’s loss of trust in and disillusionment with the pro-western elite in the wake of the 1998 Russian financial crisis and the NATO bombing of Belgrade. He compares these with recent events in the UK and the US, noting that Russia’s turn to Putin was ‘a manifestation of the frustration and distrust of many people with their own establishment’ (p. xviii). This observation is important because it serves to place specific events in context and highlights the role that they, and politics more broadly, have played in causing the emergence of a so-called ‘post-truth’ condition. Ball’s work is at its strongest when discussing how the current media ecology has led to the rise of Trump and Britain’s vote to leave the European Union. He deftly highlights how traditional media business models are failing, and draws attention to how PR companies, tech companies and major news sites all play a role in creating a broken media environment whereby almost everyone profits from ‘outright fake news or articles of very dubious quality’ (p. 212). This culture of sensationalism and a focus on gaining clicks and views, alongside the public’s dissatisfaction with mainstream media reports reflecting the status quo, are indeed important contextual factors that have contributed to Brexit and Trump (Posttruth: how bullshit conquered the world, p. 225). In a similar vein, Davis is right to point to the rise of marketing, PR, spin and disinformation in leading to the events of 2016. Yet there is a tension between his suggestions that there have been ‘genuine changes in the way public discourse was conducted’ (p. xiii) and his claims that a deep-seated culture of bullshit (that is hard to change) led to the ruptures of 2016. Oddly, for a book that draws heavily on insights from different academic fields, the chapter on ‘culture and norms’ does not engage with cultural studies or the study of culture. D’Ancona points out how trust in politicians and the establishment has been undermined by crisis after crisis in prominent public institutions. He suggests that bank bailouts after the financial crisis of 2008, the MPs’ expenses scandal, child sex scandals at the BBC and the phone hacking scandal at the News of the World have led to ‘an age of institutional fragility’ (p. 41) where people no longer trust political, economic and social institutions. These events no doubt played a role in determining how people felt towards, and ultimately bought into, the anti-establishment narratives of the Trump and Brexit movements, and they warrant more discussion than is present in d’Ancona’s book. This is because, like Davis, d’Ancona also struggles when it comes to discussing culture. However, this is not because he ignores theorists of it, but because he dedicates a whole chapter to blaming them for causing the ‘post-truth’ politics of today. The notion that post-modern and post-structural philosophers ‘paved the way for post-truth’ (Post-truth: the new war on truth and how to fight back, p. 96) has become a rather tedious refrain. This argument is based on a caricature of post-structural thought and fails to reflect on the fundamental fact that the likes of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler and Jean Baudrillard are not advocating for politi- cians to lie and play fast and loose with the truth. Rather, what these post-structuralists, and the critical scholars of IR that they influence, are interested in is how truths are mobilized. For example, when Baudrillard was writing about the Gulf War, he was not encouraging politicians and the military to provide a sanitized view of conflict to the media. He was critiquing how such a sanitized media representation of the war led to western audiences failing to fully comprehend the violence taking place in Iraq.3 As such, Baudrillard was challenging politicians’, militaries’ and the media’s deployment of untruths, and was essentially critiquing the ‘post-truth’ view of the Gulf War. In fact, one of the key takeaways from Baudrillard and other post-structural philosophers is that we should always be sceptical of claims made by politicians, the media and businesses—a point that is remarkably similar to d’Ancona’s suggestion that in order to combat ‘post-truth’ politics ‘we must all become editors: sifting, checking, assessing what we read’ (p. 113). Furthermore, the critical ethos presented by post-structuralists, as well as their associated methodological tools of deconstruction and genealogy, can be used to address and challenge the issues most apparent in ‘post-truth’ politics—the lies, xenophobia and misogyny.4 These books also suffer in their tendency to suggest that a collective ‘we’ are to blame for the ‘post-truth’ politics of Brexit and Trump. This argument leads the authors to focus on human psychology and blames us, the public, for the current ills of political discourse. As Davis argues: ‘we live in a post-truth age because significant numbers of gullible people are taken in by fake news and false narratives that are put about by those who play to our disposition to believe’ (p. 125). Indeed, Britain’s vote to leave the EU and the election of Donald Trump would not have happened if people didn’t turn out and vote for them. However, such a view that people did so because they are ‘gullible’ or psychologically disposed to believe bullshit falls short not only because it is perhaps borderline insulting, but also because it lets those who strategically stretched the truth off the hook. Each author does suggest that the events of Brexit and Trump happened because of their respective campaigns and the narratives they strategically deployed—whether that be claims about the UK’s National Health Service spending painted on the side of a big red bus or Trump’s promise to ‘drain the swamp’. However, what would benefit these works is a deeper engagement with the strategies, actions and narratives of these campaigns and how they created the effects they did. It is high time that people stopped suggesting that ‘post-truth’ politics and ‘fake news’ can be explained by broad generalizations about psychology and our propensity to believe lies. Instead, the focus should be on the role of actors who intentionally deceive for political purposes, and the people who have actually been influenced by them. This brings us to the authors’ recommendations about countering ‘post-truth’ politics. Ball provides a detailed range of sensible suggestions for politicians, the media, and for readers and voters. By far his most convincing recommendations concern the media. He argues that media literacy needs to be taught in schools and that politicians should work to bring targeted social media advertising into the public eye. D’Ancona’s claim that tech companies should ‘acknowledge their responsibility as the world’s most powerful distributors of information’ (p. 117), and act on this, is also important. In comparison, Davis’s recommendations seem rather broad, and in suggesting that the media ‘should do its job with the usual rigour and set out the facts as it always would’ (p. 289) he not only provides a rosetinted view of the media (one wonders if he has ever seen a copy of the Daily Mail or watched Fox News), but he also fails to reflect on the role that the media have played in the Brexit and Trump campaigns. Trump simultaneously used the media to great effect in garnering coverage of his campaign while also latching on to people’s anger that the mainstream media failed to reflect their views and life experiences. Herein lie the implications of these works for scholars and practitioners of global politics. The most serious of these include a need to engage with the everyday lived experiences of people, pay greater attention to the role of racism, sexism and xenophobia in global politics and interrogate the role of the media in our analyses—and how this is being transformed by developments of digital technology. For d’Ancona, Ball and Davis, people’s motivations for being antiestablishment are often obscured by generalizable claims about psychology. D’Ancona does highlight how real events such as the financial crisis have led to people losing trust in politicians and public institutions, but more could be said about the importance of Iraq, propaganda and anti-establishment sentiment. One recent study found that in the US, one of the clearest indicators of a community’s support for Trump was the number of people from that community who had died fighting for the US in the ‘war on terror’.5 Studies like this make clear that actual politics—such as the propaganda, decisions and actions of past governments—are implicated in the rise of populist movements. IR as a discipline must place greater focus on understanding the everyday lived experiences of people, and take these as a serious source of inquiry. Such an approach would help to make sense of the actual reasons behind people’s support for Brexit and Trump beyond the generalizations drawn from pop psychology presented in these books. In addition, these books **engage only in a limited way with blatantly important societal ills such as racism, sexism and xenophobia** and their role **in** both **Brexit and the election of Trump**. Research has demonstrated that the most consistent evidence for support of populist movements is cultural values, and that antiimmigrant sentiment as well as right-wing cultural beliefs explain why people support the populism of Trump and Brexit.6 But the authors of these works on ‘post-truth’ barely recognize this, let alone address what can be done about it. Others have been much more attentive to the role that racism and misogyny have played in movements such as the alt-right,7 and it is **imperative that scholars of IR pay greater attention to the insights of scholars working in the areas of postcolonial and feminist theory**. Not only do they help understand how and why racism and sexism serve political interests in the way that they do, but they have also spent decades grappling with many of the issues which seem to be suddenly so important. **The starkest omission from these books on ‘post-truth’ politics is any engagement with gender.** This is rather unforgivable in any work that discusses the election of Donald Trump who, of course, ran against the first female US presidential candidate nominated by a major party, Hillary Clinton. Neither d’Ancona, nor Ball nor Davis explores in detail how sexism and misogyny were at the heart of Trump’s rhetoric and how he was still elected despite being caught on tape bragging about sexual assault. **Scholars of IR should avoid being so gender-blind, and would be wise to place gender at the heart of their analysis of Trump, Brexit and other populist ‘post-truth’ phenomena.** Indeed, if emotion is at the heart of the ‘post-truth’ condition, as d’Ancona, Ball and Davis all suggest, they would do well to remember that ‘feminist scholarship has a very long history with “the emotional”’8 , and is therefore a valuable source of insight. Finally, these works on ‘post-truth’ politics all demonstrate that IR needs to take the media and popular culture seriously. There are well-developed literatures on political communication and on popular culture and world politics, which are perhaps no longer on the margins of IR scholarship. As Ostrovsky makes clear, Trump and Putin have many differences, yet ‘both men are, in their own way, a product of the media rather than of traditional politics, and both are TV personalities’ (p. xviii). This highlights the importance of recognizing how politics is mediatized: a process whereby politicians and institutions increasingly adopt media logics. Furthermore, since the mid-2000s, social media platforms, algorithms and targeted advertising have reconfigured power, legitimacy and authority in global politics and, in the wake of 2016, it is clear that they need to be integrated into our studies. On the whole, the works reviewed here are worth reading. While certain claims—such as the main argument that we have transitioned from an age of reason to an age of emotion—rest on shaky foundations, they are important as they provide an insight into how journalists themselves think about the current ills that face their industry and the world they write about. The books **struggle to articulate both what is novel about the current ‘post-truth’ moment, and what caused it**. D’Ancona’s, Ball’s and Davis’s works would benefit from a more sustained engagement with the contextual histories of the events they purport to cover—as Ostrovsky does. However, Ostrovsky also could benefit from a further interrogation of the political present in Russia and elsewhere. Perhaps it is too harsh to expect these journalistic works to reflect a level of critical engagement one might hope to find in academic inquiry, yet what they lack—such as a sustained discussion of sexism and gender, particularly in the context of Trump’s election victory—is jarring. That said, these books do highlight several important issues IR scholars should take up for further research. Davis and d’Ancona are optimistic about addressing the problems of contemporary politics, suggesting that ‘the truth will out’ (Posttruth: the new war on truth and how to fight back, p. 149) and that ‘good sense normally prevails in the end’ (Post-truth: why we have reached peak bullshit and what we can do about it, p. 302). Such platitudes are misplaced in the face of populism informed by racism and sexism. If, as some suggest, IR and security studies are facing a crisis of ethics, we would be wise to place the ethical imperative of our work on challenging the underlying global social and political ills that make the victories of xenophobes and misogynists possible.